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Abstract
The main research question of this dissertation is whether factors other than labor productivity
can help to explain short-run fluctuations and medium-run trends in unemployment in Austria
respectively Western Continental Europe.
In the part on analyzing short-term-fluctuations I will set up a New Keynesian DSGE model with
a richly specified labor market. This model will be used to compare how different labor market
specifications fit to Austrian quarterly data. Most importantly, the Bayesian model comparison
indicates an important role for nominal wage rigidities and for a timely response of employment
to changes in vacancies. Furthermore, models with consensual determination of working hours
(’efficient bargaining’) tend to perform relatively well. The best model can reproduce the relative
volatility of labor market tightness compared to labor productivity comparatively well. Moreover,
shock decompositions show that fluctuations in Austrian labor market tightness are mainly driven
by demand shocks and to a much smaller extent by productivity shocks.
In the part on explaining medium-term-trends in unemployment I will set up a theoretical model
and demonstrate that certain stylized facts can also be generated by an increase in international
trade (and not only by skill-biased technological change). Furthermore I will show that a differen-
tial response of different industrial economies (’US’ versus ’Continental Europe’) might be due to
characteristics of sectors which are not directly exposed to globalization.
Abstract
Die zentrale Forschungsfrage dieser Dissertation ist, ob andere Faktoren als Entwicklungen in
der Arbeitsproduktivität helfen können, kurzfristige Fluktuationen und mittelfristige Trends der
Arbeitslosenquote in Österreich beziehungsweise Westeuropa zu erklären.
Im Teil über kurzfristige Fluktuationen werde ich ein neukeynesianisches DSGE-Modell aufsetzen,
in dem der Arbeitsmarkt ausführlich spezifiziert wird. Dieses Modell wird dann verwendet,
um unterschiedliche Arbeitsmarktspezifikationen bezüglich ihres Fits mit österreichischen Quar-
talsdaten zu vergleichen. Der bayesianische Modellvergleich zeigt eine große Bedeutung von
nominellen Lohnrigiditäten und von einer schnellen Reaktion der Beschäftigung auf Änderungen
in der Anzahl der offenen Stellen auf. Außerdem werden in den besten Spezifikationen die
Arbeitsstunden konsensual zwischen Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer bestimmt. Das beste Modell
kann die relative Volatilität der inversen Stellenandrangsziffer im Vergleich zur Arbeitsproduktiv-
ität gut reproduzieren. Zudem zeigen Schockzerlegungen an, dass die Fluktuationen der inversen
Stellenandrangsziffer vor allem von Nachfrageschocks generiert werden und Produktivitäts-
schocks eine weitaus geringere Rolle spielen.
Im Teil zur Erklärung mittelfristiger Trends in der Arbeitslosigkeit werde ich ein theoretisches
Modell spezifizieren und damit demonstrieren, dass gewisse stilisierte Fakten auch durch inter-
nationalen Handel (und nicht nur durch verzerrenden technischen Fortschritt) generiert werden
können. Zudem werde ich zeigen, dass die unterschiedliche Reaktion der Arbeitsmärkte ver-
schiedener Volkswirtschaften (’USA’ versus ’Kontinentaleuropa’) auch durch unterschiedliche
Charakteristika jener Sektoren erklärt werden könnten, die der Globalisierung nicht direkt
ausgesetzt sind.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Modelling unemployment in macroeconomics
The rate of unemployment is one of the most important macroeconomic variables (together with
GDP and the CPI) and a vast amount of economic literature is dedicated to explaining its existence
and analyzing differences in unemployment rates across time, space and cohorts.
When one wants to model involuntary unemployment in a macroeconomic1 setting, one needs a
deviation from the neoclassical benchmark case of frictionless markets. In frictionless markets
there would be only voluntary unemployment; e.g. people who are able to work but do not want
to at the market wage rate.
The currently most popular kind of explaining short- and medium-run changes of unemployment
in macroeconomics are so-called ’search models’ (or ’search and matching models’); the probably
most important references for search unemployment in general are the paper by Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) and the book by Pissarides (2000).
The idea of this approach is as follows: Each period a certain number of jobs is destroyed. Firms
post vacancies (for which they usually have to pay a certain fee) and the unemployed search for
jobs (in some models there is also the possibility of costly on-the-job-search).
A matching function determines the number of newly created jobs for given numbers of vacancies
and job searchers. If – which is the case in most papers in this literature – the matching function
has constant returns to scale, then the probabilities of filling a vacancy and of finding a job is
determined by the so-called ’labor market tightness’ which is the number of vacancies divided by
the number of searchers (which often are, but need not be, identical to the number of unemployed).
Typically there will be some time for an average labor force participant between losing a job and
finding a new one. This implies that there is a positive unemployment rate at all points of a
whole business cycle. Unemployment of this kind is often called ’frictional unemployment’ and
the involved friction is usually referred to as ’search friction’.
The probability of finding a job in a given period (and so the unemployment rate) depends
on aggregate conditions of the economy (like the level of productivity), fluctuates over the
business cycle and might change permanently after certain (permanent) institutional changes or
shocks. The rate of job destruction (fraction of destroyed jobs in a given period) could depend on
1This stands in contrast to explanations for why certain individuals are (more likely to be) unemployed, where factors
like home region, (the level and type of) education or age might play a role.
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macroeconomic conditions (and economic policy) too or might as well be exogenous.
Two of the most important reasons for the attractiveness of search models are that a law of motion
for unemployment comes out naturally (which is a very useful feature for analyzing short-run
fluctuations of labor market variables) and that several of its relevant parameters have observable
counterparts (unemployment benefits, job finding probabilities ...). Furthermore, in certain cases
the before mentioned labor market tightness is the only state variable.
Other approaches to model unemployment emphasize incentive problems (efficiency wage theory
of unemployment) or certain institutional factors (like minimum wages, unionized wage bargain-
ing, hiring and firing laws, ...). They are typically used to explain why there is unemployment
at all and possibly to discuss certain efficiency aspects like the (in)efficiency of certain labor
market regulations/institutions which could lead to involuntary unemployment in otherwise
frictionless markets, or considerations why it might be optimal for employers to pay more
than the reservation wage (efficiency wage theory).2 To some extent they are also applied for
cross-country-comparisons or explaining medium-run-trends, for example for comparing the
differing labor market performances of Continental Europe and the US from the early 1980s to
the mid-2000s.3
1.2 Short-run-fluctuations of unemployment
As said before, one advantage of search unemployment is that there is an explicit law of motion
for unemployment (or employment) which comes up naturally when formulating a model. This
aspect makes it very attractive for the analysis of short-run-fluctuations of unemployment (and
related variables like employment or GDP). A typical analysis in this field sets up a search model
with ’some special features’, calibrates it, defines certain shocks and then compares the implied
moments with empirical data.
1.2.1 State of the field
Important stylized facts in this context are that the standard deviation of labor market tightness
is typcially relatively high compared to the one of labor productivity and that the correlation
between unemployment and vacancies is strongly negative (see for example Shimer, 2005, for the
case of the US).
Most of the contributions in this literature are in the Real-Business-Cycle (RBC) tradition where
the only source of aggregate shocks is productivity. The starting point for this literature is
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), whose framework has been widely used since. Another seminal
contribution in this context has been made by den Haan et al. (2000) who showed how including
endogenous job destruction in a standard RBC model with search unemployment can help match
certain other stylized facts like the high persistence of the response of employment and output to
a temporary productivity shock.
Starting with Walsh (2005), dozens of papers have come out which integrate New-Keynesian
features, namely nominal (most prominently sticky prices) and additional real frictions (imperfect
2See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for detailed discussions of these various explanations for unemployment in
macroeconomic models.
3See chapters 8 and 13 in Borjas (2005) or chapter 10 in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
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competition, adjustment costs of investment ...), into models of search unemployment.4 In
this kind of models explanations for changes in unemployment typically do not soley rely on
technological factors but also on ’exogenous’ changes in monetary policy, in preferences, in the
extent of competition in product markets, and so on. From now on I will simply refer to them as
DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models.5
At the same time, papers like Walsh (2005) can also be thought of as part of the vast literature
extending the simple monetary three-equations-New-Keynesian-model.6 Notable contributions
to this literature include for example Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). The
latter were the first to estimate a medium scale DSGE model with Bayesian inference methods
and started a wave of other estimated medium-to-large-sized DSGE models (see for example
Christiano et al. (2011), Christoffel et al. (2008) and Fenz et al. (2012)). So far, the main focus of this
literature has been on better understanding the transmission of monetary policy on inflation and
the real economy and to match certain stylized facts in this context (like the persistent response
of GDP and inflation to a monetary policy shock).7
Among others, there are two substantial problems in the literature mentioned above.
First, Shimer (2005) claims that models of search unemployment where productivity shocks are
the only source of economic fluctuations (RBC models) are incapable of accounting for the high
relative volatility of labor market tightness compared to labor productivity.8
One possibility to overcome this problem would be to find other sources of labor market fluc-
tuations which do not have such a strong influence on labor productivity. This could be done
– still consistent with a typical RBC-setting – via productivity shocks which do not have a
strong immediate influence on labor productivity. For example, Faccini and Ortigueira (2010)
show that investment-specific technology shocks can help increase the relative volatility of the
unemployment rate compared to labor productivity.
One could also try to incorporate different real and monetary shocks on the demand side in a
New Keynesian DSGE setting. However, only very few of the contributions in this field try to
explain short-term fluctuations of unemployment, the main focus seems to be on the implications
of search unemployment for fluctuations of inflation and output in the context of monetary policy
shocks.9 Notable exceptions to that rule are the calibrated models of Sveen and Weinke (2008)
and Christoffel and Kuester (2008), who claim that demand and monetary policy shocks can
contribute to explaining US unemployment fluctuations when choosing certain labor market
specifications.
Second, the disclaimer ’when choosing certain labor market specifications’ in the last sentence
4Other early contributions in this context were the working paper version of Trigari (2009) and Christoffel and Linzert
(2005).
5For a nice overview over the conflicts between the New-Classical and the New-Keynesian school see Snowdon and
Vane (2005) and Mankiw (2006). The latter also discusses the combination of these two schools into what is sometimes
called ’the new neoclassical synthesis’; Walsh (2005) and most papers on short-run-fluctuations mentioned below fall
under this category.
6These 3 equations are a forward looking consumption Euler equation (which is occasionally called ’New Keynesian IS
curve’), a New Keynesian Phillips curve describing the relationship between inflation and real marginal costs (or the
output gap) and a Taylor Rule for monetary policy. A detailed description of this baseline is provided in chapter 5 of
Walsh (2003).
7This also explains why a large part of the work in this field has been done by central banks.
8For an alternative discussion of this problem see Costain and Reiter (2008). For discussions of possible alternative
modelling approaches to get a higher relative volatility when having only productivity shocks see for example Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007).
9An important example for this fact is the survey of Christoffel et al. (2009), who compare how different labor market
specifications can contribute to a persistent response of inflation to a monetary policy shock (which is a standard VAR
result for the euro area).
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already indicates another major issue: In the literature on search frictions in New Keynesian
DSGE models there is a significant variation in specifications of the labor market along several
dimensions. Among others these concern the timing of hiring, (the degree of) wage rigidities,
the degree of convexity of hiring costs, and the determination of job destruction and working
hours.10 They all have different implications for the co-movement of observable macroeconomic
variables (obviously especially for labor market variables):
• A higher degree of wage rigidity tends to – if it also concerns newly formed matches – lead
to a relatively stronger response of employment to demand and supply shocks. In the New
Keynesian literature there are also different approaches concerning whether the real (for
examle in Sveen and Weinke, 2008) or the nominal wage (like in Gertler et al., 2008) is rigid.
• The way of determination of working hours is crucial for the role of the extensive (employ-
ment in persons) versus the intensive (hours worked per person) margin of employment
when firms react to changes in economic conditions. In the literature, there are the possi-
bilities of choosing hours via maximizing the surplus of the match (’efficient bargaining’)
or of the employer deciding on the amount of working time (’right-to-manage’) by profit
maximization. Typically the first option implies a relatively lower volatility of working
hours.
• When job destruction becomes endogenous,11 it means on the one hand a stronger reaction
of unemployment to certain shocks: In this case an upswing not only means a higher
probability of finding a job for the unemployed, but also a lower probability of losing a
job for the employed. On the other hand, endogenous job destruction tends to induce a
positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies, which is at odds with empirical
evidence. The latter point has been extensively discussed in the RBC literature on search
unemployment (see for example Ramey, 2008).
• The timing of hiring, namely whether newly hired workers can start working in the same
or only in the next period, is crucial for the speed of reaction to shocks of the extensive
margin opposed to the intensive one. In the latter case, firms can adjust employment in t
after a shock in t only along the intensive margin (working hours), while they can raise
employment in persons only in t+ 1. In the other case, firms can immediately adjust along
both margins.
• Convex costs of posting vacancies can lead to a relatively smaller response of the number of
vacancies to demand and supply shocks (compared to the standard specification of linear
costs).
10Other dimensions along which labor market specifications differ in the literature (see for example Christoffel et al.,
2009) include for example whether on-the-job-search is possible. Such additional alternatives will not be further discussed
in this disseration.
11Job destruction is usually made endogenous via assuming that matches are dissolved when the expected utility of
continuing the match is lower than that of the outside option (posting a vacancy or being unemployed).
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1.2.2 Dissertation I: Explaining short-run-fluctuations of unemployment in
Austria
Dissertation Ia: Model comparison as prerequisite
In the part on short-term-fluctuations I will extend the DSGE model of Fenz et al. (2012),
which describes a small open economy without own monetary policy (building on the seminal
contribution by Smets and Wouters, 2003). There I will replace the simple labor market which
is modeled in the style of Erceg et al. (2000)12 by a richly specified labor market with search
unemployment and endogenous working hours.
The main distinctive feature of this part of my dissertation will be an empirical comparison of
different possibilities to model the labor market in a DSGE model.13 For this I will use Austrian
data and compare several models which differ only in their labor market specification along the
before mentioned dimensions:
• determination of working hours,
• rigidity of wages,
• the timing of hiring,
• degree of convexity in vacancy posting costs, and
• whether job destruction is exogenous or endogenous.
I will use quarterly data from 1995 on, so there will be close to 70 observations. 1995 is the
starting point of a reliable data series for working hours, which are a crucial observable variable
in the context of this part of the dissertation. The model comparison will be conducted using
system estimation by Bayesian methods.
Comparisons of specifications in this context have been conducted before, but they were either
not comprehensive (like Christiano et al., 2009) or they did not look at the overall fit with
macroeconomic data (like Christoffel et al., 2009, who compared different specifications with
regard to their implications for the response of inflation to a monetary policy shock).
This part of the dissertation will be presented in chapter 2.
Dissertation Ib: Assessing the impact of demand shocks on Austrian unemployment
Furthermore, I will analyze how well the model with the best information criterion can reproduce
certain stylized facts of the Austrian labor market and I will try to investigate which kind of
shocks (productivity shocks, mark-up shocks, domestic or foreign demand shocks or monetary
policy shocks) contributed most to fluctuations in Austrian unemployment. The latter will be
done via a forecast error variance decomposition and a historical shock decomposition (both are
byproducts of the Bayesian estimation). These decompositions show which shocks (i.e. which
parts of the vector et) can be attributed to the observed changes in unemployment (given the
model setting). Hereby, I will contribute to the literature which investigates the ability of search
12In their widely used modelling approach labor is heterogeneous; the different labor inputs are combined via a CES
aggregator and workers are in monopolistic competition to each other. In this kind of setting adjustment of labor inputs is
only at the intensive margin (working hours) and (partial) unemployment is of a voluntary nature.
13Christoffel et al. (2009) also provide a fairly detailed discussion of different labor market specifications. However, they
do not estimate their different models; they only compare the impulse response of inflation to a monetary policy shock.
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models to generate certain stylized facts of labor markets and complement contributions like
Sveen and Weinke (2008) and Christoffel and Kuester (2008).
This part of the dissertation will be presented in section 2.6 of chapter 2.
1.3 Medium-term trends in unemployment
Search models are also usable for explaining medium-term trends in unemployment as important
institutional features are easy to integrate (like firing costs) or even show up ’automatically’
(unemployment benefits, hiring costs) in such models (this can be seen for example in the
application of Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, where the impact of different labor market
regulations is analyzed).
In principle, medium term changes in unemployment patterns can be explained by
1. changes in one or more institutional features for an unchanged macroeconomic environment,
or
2. imperfect adjustment of one or more institutional features to changes in the macroeconomic
environment (skill biased technological change, globalization ...).
1.3.1 State of the field
The probably most important medium-term trend in labor markets from the early 1980s until
the mid-2000s is the relative increase in unemployment rates of low skilled14 and the decrease of
their relative wages, where in the US the decrease in relative wages was more pronounced while
in Western Europe the increase in the relative unemployment rate was stronger.15
This naturally raises two questions:
1. Which factors contributed to the losses of unskilled labor in Western Europe and the US?
2. Which factors can be made responsible for the differential response of (Continental) Western
Europe and the US?
Concerning the first question, the different (but partially interconnected) possible reasons which
are discussed most prominently in the literature are: migration, institutional changes, international
trade and (skill-)biased technological progress (see for example Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004,
chapter 10).
Like in the literature on short-term-fluctuations, here again technology seems to be the most
popular explanation for observed trends in labor markets; there are also several empirical studies
claiming a dominant role for skill-biased technological progress. However, a comparatively
smaller role of international trade is usually acknowledged too.16 Contributions to the literature
on the effects of trade on unskilled unemployment include Krugman (1995), Davis (1998), Sener
(2003), Moore and Ranjan (2005), Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) and Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009),
where the latter three papers use search unemployment.
14The use of the words ’skilled’ and ’unskilled’ in this paper is not meant to indicate that people without a university
(or high school) degree are less able than people who have a diploma; it is just following a convention in the literature
which refers to worse prospects at the job market.
15See for example chapter 13 in Borjas (2005) or chapter 10 in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
16There is also the reasoning that both factors are closely interrelated as for example globalization might enforce
(skill-biased) technological progress (see again Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, chapter 10).
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One common argument (for example made by Moore and Ranjan, 2005) against a strong con-
tribution of international trade to the relative decrease in unskilled wages and employment
is the following: Relative prices of skilled goods and relative employment in skill-intensive
sectors did not increase too much over the last decades which goes contrary to predictions of
the Heckscher-Ohlin-model for the effects of opening up trade with (unskilled-)labor-abundant
(’Southern’) countries.
The answer of authors like Feenstra and Hanson (2001)17 is that one has to look at relative
employment shares and prices of different fragments/subsectors instead of more aggregated
sectors – when doing this, the fit with the theoretical implications of the Heckscher-Ohlin-model
tends to become much better.
This is one substantial argument for the theoretical and empirical importance of trade in inter-
mediate goods (see also OECD, 2007). Another relevant aspect of international outsourcing is
the so-called scale effect – namely that relative productivity of outsourcing sectors increases
which may even lead to an overall increase of employment in this sector (compared to the
pre-outsourcing situation). These effects are empirically very hard to distinguish from the ones of
skill-biased-technological change.18
Concerning the second question, most of the literature refers to factors like relatively higher
unemployment benefits, employment protection and union power in Continental Europe (see
for example Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Pierrard and Sneessens (2008) and Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999)). All 3 factors are thought to lead to a relatively smaller reaction of wages to a
negative shock, making a stronger reaction of employment ’necessary’.19
1.3.2 Dissertation II: The role of international fragmentation
In the part on explaining medium-term-trends I will show that the observed relative loss of
unskilled labor in industrialized countries can also be generated by international trade and that
the differential response of the US (decrease in relative wages) and Continental Europe (increase
in unemployment) could be generated by certain characteristics of non-trading sectors (and not
necessarily by differences in unemployment benefits or employment protection).
While a few papers in the literature (for example Egger and Kreickemeier, 2008) look explicitly at
the effect of international outsourcing (and not at trade in final goods) on unskilled unemployment,
these papers do not account for the role of non-trading sectors which can be of crucial importance
in this context. These sectors tend to be dominated by consumer services which are presumably
relatively intensive in unskilled labor compared to manufacturing. When the share of unskilled
labor used in manufacturing decreases after an increase in international fragmentation, there will
be a shift of part of the unskilled labor force from manufacturing to the non-trading sector. If the
’ability to absorb labor’ of the non-trading sector differed across industrial economies,20 it could
be one of the causes of the differential response to an increase in international trade.
In this part of the dissertation I will set up a model which shows the potential importance
17This paper provides a much longer discussion on these arguments. In addition it contains a very detailed empirical
analysis of possible effects of outsourcing on the share of low skilled in the overall wage bill (with mixed results).
18Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) show in a theoretical framework that – under certain assumptions – these
productivity effects can be so large that the factor affected by outsourcing can even benefit from it.
19It should be noted, however, that the effects of employment protection on the response of unemployment to a negative
shock can be ambiguous (see for example Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
20For example, there might be a trade-off between the probability of finding a job and the wage rate in the different
sectors.
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of international outsourcing and non-trading sectors for explaining the observed increase in
unskilled unemployment over the last decades, where the main distinctive feature will be the
emphasis on the interaction of outsourcing and the non-trading sectors. Hereby I will complement
contributions like Pierrard and Sneessens (2008) who claim that these stylized facts are driven
by an interaction of skill-biased technological change and wage rigidities. The model integrates
elements of the Heckscher-Ohlin-setting of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) with a skill-abundant
’North’ and an unskilled-labor-abundant ’South’ into a typical model of search unemployment
(which will be relatively similar to Mitra and Ranjan, 2010).
Within this framework, I will show that relocation of parts of the value added chain in manufac-
turing (due to a relative increase in Southern productivity) makes Northern production more
skill-intensive. This causes a shift of part of the unskilled labor force to the non-trading sectors
which are assumed to be highly intensive in this factor. Furthermore sectoral unemployment rates
of the low skilled will increase. The overall effect on unskilled unemployment will depend heavily
on the characteristics of the non-trading sectors, meaning that they are a potential reason for a
differential response of different Northern economies to the increase in outsourcing to Southern
economies (instead of the usual suspects like unemployment benefits or employment protection
in the manufacturing sector).
The model will be formulated in continuous time and will include 2 types of labor (skilled and
unskilled), 2 economies (unskilled-labor-abundant ’South’ and skilled-labor-abundant ’North’)
and 2 sectors. One sector produces a homogeneous non-tradable good using unskilled labor
only, and the other consists of a continuum of subsectors producing tradable inputs (intermediate
goods) for one final consumption good using both skilled and unskilled labor (in varying
intensities). In both regions there is a continuum of workers who provide one unit of labor each
and who are not mobile across regions (they cannot migrate from North to South or vice versa).
Skilled workers are always employed, they can switch from one firm to the other without
any frictions21 and get paid their marginal revenue product which then has to be equal in all
subsectors of the respective region. Unskilled workers are subject to search-unemployment; there
is no on-the-job-search. The unemployed have to choose between searching in the (non-tradable)
consumer services sector or in the manufacturing sector.
The before-mentioned crucial differences in characteristics of the non-trading sectors will be
represented by the costs which firms have to pay for posting vacancies. As the unemployed have
to be indifferent between searching in the manufacturing and the service sector, they induce a
sectoral trade-off between the job finding probability and the wage in case of having found a job.
After some substitutions it will be possible to derive how the steady state of several important
variables (especially wages and unemployment rates) changes after an increase in productivity in
the unskilled-labor-abundant economy, which will lead to an increase in outsourcing from the
’North’ to the ’South’ (as some marginal intermediate goods are then cheaper to produce in the
South). The results of this part will be qualitative only.22
This part of the dissertation will be presented in chapter 3.
21One could think of them being employed by competitive temp agencies.
22The empirical part of this section will be limited to a comparison of main predictions of the model with important
stylized facts (especially the increase in unskilled unemployment in Western Europe).
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1.4 Methodological aspects
In the end, this dissertation is located in the field of the empirical sciences. It is about the
relationship between empirical objects (like unemployment rate, GDP ...). So these relationships
can (and very likely will) change over time. This (unfortunately) also means that if some setting
fits best with the data observed so far, I cannot conclude that it will continue to do so in the
future.
In line with what is called ’methodological individualism’ in economics,23 most equations
describing relationships between empirically observable data stem from solutions to optimization
problems and imposed equilibrium conditions of an artificial model. This part of the work is
deductive but serves just as an intermediate step to get to the hypothesized relationships between
certain empirical objects.
Furthermore, this thesis mainly stands in an instrumentalist tradition. Its methodology is in line
with the approach advocated by Friedman (1953), which can be summarized by ’A model is
good not because it is true, but because the world behaves as if it were true’ (Hoover, 2001, p.
141).24 In some sense I could say that ’I do not take my models too literally’. There are plenty
of unrealistic assumptions made in these models. For example in both parts certain functional
forms for the utility function are imposed, there are no people who do not want to work at
all, and heterogeneity of agents is very stylized. So I have to clearly state which variables the
model has to be able to predict and which not. For example, the DSGE model for the analysis of
short-run-fluctuations of unemployment should be able to make predictions about (observable)
macroeconomic aggregates (like GDP, unemployment rate, average working hours, ...). However,
it will not be suitable for making predictions concerning objects like the distribution of income
(as workers are assumed to be ex ante identical).
23This ’methodological individualism’ has been heavily (and successfully) advocated by the New-Classical school. For a
discussion of this approach and a critique of common assumptions made there see chapter 3 of Hoover (2001).
24This approach is wide-used in macroeconomics but is also subject to substantial criticism. Hoover (2001) states that
’Of course, there is a serious question about why the world should be tractable if the model were not in fact true in some
sense’ (p. 141). He furthermore calls the methodology of ’as if’ the ’best-used tool in the kit of unreflective rationalizations
with which economists support their practices’ (p. 142).

Chapter 2
Modelling the labor market in a
DSGE Model for the Austrian
economy
Lukas Reiss1
JEL codes: E32, E24, C52, J64
Abstract
In this paper I integrate a richly specified labor market with search unemployment into the New
Keynesian DSGE model for the Austrian economy of Fenz et al. (2012). Within this setting, I
compare different labor market specifications which are currently used in the literature concerning
their fit with Austrian quarterly data on important macroeconomic aggregates (including several
labor market variables).
Most importantly, the Bayesian model comparison indicates an important role for nominal wage
rigidities and contemporaneous hiring. Furthermore, determination of working hours via ’efficient
bargaining’ performs better than via ’right-to-manage’.
The best-performing model can reproduce the relative volatility of labor market tightness com-
pared to labor productivity relatively well (but absolute volatilities are too high). Furthermore,
shock decompositions show that fluctuations in Austrian labor market tightness are mainly driven
by external demand shocks and to a much smaller extent by productivity shocks.
2.1 Introduction
Over the last years, there have been dozens of papers which integrate search unemployment
into New-Keynesian DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models.2 One typical
1Lukas.Reiss@oenb.at. Many thanks to my dissertation supervisors Ingrid Kubin and Jesus Crespo-Cuaresma as well
as Gerhard Fenz, Martin Schneider, Philip Schuster and Klaus Wohlrabe for very useful comments. Remaining mistakes
are all mine.
2Early contributions in this context have been made by Walsh (2005), Christoffel and Linzert (2005) and the working
paper version of Trigari (2009).
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rationale for doing that is to improve the understanding of the impulse responses of certain
non-labor-market-variables to non-labor-market-shocks (like the persistent response of output and
inflation to monetary policy shocks). At the same time, these papers are complementing the early
contributions in the literature on short-term-fluctuations in search unemployment where the only
source of aggregate shocks is productivity3 by including more rigidities and providing additional
possible explanations for changes in unemployment like ’exogenous’ changes in monetary policy,
in preferences, in the extent of competition in product markets, and so on.
In this literature on search frictions in New Keynesian DSGE models there is a significant variation
in specifications of the labor market along several dimensions. Among others, there is variation
in the degree of convexity of hiring costs and of wage rigidities, the timing of hiring, and the
determination of job destruction and working hours. They all have different implications for the
co-movement of observable macroeconomic variables (especially for labor market variables):4
• A higher degree of wage rigidity tends to – if it also concerns newly formed matches – lead
to a relatively stronger response of employment to demand and supply shocks. In the New
Keynesian literature there are also different approaches concerning whether the real (for
example in Sveen and Weinke, 2008) or the nominal wage (like in Gertler et al., 2008) is
rigid.
• The way of determination of working hours is crucial for the role of the extensive (employ-
ment in persons) versus the intensive (hours worked per person) margin of employment
when firms react to changes in economic conditions. In the literature, there are the possibili-
ties of choosing hours via maximizing the surplus of the match (’efficient bargaining’) or of
the employer deciding on the amount of working time (’right-to-manage’). Typically the
first option implies a relatively lower volatility of working hours.
• The timing of hiring, namely whether newly hired workers can start working in the same
or only in the next period, is crucial for the speed of reaction to shocks of the extensive
margin opposed to the intensive one. In the latter case, firms can adjust employment in t
after a shock in t only along the intensive margin (working hours), while they can raise
employment in persons only in t+ 1. In the other case, firms can immediately adjust along
both margins.
• When job destruction becomes endogenous, it means on the one hand a stronger reaction
of unemployment to certain shocks: In this case an upswing not only means a higher
probability of finding a job for the unemployed, but also a lower probability of losing a
job for the employed. On the other hand, endogenous job destruction tends to induce a
positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies, which is at odds with empirical
evidence. The latter point has been extensively discussed in the RBC literature on search
unemployment (see for example Ramey, 2008).
• Convex costs of posting vacancies can lead to a relatively smaller response of the number of
vacancies to demand and supply shocks (compared to the standard specification of linear
costs), while concave costs may make them larger.
3See for example Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and den Haan et al. (2000).
4Other dimensions along which labor market specifications differ in the literature include for example whether
on-the-job-search is possible (see for example Christoffel et al., 2009). Such additional alternatives will not be further
discussed in this paper.
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In this paper I will extend the DSGE model of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Fenz et al.,
2012), which describes a small open economy without own monetary policy. There I will replace
the simple labor market which is modeled in the style of Erceg et al. (2000) by a richly specified
labor market with search unemployment and endogenous working hours. I will then compare
several models which differ only in their labor market specification along the before mentioned
dimensions using Bayesian estimation methods.
To my knowledge, this is the first comprehensive comparison of labor market specifications in a
DSGE model using system estimation; previous comparisons were either not comprehensive or
not based on system estimation. For example, Christoffel et al. (2009) provide a comprehensive
comparison of different labor market specifications, but they do not estimate their different
models – they only compare the impulse response of macroeconomic variables (with a focus on
inflation) to a monetary policy shock.5 So their approach only accounts for trade-offs concerning
the explanation of different variables with different models to a very limited extent. For example,
Krause and Lubik (2007) show that in their model real wage rigidities help to generate certain
stylized facts on labor markets but not on inflation. Furthermore, economic fluctuations are not
solely due to surprise changes in monetary policy but also to changes in other factors like real
demand or productivity.
Model comparisons based on (Bayesian) system estimation have been for example conducted by
Gertler et al. (2008), Mandelman and Zanetti (2010), Riggi and Tancioni (2010), Christiano et al.
(2009), Ichiue et al. (2009) and Cheremukhin (2011); however, all of them compare only a very
limited number of specifications (mostly using US data).6
A first application of the results will be to analyze how the best-performing model can reproduce
stylized facts of Austrian labor market fluctuations and to which kind of shocks (productivity,
mark-ups, domestic or foreign demand, monetary policy, ...) they can be attributed. The latter
will be done by a forecast error variance decomposition and a historical shock decomposition
(which are by-products of the Bayesian estimation). Hereby, I contribute to the literature which
investigates the ability of search models to generate certain stylized facts of labor markets and
complement contributions like Shimer (2005), Sveen and Weinke (2008) and Christoffel and
Kuester (2008).
Sections 2.2 (baseline model without the labor market) and 2.3 (labor market specifications)
describe the model framework. Section 2.4 shows the linearized version of the model. Section
2.5 discusses the model comparison (and all related estimation issues) and section 2.6 shows the
shock decompositions of Austrian unemployment. Section 2.7 concludes.
5Less comprehensive comparisons of model specifications using impulse responses have been for example conducted
by de Walque et al. (2009) and Trigari (2006).
6Cheremukhin (2011) investigates the role of training costs and endogenous job destruction in an RBC setting
(productivity shock as only shock with economic interpretation; the remaining shocks are measurement errors) and
compares it to the calibrations of the simpler models of Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Mandelman
and Zanetti (2010) compare different specifications of hiring costs, Gertler et al. (2008) compare flexible and nominally
rigid wages, Riggi and Tancioni (2010) compare nominal and real wage rigidities, and Christiano et al. (2009) compare
exogenous and (two types of) endogenous job destruction with a labor market in the style of Erceg et al. (2000). Ichiue
et al. (2009) compare (using Japanese data) specifications with only the intensive margin, only the extensive margin and
both margins.
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2.2 The baseline model without the labor market
The DSGE model of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (see Fenz et al., 2012), describes a small
open economy without own monetary policy (building on the seminal paper by Smets and
Wouters, 2003). It combines neoclassical/new classical features like forward-looking optimizing
agents with rational expectations and ’Keynesian’ features like nominal (rigid prices and wages)
and real (monopolistic competition, investment adjustment costs, ...) rigidities.
The labor market in their model builds on the contribution of Erceg et al. (2000): Labor is
heterogeneous, the different labor inputs are combined via a CES aggregator and workers are in
monopolistic competition to each other. In this kind of setting adjustment of labor inputs occurs
only at the intensive margin (working hours) and (partial) unemployment is of a voluntary nature.
The non-labor-market-parts of Fenz et al. (2012) are described in the rest of this section, while in
section 2.3 the specification of the labor market will be discussed in detail.
2.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by h ∈ [0, 1]. Each household
consists of infinitely many agents (again a unit interval) which pool their income. Households
supply labor (see section 2.3) und accumulate capital. They maximize their intertemporal utility
function which is given by7
Utilityt = Et
∞
∑
s=0
βsect+s
(
ln(Ch,t+s − κCt+s−1)−
∫ Nt
0
eLt ςL
1+ σL
H1+σLh,i,t di
)
, (2.1)
where Ch,t is the consumption of household h, Hh,i,t are working hours supplied by household
h in firm i,8 Ct−1 denotes the average consumption of the economy in the previous period,
and Nt is employment in persons. β is the subjective discount factor and κ the degree of
(external) habit formation.9 eLt = (1− ρL) + ρLeLt−1 + eLt is a negative labor supply shock and
ect = (1 − ρc) + ρcect−1 + ect is a positive consumption shock. The budget constraint for the
representative household is given by
Ch,t + Ih,t + Tt =
B fh,t−1
Pt
− B
f
h,t
R ft φ˜rp
(
n f at, e
rp
t
)
Pt
+
∫ Nt
0
Wi,tHh,i,tdi+ Atb(1− Nt) + AtcV,tVt
+Divt + (RKt Zh,t −Ψ(Zh,t))Kh,t−1 +
∫ 1
0
Ψ(Zh,t)Kh,t−1dh+ NtAtΦL, (2.2)
where It is investment, Tt is a lump-sum-tax, B
f
h,t are foreign bonds held in period t,
10 Pt is the
price level of final (consumption and investment) goods, R ft is the (gross) foreign interest rate
paid on bonds, φ˜rp
(
n f at, e
rp
t
)
denotes a risk premium on foreign net bond holdings (see section
2.2.4), RKt is the real rate of return on physical capital, Wi,t is the real wage paid in firm i, Zh,t
7I choose log-utitility to ensure that working hours are stationary in spite of the unit root in aggregate productivity.
8Note that my notation somehow deviates from conventions. Namely, indices referring to a continuum (like h and i
above) are written as sub-indices (e.g. Hh,i,t) and not in parentheses (e.g. Ht(h, i)).
9Variables without group subindex (h, i, j, k) denote averages, variables without time subscripts denote steady state
values (or parameters) and variables with hats denote log deviations from the steady state.
10Bonds are zero-coupon bonds, i.e. a bond that pays 1 in period t+ 1 is bought in period t for 1
R ft φ˜rp(n f at ,e
rp)
.
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is the utilization rate of the capital stock, Ψ(Zh,t) is the cost of utilization of capital,11 Kh,t is the
stock of physical capital held by household h, Divt denote received dividend payments, cV,tVt are
overall vacancy posting costs, and NtAtΦL are overall fixed costs in the labor service sector.12 The
endogenous capital utilization rate introduces an intensive margin of capital; while an increase
in the rental rate of capital can only lead to a sluggish response of the extensive margin of the
capital stock (via higher physical investment), Zh,t can jump up immediately.
Households own the capital stock. The law of motion of capital is given by
Kh,t = (1− τ)Kh,t−1 +
(
1− S
(
eit
Ih,t
µa Ih,t−1
))
Ih,t, (2.3)
where τ is the rate of depreciation, S(.) are investment adjustment costs (S(1) = S
′
(1) = 0 and
S
′′
(1) = 1ϕ > 0), µa denotes the trend growth rate of the economy and e
i
t = (1− ρi) + ρieit−1 + eit
is a negative investment shock. The investment adjustment costs – similar to the external
habit formation in consumption – lead to hump-shaped responses of investment to changes in
macroeconomic conditions; otherwise investment would be a ’pure’ jump variable.
The households maximize their utility by choosing the level of consumption, bond holdings,
investment and the capital utilization rate subject to (2.2) and (2.3), where dividends, economy-
wide capital-utilization costs and vacancy posting costs are taken as given. The Lagrangian for
this problem is:
Ωh,t = Et
∞
∑
s=0
βs

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)
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f
h,t+s−1
Pt+s
− ∫ Nt+s0 Wi,t+sHh,i,t+sdi− At+sb(1− Nt+s)− At+scV,t+sVt+s
−Divt+s −
(
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)
Kh,t+s−1
− ∫ 10 Ψ(Zh,t+s)Kh,t+s−1dh− Nt+sAt+sΦL

−Λh,t+sQh,t+s
(
Kh,t+s − Kh,t+s−1 (1− τ)−
(
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(
eIt+s
Ih,t+s
µa Ih,t+s−1
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Ih,t+s
)

,
(2.4)
where Qh,t is the real value of one unit of capital in household h.
Differentiating with regard to Ch,t, B
f
h,t, Ih,t, Zh,t and Kh,t yields the following set of first order
11Zt is normalized as such that in equilibrium Z = 1. So Ψ(1) = 0 and Ψ′(1) = 1β − 1+ τ = RK .
12To ensure consistency of budget constraints and GDP equations, it is assumed that overall utilization costs of capital
(
∫ 1
0 Ψ(Zh,t)Kh,t−1dh), overall vacancy posting costs (cV,tVt) and overall fixed costs in the labor service sector (NtAtΦL) are
paid to households.
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conditions (FOCs):
∂Ωh,t
∂B fh,t
= 0 ⇒ Et
βΛh,t+1
Λh,t
R ft φ˜rp
(
n f at, e
rp
t
)
Pt
Pt+1
 = 1, (2.5)
∂Ωh,t
∂Ch,t
= 0 ⇒ Λh,t = ect (Ch,t − κ Ct−1)−1, (2.6)
∂Ωh,t
∂Kh,t
= 0 ⇒ Qt = EtβΛh,t+1Λh,t
[
Qh,t+1(1− τ) + Zh,t+1RKt+1 −Ψ(Zh,t+1)
]
, (2.7)
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, (2.8)
∂Ωh,t
∂Zh,t
= 0 ⇒ RKt = Ψ
′
(Zh,t). (2.9)
Due to the assumption of income pooling, all members in a household consume they same,
whether they are unemployed or employed. As all households are ex ante identical and infinitely
large, unemployment rates and (capital and wage) income are therefore the same across all of
them. This implies that the marginal utilities of consumption, subjective discount factors and the
real value of capital are also identical across households.
2.2.2 Domestic firms
The production structure in this model is highly stylized with four stages of production:
1. Labor service firms transform a labor input into a homogeneous output L. They are subject
to perfect competition and have to face search frictions when hiring labor. This sector
replaces the CES-aggregator of heterogeneous labor inputs in Smets and Wouters (2003) or
Fenz et al. (2012) and is discussed in greater detail in section 2.3.
2. Intermediate goods producing firms transform labor services (of 1st stage) and capital
(which is rented from households) into a differentiated good. They are subject to monopolis-
tic competition, cannot freely adjust prices every period (Calvo pricing) and face transitory
and permanent shocks to their productivity.
3. Domestic good assembling firms transform the differentiated inputs from the second stage
of production into a homogeneous good (via a CES aggregator). They are subject to perfect
competition and their production is equal to domestic GDP.
4. Final good firms assembly domestic goods and imports into final goods which are used for
consumption (private + government), investment and export.13 This sector is also subject to
perfect competition and faces real adjustment costs like in Christoffel et al. (2008).
13The assumption that imports are necessary for producing the export goods is made to account for the high import
content of Austrian exports.
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Domestic good assembling firms
The domestic good is assembled by assembling firms which buy differentiated intermediate
goods from a continuum of domestic intermediate goods producers and transform them into a
homogeneous domestic good. They are subject to perfect competition, their overall production is
given by:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
1
1+λp,t
j,t dj
]1+λp,t
, (2.10)
where Yt denotes production of the domestic good, Yj,t is the production of differentiated
intermediate good j and λp,t is a time-varying mark-up (λp,t = λp,t + e
p
t ). Cost minimization of
the domestic goods assembling firms yields demand for output of firm j:
Yj,t =
(
Pdj,t
Pdt
)−(1+λp,t)
λp,t
Yt, (2.11)
where Pdj,t denotes the price of the differentiated good j. The aggregate price P
d
t of the domestic
good (the GDP deflator) is given by:
Pdt =
[∫ 1
0
(Pdj,t)
−1
λp,t dj
]−λp,t
. (2.12)
Firms producing domestic intermediate goods
There is a continuum j ∈ [0, 1] of intermediate goods producers that transform homogeneous
input from labor service firms and capital (rented from households) into a differentiated output.
The production function is given by
Yj,t = A1−αt e
a
t Kˇ
α
j,tL
1−α
j,t − AtΦ, (2.13)
where At is a non-stationary global technology process, eat is a stationary domestic technology
process, Lj,t and Kˇj,t denote labor services bought from first-stage-firms and effective capital
rented from households by firm j. AtΦ are fixed real costs of production, which allow for
relatively larger reactions of output to changes in employment or the (effective) capital stock. The
levels of the technology shocks evolve according to AtAt−1 =: µ
a
t =
(
1− ρµa
)
µa + ρµaµ
a
t−1 + µ
ae
µa
t
and eat = (1− ρa) + ρaeat−1 + eat . The capital stock Kˇj,t employed by firms in period t is related to
the households’ capital stock as follows:
∫ 1
0
Kˇj,tdj =
∫ 1
0
Zh,tKh,t−1dh. (2.14)
The intermediate goods producers maximize their profits from selling their products to the
domestic goods assembling firm. The cost-minimizing condition for all firms is given by
Kˇj,t
Lj,t
=
α
1− α
PL,t
RKt
, (2.15)
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where PL,t is the price of labor services bought from labor service firms. This leads to the following
equation for real marginal costs:
MCj,t = MCt =
(RKt )
α
(
PL,t
At
)1−α
eat αα(1− α)1−α
, (2.16)
which are identical over firms as input prices RKt and PL,t are the same for all firms. Furthermore,
from firm j’s perspective, the size of marginal costs is independent of the quantity it produces.
Nominal profits of firm j are given by Pro f itj,t = (Pdj,t − PtMCt)Yj,t − PtMCtAtΦ. Firm j sells its
differentiated products to the domestic good assembling firms on a market with monopolistic
competition. This form of competition is needed to be able to model nominally rigid prices and is
also useful to introduce a wedge between inflation and real marginal costs via variations in λp,t.
Plugging the demand function of the domestic good assembling firms (2.11) into this equation
yields an expression for nominal profits of firm j in period t:
Pro f itj,t =
(
Pdj,t − PtMCt
)(Pdj,t
Pdt
)−(1+λp,t)
λp,t
Yt − PtMCtAtΦ. (2.17)
Firms face nominal frictions a la Calvo (1983) when maximizing their profits. In each period,
only a fraction 1− ξp of firms is allowed to adjust their prices. These firms set the price P˜jt to
maximize their expected profits. The remaining ξp firms are assumed to follow a simple partial
indexation rule based on past developments of the price of their goods Pdj,t =
(
Πdt−1
)γp
Pdj,t−1.
This indexation leads to hump-shaped responses of inflation to macroeconomic shocks.
So when a firm is able to maximize its profits in period t, it has to take into account that it might
not be able to do adjustments in the following periods:
max
P˜dj,t
Et
∞
∑
s=0
ξspβ
sΛt+s
Λt
Pro f itj,t+s
Pt+s
. (2.18)
Plugging the indexation rule and (2.17) into (2.18) and rearranging yields:
Et
∞
∑
s=0
ξspβ
sΛt+sYj,t+s
[(
Pdt+s−1
Pdt−1
)γp P˜dj,t
Pt+s
− (1+ λp,t)MCt+s] = 0. (2.19)
Using (2.12), the price of the domestic good Pdt can be obtained as a CES aggregate over the prices
of adjusters and non-adjusters:
Pdt =
[
ξp
(
Pdt−1(Π
d
t−1)
γp
)− 1λp,t + (1− ξp) (P˜dj,t)− 1λp,t ]−λp,t . (2.20)
Firms assembling final goods
For the sake of simplicity I assume that there is only one final good in the domestic economy (Ft),
that is used for private consumption, investment, exports and for government consumption. This
final good is assembled by a continuum of final good assembling firms, which work under perfect
competition and use domestically produced and imported goods as inputs. The production
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function of final good assembling firm k has the following CES form:
F(Dk,t, Mk,t) =
[
µ
σm
1+σm D
1
1+σm
k,t + (1− µ)
σm
1+σm (φk,tMk,t)
1
1+σm
]1+σm
, (2.21)
where µ is a parameter for a home bias for domestically produced goods, and 1+σmσm is the elasticity
of substitution between domestically produced and imported intermediate goods. There is an
adjustment cost (represented by the function φk,t) when firm k’s ratio of imported over domestic
inputs deviates from the previous period’s economy-wide average:
φk,t =
[
1− φm
(
e˜mt −
Mk,t/Dk,t
Mt−1/Dt−1
)2]
, (2.22)
with e˜mt = (1− ρm) + ρm e˜mt−1 + e˜mt . This specification ensures that changes in relative prices do
not lead to ’too fast’ responses of relative demand (again creating hump-shaped responses). Final
good firm k decides on its input demand for domestic and imported goods by maximizing profits:
max
Dk,t ,Mk,t
[
PtF(Dk,t, Mk,t)− Pdt Dk,t − Pmt Mk,t
]
, (2.23)
where Pt is the price of the final good. In the aggregate it holds that Ft =
∫ 1
0 F(Dk,t, Mk,t)dk,
where
∫ 1
0 Dk,tdk = Yt and
∫ 1
0 Mk,tdk = Mt.
2.2.3 The foreign economy
Austria is linked to the foreign economy (= rest of the world) via trade and financial flows. The
foreign economy is modelled in a parsimonous way. It is infinitely large compared to Austria
which implies that the share of imports from and exports to Austria tend to zero (and it is not
affected by shocks occuring just in Austria). I denote foreign variables with superscript f (e.g.
Y ft ).
Three-equation model for output, inflation and the interest rate
The core model for the rest of the world consists of a simple New Keynesian model with three
equations for foreign output (Y ft ), foreign inflation (Π
f
t ) and the foreign interest rate (R
f
t ).
14 It
is assumed that the unit-root-productivity process At (which was described before) also enters
the production function of the rest of the world. While this 3-equation-model is probably not
the best way to explain the behavior of foreign (Euro area)15 output, prices and interest rates, it
should be sufficient to generate meaningful (e.g. demand, cost-push/supply and interest rate)
external shocks for the Austrian economy and reasonable expectations for future values of foreign
variables.
The foreign economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by h ∈ [0, 1]. They
14A more detailed description of such a simple monetary three-equations-New-Keynesian-model is for example
provided in chapter 5 of Walsh (2003).
15In the context of this paper, the terms ’foreign’, ’rest of the world’ and ’(rest of) Euro area’ are used synonymously.
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maximize their intertemporal utility function given by
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βsey ft+s
ln(C fh,t+s − κ fC ft+s−1)− (H fh,t+s)1+σ
f
l
1+ σ fl
 ,
where ey ft = (1− ρy f ) + ρy f ey ft−1 + ey ft is a positive demand shock. The budget constraint for the
representative househould is given by
C fh,t +
B fh,t
R ft P
f
t
=
B fh,t−1
P ft
+W ft H
f
h,t + Div
f
t ,
where wages are assumed to flexible and taken as given by households.
The FOCs for bonds and consumption are both similar to the domestic economy and can be
combined with Y ft = C
f
t to get to an Euler equation for output:
Et
[
β
Λ ft+1
Λ ft
R ft P
f
t
P ft+1
]
= 1, (2.24)
Λ ft = e
y f
t (C
f
t − κ f C ft−1)−1. (2.25)
Wages are flexible and hours are set optimally such that the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption equals the real wage rate:
ey ft (H
f
h,t)
σ
f
l = Λ ftW
f
t . (2.26)
Aggregate production is a simple function of aggregate working hours and the global technology
process: Y ft = AtH
f
t . So real marginal costs can be expressed as follows:
MC ft =
W ft
At
=
(H ft )
σ
f
l
(C ft −κ f C ft−1)−1
At
=
(
Y ft
At
)σ fl
(C ft − κ f C ft−1)
At
=
(
Y ft
At
)σ fl +1(
1− κ f Y
f
t−1
Y ft
)
. (2.27)
Optimal price setting and the law of motion of the foreign price level are given by:
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(ξ
f
p)
sβsΛ ft+sY
f
j,t+s
 P˜ fj,t
P ft
(
P ft+s−1
P ft−1
)γ fp
P ft
P ft+s
−
(
1+ λ fp,t
)
MC ft
 = 0, (2.28)
P ft =
ξ fp (P ft−1(Π ft−1)γ fp)− 1λ fp,t + (1− ξ fp) (P˜ ft )− 1λ fp,t
−λ
f
p,t
. (2.29)
The last 3 equations can be combined to get to a simple New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Finally, monetary policy can be described by the following log-linar rule:
R̂ ft = ρrR
f
t−1 + (1− ρr)(ψ fpiΠ̂ ft + ψ fy ŷ ft ) + ert , (2.30)
2.2. THE BASELINE MODEL WITHOUT THE LABOR MARKET 21
where ρr is introduced to account for the persistence of interest rates and it is assumed that
deviations of output from its steady state are taken as proxy for the output gap (therefore ŷ ft
enters the last equation).
Trade with Austria
Exports to Austria are assembled out of the foreign good (which has price P ft ) and are sold at
price Pmt to Austrian final good firms:
Pmt = e
pim
t P
f
t , (2.31)
where the wedge epimt between P
f
t and P
m
t can be interpreted as a mark-up process (e
pim
t =
ρpimepimt−1 + (1− ρpim)epim + epimepimt ).
Imports from Austria (which are bought at price Pt) and domestic production are assemblied to
foreign final goods with the following production function:
F fk,t =
∫ 1
0
µ σmf1+σmff (D fk,t) 11+σmf + (1− µ f ) σmf1+σmf (φ fk,tM fk,t) 11+σmf
1+σmf dk, (2.32)
where µ f → 1. Therefore F ft → Y ft = D ft and – as assemblers are perfectly competitive – the price
of the foreign final good P ft equals the price of the foreign intermediate good. φ
f
k,t represents
import adjustment costs as in (2.22) with shock process e˜mft .
2.2.4 Aggregate output and net foreign assets
In addition to the equations presented above, a set of market clearing conditions is needed to
complete the model. The aggregate production function can be derived by putting (2.13) into
(2.10):
Yt = A1−αt e
a
t
(∫ 1
0
Kˇ
α
1+λp,t
j,t L
1−α
1+λp,t
j,t dj
)1+λp,t
− AtΦ. (2.33)
The market clearing condition for the final goods market relates supply (Ft) to total demand,
given by the sum of private consumption, investment, government consumption and exports:16
Ft = Ct + It + Xt + Ate
g
t , (2.34)
where Ate
g
t denotes government consumption, which evolves according to Ate
g
t = (1− ρg)Atgc+
ρgAte
g
t−1 + Atgceg,t. As final goods firms are competitive, it holds that PtFt = P
d
t Yt + P
m
t Mt,
which – using (2.34) – can be reformulated as follows:
Pdt Yt = PtFt − Pmt Mt = Pt(Ct + It + Xt + Ategt )− Pmt Mt. (2.35)
As indicated before, monetary policy (and so the euro area interest rate) are treated as exogenous.
Therefore I use a (risk) premium on foreign bond holdings to ensure stationarity of net foreign
16Since there is only one final good, the price index cancels out of the equation.
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assets and other macroeconomic aggregates.17
The risk-adjusted interest rate is similar to Adolfson et al. (2007) and given by R ft φ˜rp
(
n f at, e
rp
t
)
,
where φ˜rp is related to the ratio of real net foreign assets over domestic production valued at
export prices (n f at :=
B ft
PtYt ) via the following functional form:
φ˜rp
(
n f at, e
rp
t
)
= exp
(
−φrpn f at + erpt
)
. (2.36)
The budget constraint of the government is given by
Ate
g
t + At(1− Nt)b+
B fg,t
R ft φ˜rp
(
n f at, e
rp
t
)
Pt
= Tt +
B fg,t−1
Pt
,
where B fg,t are bonds held by the government in t (so in reality B
f
g,t would be negative in most
industrialized countries). Aggregating the budget constraints of the domestic households and
the domestic government (B ft =
∫ 1
0 B
f
h,tdh+ B
f
g,t), one gets to the law of motion of foreign bond
holdings
B ft
R ft φ˜rp
(
n f at, e
rp
t
) = B ft−1 + PtXt − PMt Mt. (2.37)
Dividing (2.37) by PtYt and using the definition of n f at leads to:
n f at
R ft φ˜rp
(
n f at, e
rp
t
) = n f at−1
Πt YtYt−1
+
Xt
Yt
− P
M
t
Pt
Mt
Yt
. (2.38)
2.3 Specifications of the labor market
In the model of Fenz et al. (2012), on which the previous chapter is based upon, there are just
two observable labor market variables: real wages W and employment in persons N. They are
linked to the rest of the model by one equation relating wages to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure and one equation relating unobservable working hours to
observable employment in persons.18
In this paper, I will additionally include average working hours of employed persons H and the
number of posted vacancies V as observables (as the size of the labor force is normalized to 1,
employment N implies the number of unemployed U).
2.3.1 Baseline specification
The baseline specification in the model is a combination of features which are widely used in the
literature on search unemployment in DSGE models; for example, there are many similarities
with the baseline model in Christoffel et al. (2009).
Entrepreneurs in the 1st stage of production (the linkages to the other stages of production are
17See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for an overview over options to close small-open-economy-models.
18The latter has been done as data on employment in persons is thought to be more reliable than data on working
hours.
2.3. SPECIFICATIONS OF THE LABOR MARKET 23
described in section 2.2.2) are ex ante symmetric.19 They search for workers in the labor market.
The production of firm i is given by:
Li,t = ςxNi,tH
γ
i,t,
where γ < 1. This specification ensures that – like with capital – there is both an extensive
(number of employees) and an intensive (working hours) margin of employment.
All of these firms employ a unit interval of workers (such that every firm employs members from
all households in the economy), so Ni,t = 1 ∀i. Due to perfect competition they all charge the
same price PL,t for their good. The relationship between demand (of intermediate good producing
firms) and supply of labor services is as follows:
Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lj,tdj =
∫ Nt
0
Li,tdi =
∫ Nt
0
ςxH
γ
i,tdi. (2.39)
To hire labor, entrepreneurs post vacancies V. They are matched to the unemployed U by a linear
homogeneous matching function; the number of newly hired workers who start working in t is
given by:
Matcht = ςmeθtV
η
t−1U
1−η
t−1 ,
where eθt = (1− ρθ) + ρθeθt−1 + eθt is time-varying matching efficiency. The exact timing in each
period is as follows:
1. A fraction δ of existing matches separates exogenously.
2. Matches are formed out of vacancies from t− 1 and the unemployed from t− 1 (where
matching efficiency depends on the realization of eθt ). People having lost their job at the
beginning of the period are excluded in this stage.
3. At the same time the other aggregate shocks (productivity, external demand ...) materialize.
4. Entrepreneurs post vacancies and the unemployed (including the ones who just lost their
job) search.
5. At the same time existing matches (including the ones formed just at the beginning of the
period) are negotiating wages and working hours, and are producing labor services.
People who are unemployed at the end of period t− 1 can search in the labor market in the
beginning of t. Their probability qU of starting to work in t is given by:
Matcht
Ut−1
=: qU(θt−1, eθt ) = ςmeθt θ
η
t−1,
where θ denotes labor market tightness θt = VtUt . There is no on-the-job-search. Firms have to pay
a fee cV,t for posting vacancies; the probability qV of filling a vacancy and start working in t is
19Kuester (2007) combines the search friction (here in the first stage of production) and the price-setting friction (here
in the second stage) into one stage of production. I do not use this specification as then the model comparison would
become very difficult computationally.
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given by:
Matcht
Vt−1
=: qV(θt−1, eθt ) = ςmeθt θ
η−1
t−1 .
The employed in period t are given by the employed of the previous period whose job was not
destroyed ((1− δ)Nt−1) plus the previously unemployed who found a job (qU(θt−1, eθt )Ut−1):
Nt = (1− δ)Nt−1 + qU(θt−1, eθt )Ut−1. (2.40)
As there is a unit mass of agents in each household, unemployment is simply given by:
Ut = 1− Nt. (2.41)
Shocks to matching efficiency eθt drive a wedge between (un)employment in t and (un)employment
and vacancies in t− 1. As all these variables are observable, it is assumed that the matching
efficiency shock is realized only at the beginning of the period where new matches are starting to
work (i.e. in period t); otherwise there would have been problems when estimating the model.
Let JF and JV denote the value of a match and of posting one more vacancy to the employer
and let JW and JU be the values of being employed at firm i and of being unemployed.20 The
corresponding asset equations are as follows:
JF,i,t = PL,tςxH
γ
i,t −Wi,tHi,t − AtΦL + βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(1− δ)JF,i,t+1, (2.42)
JV,t = −AtcV,t + βEtqV(θt, eθt+1)
Λt+1
Λt
JF,new,t+1, (2.43)
JW,i,t = Wi,tHi,t − e
L
t e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t + βEt
Λt+1
Λt
((1− δ)JW,i,t+1 + δJU,t+1) , (2.44)
JU,t = Atb+ βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(
qU(θt, eθt+1)JW,new,t+1 + (1− qU(θt, eθt+1))JU,t+1
)
, (2.45)
where Wi,t is the hourly wage rate paid in firm i, AtΦL are fixed costs (paid to households),21
AtcV,t is the cost of posting a vacancy (in terms of the final good), PL,t is the price of one unit of
labor service in t, δ is the exogenous job-breakup rate and Atb is the unemployment benefit.22
The subscript new means that an average is taken over newly formed matches only; if no subscript
is used, then the respective expressions refer to economy-wide averages.
2.3.2 Variations within this baseline
As said before, I will compare several different specifications of the labor market in this pa-
per. Alternative rules for hiring costs, wage determination and hours determination can be
specified within the above stated framework (in contrast to endogenous job destruction and
contemporaneous hiring, which will be discussed separately in subsections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).
20The difference between JW and JU divided by the marginal utility of consumption yields the marginal value of having
one more employed member in a household.
21For the rationale behind these fixed costs in the spirit of Christoffel and Kuester (2008) see section 2.5.3.
22To ensure that hiring costs, fixed costs and unemployment benefits do not become negligible in the long run, they are
assumed to grow in line with At.
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Alternative hiring costs
To ensure that firms do not post an infinite number of vacancies, it is assumed that they have
to pay fees for that. The exact specification of this fee can influence the co-movements of labor
market variables.
1. Linear hiring costs: Linear hiring costs are the widely used standard specification in the
literature on search unemployment and mean that cV,t = cV . As the zero-expected-profit-
condition for entrepreneurs (JV,t = 0) holds in all periods, the following condition for hiring can
be derived:23
Et
AtcV
qV(θt, eθt+1)
=
= βEt
Λt+1
Λt
[
PL,t+1ςxH
γ
new,t+1 − At+1ΦL −Wnew,t+1Hnew,t+1 + (1− δ)
At+1cV
qV(θt+1, eθt+2)
]
.(2 46)
The left-hand side (LHS) is simply the expected cost of filling a vacancy. The right-hand side
(RHS) is given by the discounted flow profit of next period (simply revenue minus wages and
fixed costs) plus an expression for the expected value of the match in later periods (multiplied by
the survival probability).
This equation is crucial for the determination of the labor market tightness and thereby the level
of unemployment: An increase in price PL,t+1 or a decrease in hourly wages Wt+1 causes – ceteris
paribus – an increase in expected cost of filling a vacancy which is equivalent to an increase in
labor market tightness θt (via a higher number of vacancies this period). This leads to a decrease
in unemployment next period.24
2. Non-linear hiring costs: Several prominent papers in the literature deviate from the standard
case of linear hiring costs; for example Gertler et al. (2008) and Thomas (2008) model large firms
whose overall vacancy posting costs are quadratic in the number of their posted vacancies and
decreasing in its overall workforce.
To keep things simple I assume that for a given entrepreneur the cost of posting one vacancy
depends on the aggregate number of posted vacancies with the following functional form:
cV,t =
AtcVV
ψv
t
Vψv .
25 Then (2.46) becomes:
Et
AtcVV
ψv
t
qV(θt, eθt+1)V
ψv
=
= βEt
Λt+1
Λt
[
PL,t+1ςxH
γ
new,t+1 − At+1ΦL −Wnew,t+1Hnew,t+1 + (1− δ)
At+1cVV
ψv
t+1
qV(θt+1, eθt+2)V
ψv
]
.(2.47)
23Derivation in appendix 2.A.
24Note that cV,t
qV (θt ,eθt+1)
enters (2.46) with coefficient 1 while Et
cV,t+1
qV (θt+1 ,eθt+2)
enters with coefficient β(1− δ)Et Λt+1Λt which
is significantly smaller than 1 when being close to the steady state.
25The scaling by Vψv is done to ensure that in steady state the costs of posting one vacancy are cV in both specifications.
If ψv > 0, I could interpret this equation as the result from large firms facing overall vacancy posting costs of
AtcVV
1+ψv
i,t
(1+ψv)Vψv
.
This would imply marginal costs of posting another vacancy of
AtcVV
ψv
i,t
Vψv . Then equations (2.42) and (2.43) would describe
the value of employing one more worker and posting one more vacancy, respectively.
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If ψV > 0, the number of posted vacancies would likely fluctuate less than in the case of linear
vacancy posting costs (while with ψV < 0 they would likely fluctuate more), as then it would be
relatively cheaper for entrepreneurs to smooth the number of posted vacancies over time.
Alternative ways of working hours determination
In a competitive neoclassical economy without frictions both firms and workers take the wage
rate as given when deciding on labor demand respectively labor supply. In this case it would
have to hold that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equals the
wage rate equals the marginal revenue product of labor, where the first equality is the FOC for
labor supply and the second equality the FOC for labor demand.
However, wages are not taken as given by agents in models with search unemployment – they
are the result of a negotiation process between the worker and the entrepreneur (see also below
in subsection 2.3.2), in which the rent generated by the match is shared. Currently there are two
popular ways to determine working hours (in case they are endogenous at all); both assume that
the number of hours can be freely adjusted (reoptimized) every period.
I. ’Efficient bargaining’: In case of ’efficient bargaining’, which is for example used by Thomas
(2008), the joint surplus of entrepreneur and worker JF,i,t + JW,i,t − JU,t is maximized by taking
the first derivative with regard to working hours.26 The optimality condition ’marginal revenue
product = marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption’ leads to:
PL,tςxγH
γ−1
i,t =
ect e
L
t ςLH
σL
i,t
Λt
. (2.48)
II. ’Right-to-manage’ bargaining: When assuming efficient bargaining, there is no direct re-
lationship between wages and consumer prices as wages then do not enter the Price Phillips
curve.
This has led to the suggestion of an alternative specification in which, given a wage schedule,
firms maximize their value of the match JF,i,t. Among others, Trigari (2006) and Christoffel and
Kuester (2008) employ this setting. Taking the first derivative of the RHS of (2.42) with regard to
working hours leads to the optimality condition that ’marginal revenue product = hourly wage’:27
PL,tςxγH
γ−1
i,t =Wi,t. (2.49)
Assuming that σL is relatively large (meaning a relatively high marginal disutility when working
slightly more), this specification can lead to relatively large reactions of working hours to certain
shocks as adjusting the intensive margin of employment is typically much ’cheaper’ from the
firm’s perspective than in the efficient-bargaining-case.
Note that the terms ’efficient bargaining’ and ’right-to-manage’ have been used in a somewhat
older literature in a slightly different context, namely the negotiations between a union and a
26As hours can be freely adjusted every period, all derivatives of terms of t+ 1 with regard to working hours in t are
zero.
27To ensure that firms can cover the costs of posting vacancies in the case of ’right-to-manage’, one either needs
decreasing returns to labor or a downward sloping demand curve for each firm. I choose the former as merging all
the involved frictions (search friction, Calvo pricing, possibly rigid wages) into the differentiated sector would be very
complicated (see for example Christoffel et al., 2009).
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firm on employment in persons and wages. Furthermore the term (weakly)28 efficient bargaining
is only used there in case of Nash bargaining on both wages and employment (see for example
Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, chapter 7), while in this paper ’efficient bargaining’ on working
hours does not necessarily mean that there is Nash bargaining on wages too (see below).
Alternative ways of incorporating wage rigidities
As indicated before, in models with search frictions wage rates are determined in negotiations
between workers and entrepreneurs. In principle, every wage rate which makes both better of
than their respective outside option (posting a vacancy/being unemployed) is a possible solution
to the bargaining problem (see for example Hall, 2005).
The standard assumption is that wages are renegotiated every period via Nash bargaining between
entrepreneur and worker where JνF,i(JW,i − JU)1−ν is maximized with regard to the (hourly) wage.
Making this assumption can lead to a significant volatility of nominal and real wages. While the
level of wages is relevant for the determination of working hours only in case of right-to-manage,
the wages of newly hired employees are crucial for job creation. The more rigid they are, the
larger will be the response of the extensive margin of employment to shocks to productivity
and/or demand. So one could suppose that wages move only slowly within the possible range
(which makes both negotiators better of than their outside option), as for example suggested by
Hall (2005).29
For the rest of the paper I will assume that, in absence of wage rigidities, there will be Nash
bargaining on wages between the entrepreneur and workers. They maximize JνF,i,t(JW,i,t − JU,t)1−ν
with respect to the wage rate; this yields:
ν(JW,i,t − JU,t)∂(JW,i,t − JU,t)∂Wi,t + (1− ν)JF,i,t
∂JF,i,t
∂Wi,t
= 0.
In case of efficient bargaining30 this reduces to:
ν(JW,i,t − JU,t) = (1− ν)JF,i,t,
which means that the the entrepreneur will get a share of ν of the overall surplus (with the
residuum going to the worker). In case of Nash bargaining every period in firm i (but not
28As the negotiations in my model are just between one worker and one employer, there is no distinction between
’weakly efficient bargaining’ and ’strongly efficient bargaining’ as in chapter 7 of Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), where due
to risk-aversion of workers there is over-employment (and therefore the outcome only being ’weakly efficient’) when
unemployment benefits and/or severance payments for the non-employed union members are not part of the bargaining
process.
29In both variants of rigid wages I actually would have to constrain the wages to lie in the bargaining set of worker and
employer – to avoid cases in which the surplus of one or both agents is negative. In the steady state both surpluses are
positive and in my analysis of out-of-steady-state-dynamics I linearize around this point. According to Hall (2005)[p. 64]
ignoring this constraint is ’unlikely to have any practical effect’ in such cases.
30Here it holds that ∂(JW,i,t−JU,t)∂Wi,t = Hi,t and
∂JF,i,t
∂Wi,t
= −Hi,t.
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necessarily in the other firms), the real wage rate would be given by:31
Wnbi,t Hi,t = (1− ν)
(
PL,tςxH
γ
i,t − AtΦL
)
+ ν
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t
)
+νβEtqU(θt, eθt+1)
Λt+1
Λt
(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1). (2.50)
In case of right-to-manage the number of hours depends directly on the wage rate,32 which makes
things more complicated:33
ν
MRSi,t
Wi,t
− γ
1− γ (JW,i,t − JU,t) = (1− ν)JF,i,t,
where MRSi,t =
ect e
L
t ςLH
σL
i,t
Λt
. In this specification the share of workers in the overall surplus
increases in the number of hours worked, which dampens the effects of an increase in the price
of the labor service good on the number of hours worked (see for example Christoffel et al., 2009).
Solving for the wage rate yields:341+ 1− ν
ν
1− γ
MRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
Wnbi,t Hi,t =
=
1− ν
ν
1− γ
MRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
(PL,tH
γ
i,t − AtΦL) + Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t
+β
1− ν
ν
(1− δ)EtΛt+1Λt JF,i,t+1
 1− γMRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
− 1− γMRSi,t+1
Wnbi,t+1
− γ

+βEt
Λt+1
Λt
qU(θt, eθt+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1). (2.51)
The combination of Nash bargaining on wages and right-to-manage-determination of working
hours leads to Pareto-inefficient contracts. In case of ’classical’ right-to-manage (between unions
and employers) this can be justified by – implicitely – assuming that wages and employment are
being determined on different levels (i.e. wages are determined between unions and federations
of employers while employment is determined by the aggregation of decisions of individual
employers) and by the fact that wages are much easier to enforce at court than employment in
persons (see for example Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, chapter 7). However, these arguments do
apply to a much smaller extent in this case as it is clearly about negotiation of working hours and
wages on the firm level. Therefore I will also use simple ’surplus sharing’ (equation (2.50), i.e.
the solution to the wage determination problem in case of efficient bargaining) in combination
with right-to-manage. This will be useful to see how the empirical performance of models with
right-to-manage is influenced separately by the different setting of working hours and the more
31Derivation in appendix 2.A. The superscript nb is used as (see below) this wage rate might be only a hypothetical
reference value in case of real or nominal wage rigidities.
32Rearranging (2.49) yields Hi,t =
(
PL,tςxγ
Wi,t
) 1
1−γ . This implies ∂(JW,i,t−JU,t)∂Wi,t =
Hi,t
1−γ (
MRSi,t
Wi,t
− γ) and ∂JF,i,t∂Wi,t = −Hi,t.
33Derivations in appendix 2.A.
34Derivation in appendix 2.A.
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complicated formula for wage determination.
A. Flexible wages: In case of absence of wage rigidities, the wage is simply given by:35
Wi,tHi,t =Wnbi,t Hi,t. (2.52)
B. Real rigidity: A relatively simple possibility to introduce real wage rigidities is used in
Krause and Lubik (2007), where the actual wage is a convex combination of the hypothetical
Nash bargaining wage and the steady state wage:36
Wi,t = (1− ξwr)Wnbi,t + ξwrAtw, (2.53)
where w is the steady state value of WtAt . Note that in this case as well as in A the i-index can be
dropped as there 1st-stage-firms are also completely symmetric when out of the steady state.
To some extent, one could think of this specification as a special case of flexible wages with a
relatively lower bargaining power of the worker. However, in contrast to a high value of ξwr, a
lower bargaining power of workers would also have a strong influence on steady state ratios,
which can be important for reactions to permanent shocks and in some cases also for driving
short-run-fluctuations.
C. Nominal rigidity (Calvo wages): Another popular (and slightly more complicated) variant
to introduce wage rigidity is a Calvo-type rigidity of nominal wages; among others, Thomas
(2008) and Gertler et al. (2008) make this assumption.37
In each period, the wage of a match can be freely adjusted with probability 1− ξw; if adjusted,
they are determined by Nash bargaining (taking into account that there is a chance that the wage
cannot be readjusted the following periods). The remaining fraction ξw of existing matches does
full indexation to the growth in At and partial indexation to previous inflation which means that
the previous nominal wage is multiplied by AtAt−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γw
.
Firms and employees which are optimizing in t agree on a nominal wage PtW∗t which solves the
following condition:38
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βsΛt+s(1− δ)sξsw
(
At+s
At
(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)γw Pt
Pt+s
W∗i,tHi,t+s −Wnbi,t+sHi,t+s
)
= 0. (2.54)
For a better understanding of (2.54) one can think in the following steps:
• PtW∗t is the nominal wage agreed on in t.
35If in each periods all matches can vary their wages freely according to the proposed surplus sharing rule, one could
actually reduce (2.50) to Wnbi,t Hi,t = (1− ν)
(
PL,tςxH
γ
i,t + cV,tθt
)
+ ν
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
t ςL
(1+σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t
)
, which might be a more
familiar expression for many readers. Note again that (2.50) is computed as if there were Nash bargaining/surplus
sharing every period in match i, but not necessarily in all the other matches.
36Hall (2005) proposes to use a convex combinaton of the hypothetical Nash bargaining wage and last period’s actual
wage.
37This looks similar to the nominal wage rigidities used in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Fenz et al. (2012). However,
the search-friction allows me to incorporate such rigidities without the assumption that workers have all the bargaining
power in negotiation with firms.
38I follow here the approach of Thomas (2008) to express the derivation of Calvo wages.
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• If not adjusted in the following periods, due to indexations the nominal wage in period
t+ s is given by At+sAt
(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)γw
PtW∗t .
• Dividing the later expression by Pt+s yields the implied real wage in period t+ s.
• The net present value of this expression has to be equal to the net present value of Nash
bargaining wages Wnbt+s of the respective periods (weighted by working hours Hi,t+s). The
standard discount factor βsΛt+s is multiplied by ξsw as there can be a renegotiation of wages
and by (1− δ)s as the match may break up.
I assume that newly matched employees receive the average wage of the others.39 So the law of
motion for average real wages Wt of employed workers is as follows:
Wt = (1− ξw)W∗t + ξw
At
At−1
Pt−1
Pt
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γw
Wt−1. (2.55)
Main differences to the specification in B are the forward-looking-nature and the possible
importance of inflation; the latter point being more important in the model selection procedure
(which is based on a backward-looking policy function).
In both the specification on rigid real wages and rigid nominal wages I assume that the rigidities
affect all workers. Note that Haefke et al. (2009) provide micro-evidence which shows that in the
US the wages of newly hired workers tend to be less rigid than the ones of ’old’ workers (see also
Pissarides, 2009). However, Gertler and Trigari (2009) argue that this is at least partly driven by
composition effects, namely that in economically bad times job creation is higher in low earning
occupations (they also provide some empirical evidence for this argument).
2.3.3 Endogenous job destruction
In the specifications discussed so far, variations in employment are driven by fluctuations in
hiring (via changes in vacancies and shocks to the exogenous matching efficiency). This is not
consistent with stylized facts on business cycles as involuntary (from the employee’s viewpoint)
job destruction tends to be higher in bad times.
This is why plenty of papers also let job destruction vary over the business cycle, contribu-
tions in the New Keynesian DSGE context include Krause and Lubik (2007) and Trigari (2009).
However, endogenous job destruction tends to induce a counterfactual positive correlation be-
tween unemployment and vacancies, which somehow limits its popularity for modelling search
unemployment.40
To make things tractable, I will follow the approach used by Trigari (2009), in which workers
receive iid shocks to their disutility of work at the beginning of each period.41 This means that
the flow utility of household h is now given by (the old flow utility is visible in equation (2.1)):
ect
(
ln(Ch,t − κCt−1)−
∫ Nt
0
(
eLt ςL
1+ σL
H1+σLh,i,t +
bi,t
Λh,t
)
di
)
,
39The same assumption is for example also made by Kuester (2007).
40See for example Shimer (2005) and Ramey (2008). However, Ramey (2008) shows that this ’undesired’ positive
correlation can disappear when also including on-the-job-search.
41The approach of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), in which workers receive idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity,
is more popular in the literature. However, implementing this way of endogenous destruction in a setting with endogenous
working hours is very complicated as working hours would not be symmetric across matches in the steady state (see for
example Christoffel et al., 2009).
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where bi,t has a cumulative distribution function G(b) and a probability density function g(b) =
G′(b); the scaling of bi,t via dividing by Λh,t is done for notational convenience. If the realization
of bi is large enough to make the value of the match for the employer negative (via higher wages
which he has to pay), match i is resolved. So it is assumed that the worker has no influence on
the job destruction decision (i.e. the worker would even stay in the job if he were better of when
being unemployed).
The exact timing in each period is as follows:
1. A fraction δ of existing matches separates exogenously.
2. Matches are formed out of vacancies from t− 1 and the unemployed from t− 1 (where
matching efficiency depends on the realization of eθt ).
3. At the same time the other aggregate shocks (productivity, external demand ...) materialize.
4. The idiosyncratic shock to the disutility of work materializes; jobs above the threshold are
destroyed.
5. Entrepreneurs post vacancies and the unemployed (including the ones who just lost their
job) search.
6. At the same time existing matches are negotiating wages and working hours, and are
producing labor services.
Determination of employment and vacancies
The new law of motion of employment is given by:42
Nt = G(b˜t)((1− δ)Nt−1 + qU(θt−1, eθt )Ut−1), (2.56)
where b˜t is the time-varying threshold for the disutility of work.
The new asset equations are given by:
JF,i,t = PL,tςxH
γ
i,t − AtΦL −Wi,tHi,t + βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(1− δ)G(b˜t+1)JF,i,t+1, (2.57)
JV,t = −AtcV,t + βEtqV(θt, eθt+1)
Λt+1
Λt
G(b˜t+1)JF,new,t+1, (2.58)
JW,i,t = Wi,tHi,t − e
L
t e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t − Atςbbi,t
+βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(
(1− δ)G(b˜t+1)JW,i,t+1 + (1− (1− δ)G(b˜t+1))JU,t+1
)
, (2.59)
JU,t = Atb+
+βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(
qU(θt, eθt+1)G(b˜t+1)JW,new,t+1 + (1− qU(θt, eθt+1)G(b˜t+1))JU,t+1
)
.(2.60)
42Exogenous job destruction δ and the flow value of being unemployed b are scaled down in this setting, such that
overall job destruction and the sum of the flow value of being unemployed plus average disutility of work correspond to
their exogenous-job-destruction-counterparts in the previous section. For further details see appendix 2.B.
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The new hiring condition is given by (see appendix):
Et
AtcV,t
qV(θt, eθt+1)
=
= βEt
Λt+1
Λt
G(b˜t+1)
(
PL,t+1ςxH
γ
t+1 − At+1ΦL −Wnew,t+1Ht+1 + (1− δ)
At+1cV,t+1
qV(θt+1, eθt+2)
)
.(2.61)
Determination of wages and working hours
To ensure that working hours are independent of the realization of bi and therefore identical
across all matches (which holds with efficient bargaining due to the assumed additivity of fixed
and variable disutility of work), I exclude the case of ’right-to-manage’-determination of working
hours.
Furthermore I exclude the combination of endogenous destruction with Calvo-type nominal wage
rigidities such that the realizations of bi are the only driver of wage dispersion (as in the case of
rigid real or flexible wages). In case of Calvo wages it would also be influenced by the probability
to reoptimize nominal wages.43
Nash bargaining wages in match i are given by
Wnbi,t Hi,t = (1− ν)
(
PL,tςxH
γ
i,t − AtΦL
)
+ ν
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t + Atςbbi,t
)
+νβEtqU(θt, eθt+1)
Λt+1
Λt
G(b˜t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1). (2.62)
The average wage bill Wnbt Ht in case of Nash bargaining wages is derived by integrating over b:
Wnbt Ht = (1− ν)
(
PL,tςxH
γ
t − AtΦL
)
+ ν
Atb+ eLt ectςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLt + Atςb
∫ b˜t
0 bg(b)db
G(b˜t)

+νβEtqU(θt, eθt+1)
Λt+1
Λt
G(b˜t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1). (2.63)
As before, in case of rigid real wages, wage in firm i is given by Wi,t = (1− ξwr)Wnbi,t + ξwrAtw.
Determination of job destruction
As I excluded the case of Calvo wages, wages are symmetric for a given values of bi. So it holds
that Et JF,i,t+1 = Et JF,new,t+1. Combining (2.57) and (2.58) and using that JV,t = 0 yields:
JF,i,t = PL,tςxH
γ
i,t − AtΦL −Wi,tHi,t +Et(1− δ)
AtcV,t
qV(θt, eθt+1)
.
43In the following there will be a state-dependent threshold for the wage rate above which matches are destroyed. In
economic downturns (upturns) Calvo wages lead to the situation that matches will (not) be destroyed in spite of relatively
low (high) realizations of bi because they are not able to reoptimize their wages.
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Job i is directly at the margin of being destroyed when JF,i,t = 0. Plugging in for the wage rate
yields:
PL,tςxH
γ
t − AtΦL − ξwrAtw
−(1− ξwr)
(
(1− ν)(PL,tςxHγi,t − AtΦL) + ν
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t + Atςbbi,t
))
−(1− ξwr)νβEtqU(θt, eθt+1)
Λt+1
Λt
G(b˜t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1) +Et(1− δ) AtcV,tqV(θt, eθt+1)
= 0,
where in case of fully flexible wages ξwr = 0. Rearranging and replacing bi,t by b˜t yields the job
destruction condition:
(1− (1− ξwr)ν)
(
PL,tςxH
γ
t − AtΦL
)− ξwrAtw
−(1− ξwr)ν
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLt + Atςb b˜t
)
+Et(1− δ) AtcV,t
qV(θt, eθt+1)
−(1− ξwr)νβEtqU(θt, eθt+1)
Λt+1
Λt
G(b˜t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1) = 0. (2.64)
Note that the choice of the driving force of endogenous destruction makes the interaction with
wage rigidities at the firm level somehow counterintuitive. A – from the perspective of the
entrepreneur – negative idiosyncratic shock to a match is a higher disutility of work, which
leads to higher wage requests of the worker. Rigid wages then mean that the worker gets
only compensated for a small part of this additional disutility, making a negative value of the
match for the entrepreneur less likely. However, this does not affect aggregate labor market
dynamics as the distribution of this idiosyncratic shock is assumed to be time-invariant. So
wage rigidities still have the intuitive effect that there is a ’too small’ adjustment of wages to a
negative aggregate shock, leading to a – ceteris paribus (i.e. same parameter values) – higher
job destruction. Furthermore, such wage rigidities can lead to inefficient separations, i.e. certain
matches are resolved (i.e. jobs destroyed) in spite of having a positive surplus (but due to these
rigidities the surplus cannot be distributed such that the entrepreneur is better of than with his
outside option).
While wages are symmetric in steady state when assuming exogenous job destruction, they
are not in case of endogenous destruction as wages in firm i depend on the realization of the
idiosyncratic shock process bi. So the reference value Atw is not the steady state wage of a given
match, it is only the average over all firms. This means that wage dispersion would become
relatively smaller when ξwr > 0 (and thereby dampening the endogenous component of job
destruction) for a given standard deviation of bi given parameter values. As g(b˜) (and thereby
the standard deviation of bi) will be estimated, though, this effect can be compensated.
2.3.4 Contemporaneous hiring
The typical textbook version of the search and matching model is in formulated in continuous
time (see for example Pissarides (2000) or Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)). However, when one
wants to estimate the model, one has to assume that time is discrete. In the case discussed in the
previous subsections (from now on referred to as ’lagged hiring’), the contemporaneous response
to changes in demand for labor services is made only via working hours and job destruction (if it
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is endogenous), but not via job creation. So in case of exogenous destruction this specification
leads automatically to the result that the one-step-ahead-forecast-errors in unemployment are
solely attributed to the matching efficiency shock as apart from eθt unemployment in t only
depends on variables from t− 1.
The situation is quite similar with the other factor of production, namely (physical) capital. For
production in t, the capital stock of the end of period t− 1 is used. A shock raising the rental
rate (marginal productivity) of capital contemporaneously affects only the utilization rate Zt (the
analogue to working hours), while it can raise the capital stock only from the next period on (via
higher investment – which could be seen as an analogue to vacancies – in t).
In this subsection I will let employment in t depend on vacancies posted in t, which will lead to a
faster reaction of (un)employment to changes in economic conditions. This specification is for
example also employed in Ravenna and Walsh (2008) or in one of the variations in Christoffel
et al. (2009).
The exact timing in this new setting is as follows in each period:
1. A fraction δ of existing matches separates exogenously.
2. Entrepreneurs post vacancies and the unemployed (including the ones who just lost their
job) search.
3. Matches are formed out of vacancies from t and people who are unemployed at the
beginning from period t44 (they start working the same period).
4. At the same time the other aggregate shocks (productivity, external demand ...) materialize.
5. The idiosyncratic shock to the disutility of work materializes; jobs above the threshold are
destroyed (in case of exogenous job destruction this stage disappears).
6. Existing matches are negotiating wages and working hours, and are producing labor
services.
In the following only the equations for the case of endogenous job destruction will be shown.
The equations for exogenous job destruction can be simply derived by setting G(b˜t) = 1 and
neglecting the job destruction condition.45 Appendix 2.B provides a discussion of changes in job
destruction rates and job finding rates to ensure that as many steady state ratios as possible are
the same as before.
Determination of employment and vacancies
The new law of motion of employment is:
Nt = G(b˜t)((1− δ)Nt−1 + qU(θt, eθt )(1− (1− δ)Nt−1)), (2.65)
where the new labor market tightness is given by:
θt =
Vt
1− (1− δ)Nt−1 . (2.66)
44These ’unemployed at the beginning from period t’ are given by the unemployed at the end from t− 1 (= 1− Nt−1)
plus the ones who just lost their job by exogenous destruction (= δNt−1). Note that in the rest of the section the term
’unemployed’ will only refer to the subset of them who were not successful in the beginning of t in finding a job (= 1−Nt).
45Intermediate steps for computing the equations below and for the linearized equations are not shown in the appendix,
but they are available from the author on demand.
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The new asset equations are given by:
JF,i,t = PL,tςxH
γ
i,t − AtΦL −Wi,tHi,t + βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(1− δ)G(b˜t+1)JF,i,t+1, (2.67)
JV,t = −AtcV,t + qV(θt, eθt )G(b˜t)JF,new,t, (2.68)
JW,i,t = Wi,tHi,t − e
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)
(2.69)
+βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(
δ(1− qU(θt+1, eθt+1)) + (1− δ+ δqU(θt+1, eθt+1))(1− G(b˜t+1))
)
JU,t+1,(2.70)
JU,t = Atb+
+βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(
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)
.(2.71)
The new hiring condition is given by:
AtcV,t
qV(θt, eθt )
=
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)
.(2.72)
Determination of wages
The average wage bill Wnbt Ht in case of Nash bargaining is:
Wnbt Ht = (1− ν)
(
PL,tςxH
γ
t − AtΦL
)
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where the difference between value of being employed and of being unemployed JWU is now:
JWU,t := WtHt − e
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Determination of job destruction
Finally, the new job destruction condition is given by:
0 = (1− (1− ξwr)ν)
(
PL,tςxH
γ
t − AtΦL
)− ξwrAtw+ βEtΛt+1Λt (1− δ) At+1cV,t+1qV(θt+1, eθt+1)
−(1− ξwr)ν
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLt + Atςb b˜t
)
−(1− ξwr)νβEtΛt+1Λt qU(θt+1, e
θ
t+1)(1− δ)G(b˜t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1). (2.73)
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2.4 Linearized version of the model
To be able to estimate the model, the equations of sections 2.2 and 2.3 have to be approximated by
a Taylor series around the steady state. In this paper I choose to linearize the model.46 I use the
convention that log-deviations from the steady state are indicated by a hat (ŷt := ln
yt
y ). Variables
without a time subscript denote steady state values.
2.4.1 Efficiency units, relative prices and measurement equations
In this model there are two sources of non-stationarity. They make certain transformations
necessary such that the model is saddle-path-stable and can be estimated.
The technology process At has a unit root and thereby induces non-stationarity in all quantities
(with the exception of hours worked), the real wage and the price of labor services. So I
have to transform the respective variables by dividing them by At. I use the convention that
capital letters refer to the original variables and small letters refer to stationarized variables,
i.e. yt := YtAt , ct :=
Ct
At , it :=
It
At , kt :=
Kt
At , xt :=
Xt
At , mt :=
Mt
At , y
f
t :=
Y ft
At , wt :=
Wt
At , and
pL,t =
PL,t
At . Furthermore, the marginal utility of consumption has to be multiplied with At to
become stationary (λt := ΛtAt). Most of the before mentioned variables are observables (see also
section 2.5.1), so the following measurement equations have to be added:
∆ lnYt = ŷt − ŷt−1 + µ̂at , (2.74)
∆ lnCt = ĉt − ĉt−1 + µ̂at , (2.75)
∆ ln It = ît − ît−1 + µ̂at , (2.76)
∆ ln Xt = x̂t − x̂t−1 + µ̂at , (2.77)
∆ ln Mt = m̂t − m̂t−1 + µ̂at , (2.78)
∆ lnWt = ŵt − ŵt−1 + µ̂at . (2.79)
The other 8 observable variables are all included directly in the model as endogenous variables
(see section 2.5.1); so their measurement equations are straightforward. In principle, measurement
equations could possibly include measurement errors of observable variables. I decided, however,
to give all residuals a structural interpretation and do therefore not use measurement errors.
While inflation rates are pinned down by the foreign monetary policy rule, price levels are not
necessarily stationary. I choose the price of the final good as numeraire and express all other
price levels in relative terms (pdt :=
Pdt
Pt ; p
m
t :=
Pmt
Pt ; p
f
t :=
P ft
Pt ). The laws of motion of the relative
price levels are:47
p̂dt = p̂
d
t−1 + Π̂
d
t − Π̂t (2.80)
p̂mt = p̂
m
t−1 + Π̂
m
t − Π̂t (2.81)
p̂ ft = p̂
f
t−1 + Π̂
f
t − Π̂t. (2.82)
46An appendix to this section which shows intermediate steps for the computationally more demanding linearizations
is available on demand.
47Here I use that pdt =
Pdt
Pt
=
Pdt
Pt
Pdt−1
Pt−1
Pt−1
Pdt−1
=
Pdt−1
Pt−1
Pdt
Pdt−1
Pt−1
Pt
= pdt−1
Πdt
Πt
.
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2.4.2 Non-labor equations
Households
Log-linearizing the first order conditions (2.5) to (2.9) yields the following set of equations for the
households:
The intertemporal Euler equation is computed by linearizing (2.5):
λ̂t −Etλ̂t+1 = R̂ ft −EtΠ̂t+1 − φrpd n f at − µ̂at+1 + erpt , (2.83)
where the marginal utility of consumption is given by:
λ̂t = êct −
1
1− κµa
(
ĉt − κ
µa
(ĉt−1 − µ̂at )
)
. (2.84)
The law of motion for the real value of capital Qt is derived from (2.7):
Q̂t = Et
(
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t − µ̂at+1 +
β
µa
(
(1− τ)Q̂t+1 + RK R̂Kt+1
))
. (2.85)
The investment equation is derived from (2.8):
ît =
1
1+ β
(
ît−1 − êIt − µ̂a,t
)
+
β
1+ β
(
ît+1 + êIt+1 + µ̂a,t+1
)
+
ϕ
1+ β
Q̂t. (2.86)
Linearization of (2.9) yields
Ẑt = ΨR̂Kt , (2.87)
where Ψ = Ψ
′(1)
Ψ′′(1) . In addition to these first order conditions, the log-linear capital accumulation
equation can be obtained by log-linearizing (2.3):
k̂t =
(1− τ)
µa
(
k̂t−1 − µ̂at
)
+
(
1− 1− τ
µa
)
ît. (2.88)
Domestic firms
Combining (2.19) with (2.20) and log-linearizing yields the Phillips curve for the price of the
domestic good:
Π̂dt =
γp
1+ βγp
Π̂dt−1 +
β
1+ βγp
EtΠ̂dt+1 +
(1− βξp)(1− ξp)
ξp(1+ βγp)
(
m̂ct − p̂dt
)
+ e
λp
t , (2.89)
where m̂ct = αR̂Kt + (1− α) p̂L,t − êat and e
λp
t is a rescaled version of the iid shock to λp,t. Note
that here the price of labor services and not the wage rate itself drives real marginal costs and
that the relative price p̂dt enters the equation.
Linearizing (2.15) and then averaging over i leads to an equation for input demands:
p̂L,t + N̂t + γĤt + µˆat = R̂
K
t + Ẑt + k̂t−1. (2.90)
Linearizing and combining the equations that describe the behaviour of the final goods assembling
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firms yields the demand equations for domestic goods and imports:
p̂mt =
σmµ
1+ σm
(ŷt − m̂t) + 2φm (−ŷt−1 + m̂t−1 + ŷt − m̂t) + êmt , (2.91)
p̂dt =
σm(1− µ)
1+ σm
(m̂t − ŷt)− 2φm (1− µ)
µ
(−ŷt−1 + m̂t−1 + ŷt − m̂t)− (1− µ)µ ê
m
t , (2.92)
where emt is a rescaled version of e˜
m
t .
The relationship between import prices and foreign prices is derived by linearizing (2.31):
p̂mt = p̂
f
t + ê
pim
t . (2.93)
Foreign economy
The Euler equation for consumption/output is given by:
ŷ ft =
κ f
µa
1+
κ f
µa
(
ŷ ft−1 − µ̂at
)
+
1
1+
κ f
µa
Et
(
ŷ ft+1 + µ̂
a
t+1
)
−
1− κ fµa
1+
κ f
µa
Et
(
R̂ ft − Π̂ ft+1 + êy ft − êy ft+1
)
.(2.94)
The Phillips curve is:
Π̂ ft =
γp, f
1+ βγp, f
Π̂ ft−1 +
β
1+ βγp, f
EtΠ̂
f
t+1
+
(1− βξp, f )(1− ξp, f )
ξp, f (1+ βγp, f )
(1+ σ fl )ŷ ft +
κ f
µa
1− κ fµa
(ŷ ft − ŷ ft−1 + µ̂at )
+ eΠ ft , (2.95)
where eΠ ft is a rescaled version of the shock to λ
f
p,t. The monetary policy rule has already been
stated in section 2.2:
R̂ ft = ρrR̂
f
t−1 + (1− ρr)(ψ fpiΠ̂ ft + ψ fy ŷ ft ) + ert . (2.96)
The demand for imports from Austria is as follows:
p̂ ft =
σmf
1+ σmf
(ŷ ft − x̂t) + 2φmf
(
−ŷ ft−1 + x̂t−1 + ŷ ft − x̂t
)
+ êmft , (2.97)
where emft is a rescaled version of e˜
mf
t .
GDP and net foreign assets
The evolution of net foreign assets can be described by:
β d n f at =
1
µa
dn f at−1 + xy (x̂t − m̂t − p̂mt ) , (2.98)
where xy is the share of exports in GDP ( xy ). The nominal GDP identity is:
p̂dt + ŷt = cy ĉt + iy ît + (1− iy − cy)êGt + xy (x̂t − m̂t − p̂mt ) , (2.99)
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where cy and iy are the shares of consumption and investment in GDP. Supply of real GDP is:
ŷt =
(
1+
Φ
y
)(
êat + α
(
Ẑt + k̂t−1 − µ̂at
)
+ (1− α)(N̂t + γĤt)
)
. (2.100)
2.4.3 Labor market equations
The equation for labor market tightness is given by
θ̂t = V̂t − Ût. (2.101)
The linearized law of motion of employment is
N̂t = (1− qU − δ)N̂t−1 + ηδθ̂t−1 + δêθ t. (2.102)
The linearized relationship between employment and unemployment is
N̂t = −UNÛt. (2.103)
Hiring costs
1. Linear hiring costs: Linearizing (2.46) yields:
cV
qV
(
(1− η)θ̂t −Et êθt+1 + λ̂t −Etλ̂t+1
)
=
= βpLςxHγEt
(
p̂L,t+1 + γĤt+1
)
− βwHEt
(
Ĥt+1 + ŵt+1
)
+β(1− δ) cV
qV
Et
(
(1− η)θ̂t+1 − êθt+2
)
. (2.104)
2. Non-linear hiring costs: Linearizing (2.47) leads to:
cV
qV
(
(1− η)θ̂t −Et êθt+1 + ψvV̂t −Etλ̂t+1 + λ̂t
)
=
= βpLςxHγEt
(
p̂Lt+1 + γĤt+1
)
− βwHEt(ŵt+1 + Ĥt+1)
+β(1− δ) cV
qV
Et
(
(1− η)θ̂t+1 − êθt+2 + ψvV̂t+1
)
. (2.105)
Determination of working hours
I. Efficient bargaining: Linearizing (2.48) and averaging over i yields:
p̂L,t + (γ− 1)Ĥt = êct + êLt + σLĤt − λ̂t. (2.106)
II. Right-to-manage bargaining: Linearizing (2.49) and averaging over i leads to:
p̂L,t + (γ− 1)Ĥt = ŵt. (2.107)
This equation implies that newly hired workers work the average hours as (by assumption) newly
hired workers receive the average wage, which is a very important result for deriving the hiring
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condition (2.104). The same is also true for the efficient bargaining case, but there hours are
symmetric across all firms anyway.
Wage determination
The equation for the average Nash bargaining wage is derived by loglinearizing (2.50) and then
averaging over i:
wH (ŵnbt + Ĥt) = (1− ν)pLςxHγ
(
p̂L,t + γĤt
)
+ ν
ςL
(1+ σL)λ
H1+σL
(
êLt + êct + (1+ σL)Ĥt − λ̂t
)
+νqUβjwu
(
Etλ̂t+1 − λ̂t + ηθ̂t +Et êθt+1 +Et ĵwu,t+1
)
, (2.108)
where jwu,t :=
JW,new,t−JU,t
At and
jwu ĵwu,t = wH (ŵt + Ĥt)− ςL
(1+ σL)λ
H1+σL
(
êLt + êct + (1+ σL)Ĥt − λ̂t
)
−βqU jwu(ηθ̂t +Et êθt+1) + β(1− δ− qU)jwuEt
(
ĵwu,t+1 + λ̂t+1 − λ̂t
)
. (2.109)
The expression for the average Nash bargaining wage in case of right-to-manage is given by:
wH (ŵnbi,t + Ĥi,t) = (1− ν)pLHγ( p̂L,t + γĤi,t) + ν
ςLH1+σL
(1+ σL)λ
(êLt + ê
c
t − λ̂t + (1+ σL)Ĥi,t)
+νqUβjwu
(
Etλ̂t+1 − λ̂t + ηθ̂t +Et êθt+1 +Et ĵwu,t+1
)
+νβ(1− δ) jwu
1− γEt
(
m̂rsi,t+1 − ŵnbi,t+1
)
− ν jwu
1− γ
(
m̂rsi,t − ŵnbi,t
)
.(2.110)
A. No rigidities: In case of flexible wages, it holds that:
ŵt = ŵnbt . (2.111)
B. Real rigidity: In case of rigid real wages, linearization of (2.53) yields
ŵt = (1− ξwr)ŵnbt. (2.112)
C. Nominal rigidity (Calvo wages): In case of Calvo wages, linearization of (2.54) and (2.55)
leads to:
ŵt =
ξw
1+ ξ2wβ(1− δ)
ŵt−1 +
(1− ξw)(1− β(1− δ)ξw)
1+ ξ2wβ(1− δ)
ŵnbt +
ξwβ(1− δ)
1+ ξ2wβ(1− δ)
Etŵt+1
+
ξwγw
1+ ξ2wβ(1− δ)
Π̂t−1 − 1+ β(1− δ)ξwγw1+ ξ2wβ(1− δ)
Π̂t +
β(1− δ)ξw
1+ ξ2wβ(1− δ)
Π̂t+1. (2.113)
In all these 3 cases (A, B, C) ŵnbt can be replaced by ŵ
sh
t to get to the combination of right-to-
manage-determination of hours with surplus sharing for wages.
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Endogenous job destruction
Nash bargaining wages are given by
wH(ŵnbt + Ĥt) = (1− ν)pLHγ( p̂L,t + γĤt) + ν
H1+σL
λ(1+ σL)
((1+ σL)Ĥt + êct + ê
L
t − λ̂t)
+νςb
g˜b˜
G˜
db˜t − νςb
∫ b˜
0 bg(b)db
G˜2
g˜db˜t
+νqUβjwuG˜
(
ĵwu,t+1 + λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + ηθ̂t + êθt+1 +
g˜
G˜
db˜t+1
)
, (2.114)
where g˜ := g(b˜), G˜ := G(b˜) and
jwu ĵwu,t = wH (ŵt + Ĥt)− ςL
(1+ σL)λ
H1+σL
(
êLt + êct + (1+ σL)Ĥt − λ̂t
)
−ςb g˜b˜
G˜
db˜t + ςb
∫ b˜
0 bg(b)db
G˜2
g˜db˜t − βqUG˜jwu(ηθ̂t +Et êθt+1)
+β(1− δ− qU)jwuEt
(
G˜
(
ĵwu,t+1 + λ̂t+1 − λ̂t
)
+ g˜db˜t+1
)
. (2.115)
The law of motion of employment is derived by linearizing (2.56):
N̂t = G˜(1− δ− qU)N̂t−1 +
(
1− G˜+ δG˜
) (
ηθ̂t−1 + êθt
)
+
g˜
G˜
db˜t. (2.116)
Linearizing (2.64) yields the job destruction condition:
(1− (1− ξwr)ν)pLςxHγ( p̂L,t + γĤt)− (1− ξwr)ν ςL(1+ σL)λH
1+σL((1+ σL)Ĥt + êct + ê
L
t − λ̂t)
−(1− ξwr)νςbdb˜t + (1− δ) cVqV
(
ĉVt + (1− η)θ̂t −Et êθt+1
)
−(1− ξwr)νqUβG˜jwuEt
(
ηθ̂t + êθt+1 + λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + ĵwu,t+1 +
g˜
G˜
db˜t+1
)
= 0, (2.117)
where in case of flexible wages ξwr = 0, ĉVt = 0 in case of linear hiring costs and ĉVt = ψVV̂t in
case of non-linear ones. The hiring condition is derived by linearizing (2.61):
cV
G˜qV
Et
(
ĉVt + (1− η)θ̂t −Et êθt+1 − λ̂t+1 + λ̂t −
g˜
G˜
db˜t+1
)
=
= β
(
pLςxHγEt( p̂L,t+1 + γĤt+1)− wHEt(ŵt+1 + Ĥt+1)
)
+β(1− δ) cV
qV
Et
(
ĉVt+1 + (1− η)θ̂t+1 − êθt+2
)
. (2.118)
Contemporaneous hiring
As in section 2.3.4, just the equations with contemporaneous hiring and endogenous job destruc-
tion are shown; the equations with exogenous job destruction can be simply extracted from here
by setting G˜ = 1, g˜ = 0 and db˜t = 0, and by neglecting the job destruction condition. The new
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law of motion of employment is:
N̂t = G˜(1− δ)(1− qU)N̂t−1 + (1− G˜(1− δ))
(
ηθ̂t + êθt
)
+
g˜
G˜
db˜t. (2.119)
Labor market tightness is given by:
θ̂t = V̂t +
(1− δ)N
1− (1− δ)N N̂t−1. (2.120)
The hiring condition becomes:
cV
qV G˜
(
ĉVt + (1− η)θ̂t − êθt − g˜db˜t
)
=
= pLςxHγ
(
p̂Lt + γĤt
)
− βwH (ŵt + Ĥt)
+β(1− δ) cV
qV
Et
(
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + ĉVt+1 + (1− η)θ̂t+1 − êθt+1
)
. (2.121)
Nash bargaining wages are given by
wH(ŵnbt + Ĥt) = (1− ν)pLHγ( p̂L,t + γĤt) + ν
H1+σL
λ(1+ σL)
((1+ σL)Ĥt + êct + ê
L
t − λ̂t)
+νβqUG˜(1− δ)jwu
(
ĵwu,t+1 + λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + ηθ̂t+1 + êθt+1 +
g˜
G˜
db˜t+1
)
+νςb
g˜b˜
G˜
db˜t − νςb
∫ b˜
0 bg(b)db
G˜2
g˜db˜t, (2.122)
where
jwu ĵwu,t = wH (ŵt + Ĥt)− ςL
(1+ σL)λ
H1+σL
(
êLt + êct + (1+ σL)Ĥt − λ̂t
)
− ςb g˜b˜
G˜
db˜t
+ςb
∫ b˜
0 bg(b)db
G˜2
g˜db˜t + β(1− δ)(1− qU)G˜jwu
(
ĵwu,t+1 + λ̂t+1 − λ̂t
)
+β(1− δ)(1− qU)jwu g˜db˜t − β(1− δ)G˜qU jwu
(
ηθ̂t+1 + êθt+1
)
. (2.123)
Finally, the job destruction condition is given by:
(1− (1− ξwr)ν)pLςxHγ( p̂L,t + γĤt)− (1− ξwr)ν ςL(1+ σL)λH
1+σL((1+ σL)Ĥt + êct + ê
L
t − λ̂t)
−(1− ξwr)νβqUG˜(1− δ)jwuEt
(
ηθ̂t+1 + êθt+1 + λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + ĵwu,t+1 +
g˜
G˜
db˜t+1
)
−(1− ξwr)νςbdb˜t + (1− δ) cVqV
(
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + ĉVt+1 + (1− η)θ̂t+1 −Et êθt+1
)
= 0. (2.124)
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2.4.4 Exogenous processes
It is assumed that the foreign interest rate shock ert and the mark-up shocks e
λp
t and e
pi f
t are iid.
All the other shock processes are assumed to be AR(1):
êat = ρa ê
a
t−1 + e
a
t [stationary technology shock], (2.125)
µ̂at = ρµa µ̂
a
t−1 + e
µa
t [permanent technology shock], (2.126)
êgt = ρg ê
g
t−1 + e
g
t [government spending shock], (2.127)
êit = ρi ê
i
t−1 + e
i
t [investment shock], (2.128)
êct = ρc ê
c
t−1 + e
c
t [consumption preference shock], (2.129)
êlt = ρl ê
l
t−1 + e
l
t [labor supply shock], (2.130)
êθt = ρθ ê
θ
t−1 + e
θ
t [matching efficiency shock], (2.131)
êmt = ρm ê
m
t−1 + e
m
t [own import demand shock], (2.132)
êmft = ρmf ê
mf
t−1 + e
mf
t [foreign import demand shock], (2.133)
êrpt = ρrp ê
rp
t−1 + e
rp
t [risk premium shock], (2.134)
êpimt = ρpim ê
pim
t−1 + e
pim
t [import price shock], (2.135)
êy ft = ρy f ê
y f
t−1 + e
y f
t [world demand shock]. (2.136)
2.5 Model comparison
The linearized equations in section 2.4 are all of the following form:
Et (A(θ)ẑt−1 + B(θ)ẑt + C(θ)ẑt+1 + F(θ)et + G(θ)êt+1) = 0, (2.137)
where ẑt denotes log-deviations of the endogenous variables from their steady state, et denotes
the iid. shock innovations and A, B, C, F and G are (typically highly non-linear) matrix-valued
functions of the (to-be-) estimated parameters θ (for details see for example Ratto and Iskrev,
2011).
As the expectations Etzt+1 cannot be directly observed, (2.137) cannot be related directly to
empirical data. However, when there is a unique solution, (2.137) can be rewritten into the
following policy function:
ẑt = K(θ)ẑt−1 + L(θ)et, (2.138)
where K and L are again matrix-valued functions of the estimated parameters. Furthermore,
a measurement equation relating the observable variables ŷt to the endogenous variables ẑt is
needed, which in case of this model has a fairly simple form (see section 2.4.1).
The different model specifications are estimated using Bayesian methods (see for example An and
Schorfheide, 2007).48 The estimated parameters θ (which in this case include certain unobserved
steady state ratios) are treated as random variables, for which a prior distribution p(θ|Mi)
is specified (which could be model-specific). The implied prior beliefs are then updated by
48For this purpose I have used DYNARE (which runs in MATLAB); for a description of this software see Adjemian et al.
(2011).
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computing a conditional distribution of the parameters given the data:
p(θ|Y, Mi) = p(Y|θ, Mi)p(θ|Mi)p(Y|Mi) , (2.139)
where p(Y|θ, Mi) = L(θ|Y, Mi) is the likelihood function (it is assumed that the data is normally
distributed for given parameter values and given past data), and p(Y|Mi) =
∫
p(Y|θ, Mi)p(θ|Mi)dθ
is the marginal data density of model i.
This marginal data density can be used for model selection (see for example Del Negro and
Schorfheide, 2011).49 The criterion for choosing the ’best’ model is then the overall fit with all
observable variables of the model (based on the in-sample-one-step-ahead-forecasts of the model),
and not a certain impulse response like in Christoffel et al. (2009).
To reduce computational costs, I use the Laplace approximation of the marginal likelihood for
model comparison. This approximation only needs information from the maximization of the
posterior likelihood function; otherwise a large number of draws from the posterior would be
needed too (see again Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2011).
2.5.1 The data
Data availability restricts the number of observations I can use for the estimation. Reliable
data on hours worked by employees is only available from 1995, which means that there are 67
observations (from 1995Q2 to 2011Q4).
Observable domestic variables in my model are real GDP (Y), real consumption (C), real invest-
ment (I), real exports (X), real imports (M), working hours of the employed (
∫ N
0 H), compensation
of employees (
∫ N
0 PWH), unemployment (U), dependent employment (N), the GDP deflator (as a
proxy for Pd), the consumption deflator (as a proxy for P) and vacancies (V). All of them are taken
from the seasonally adjusted quarterly national accounts50 with the exception of unemployment
(which is taken from the Eurostat Labor Force Survey) and vacancies (which come from domestic
labor market statistics)51. The 3 foreign variables output (Y f ), interest rates (R f ) and foreign price
level (P f ) refer to Euro area aggregates and are taken from the database of Fenz et al. (2012).
Note that gross fixed capital formation was used as proxy for investment. This implies that the
residuum of equations (2.35) respectively (2.99) contains not only government consumption and
statistical discrepancies, but also changes in inventories and net acquisitions of valuables. So the
interpretation of the ’government consumption shock’ êGt has to be done cautiously.
I rescale variables as follows:
• As I restricted the labor force to have a measure of one, I divide employment, vacancies,
GDP, consumption, investment, exports and imports by the sum of dependent employment
and unemployment.52 This restriction of the size of the labor force to 153 also means that
49In principle, one could assign different prior probabilities to different models. I will abstain from that option and
assign the same prior probability to all models.
50Note that published Austrian quarterly data do not include the error component of the seasonal adjustment (in
contrast to the rest of the EU) and therefore tend to be less volatile.
51Seasonal adjustment of vacancies is also done by myself.
52Self-employed are excluded in this setting as the variable ’compensation of employees’ (which is used as a proxy
for the overall wage bill) does not include the earnings of self-employed. This also means that there is a discrepancy
between the ’unemployment rate’ in this model (whose changes are shown in figure 2.2) and published numbers (which
are typically based on the Eurostat definition or taken from domestic labor market statistics).
53This assumption also implies that the size of the labor force does not react to economic conditions; so factors like
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I ’lose’ one of the observed variables, implying that only 14 variables will be used in the
estimation.
• As W refers to the average hourly real wage, I divide the compensation of employees by
overall working hours and the consumption deflator.
• As H refers to the average working hours per employee, I divide the overall number of
working hours by the number of employees.
All variables are demeaned and detrended: A quadratic trend is subtracted from all domestic
quantities (except the labor market variables), real wages and all price variables. This implies that
the growth rates of these variables are linearly detrended. Vacancies and foreign output are HP-
filtered;54 a linear trend is subtracted from all remaining variables (working hours, unemployment
and the foreign interest rate). The measurement equations are discussed in section 2.4.1.
2.5.2 Identification analysis
Not all of the parameters showing up in the equations of appendix 2.4 can be estimated using the
available data. This has several reasons:
• Linearizing around a steady state means that I lose information on most steady state ratios
and parameters which are directly implied by these ratios (like β). So I have to calibrate
most of them (mostly using the raw data).
• In medium-scale DSGE models there are typically also other parameters which do not
have an influence on the log-likelihood at all or only when certain other parameters are
calibrated.55
Therefore I apply the routines discussed in Ratto and Iskrev (2011)56 to check which parameters
are identifiable in the estimation of the model. They try to check whether the Jacobian matrix J of
the mapping from the vector of estimated parameters θ to the first two moments of the data57 has
full column rank. As the underlying equation system is highly nonlinear, identification can only
be checked locally (see again Ratto and Iskrev, 2011), which is done via taking different draws
from the prior distribution of θ. As the data is assumed to be normally distributed (conditional
on the parameters) in this paper, the first two moments of the observable variables contain all
information on the distribution and so a full rank of the Jacobian is both necessary and sufficient
for local identification.
To ease the computational burden, Iskrev (2010b) suggests to split up this Jacobian into the
Jacobian J1 of the mapping from the policy function elements (or, to be more precise, to the
elements of the matrices K and L which depend on estimated parameters) to the first two moments
of the data and the Jacobian J2 of the mapping from the vector of estimated parameters to the
discouraged-worker-effects are neglected in this paper.
54HP-filtered Euro area output is assumed to represent y ft :=
Y ft
At
. The HP-filtering is done as it is assumed that only the
short-term-fluctuations of vacancies and foreign output are meaningful for the purpose of this paper.
55See for example Canova and Sala (2009), Iskrev (2010b) or Ratto and Iskrev (2011).
56These are in turn inspired by Iskrev (2010b). Furthermore note that they build on the population objective function
and therefore no data is needed to perform these routines (see Iskrev, 2010a).
57As these also include all correlations with previous periods, the number of moments is significantly higher than the
number of estimated parameters.
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policy function; J1 can be computed by direct differentiation of the policy function and J2 is
significantly smaller than the overall Jacobian.
As the procedures indicated that the autocorrelation of ect and the standard deviation of e
c
t are
hard to identify, I excluded this domestic consumption shock from the estimation. This means
that there are as many shocks as observable variables (14). Due to further identification issues I
set the autocorrelation of eit to 0 (due to the specification of (2.86), shocks to e
i
t have a persistent
impact on investment anyway) and calibrate the autocorrelations of the innovations to the import
demand shock emt , the export demand shock e
mf
t , the risk premium e
rp
t and the foreign interest
rate Rt (in all cases there are also other estimated parameters influencing the persistence of the
concerned observable variables and there is a strong correlation with the respective standard
deviations).
The application of these routines also indicated potential identification problems with other
parameters, for example with σm and σmf (σm shows up together with φm in equations (2.91) and
(2.92)), the situation with σmf and φmf is very similar); therefore I decided to give the production
functions in equations (2.21) and (2.32) a Cobb-Douglas form by setting σm → ∞ and σmf → ∞.
The steady state share of fixed costs in production (Φy ) is difficult to identify as well, therefore
it is set to 0. Table 2.8 also gives an overview over all other deep parameters which have been
calibrated. While the simulations indicated for all models that J2 has full rank in all draws, in
several specifications with right-to-manage J did not have full rank in about 1% of the respective
draws from the prior distributions (suggesting that J1 did not have full rank in these few cases).
Figure 2.3 shows the ’identification strength’ and the ’sensitivity component’ (at the prior mean)
of all estimated parameters for the best-performing model (for the ranking see table 2.1); both
are clearly positive for all estimated parameters.58 The ’identification strength’ is described by
Ratto and Iskrev (2011)[page 13] as ’sort of a priori t-test’ for the respective estimated parameters
and the ’sensitivity component’ indicates by how much moments of observable variables change
with the respective parameter (for the computation of these indicators see section 4.2 in Ratto and
Iskrev, 2011).
Note that revisions to quarterly Austrian macroeconomic data have been substantial over the
last years. Fluctuations of several macroeconomic aggregates were significantly lower in old
releases (because of changes in seasonal adjustment); this especially affects the growth rates of
(real) private consumption and the GDP deflator, where volatilities were lower by about 80%
respectively 60% (at very unreasonable levels) in old data releases. Running the same estimation
procedures with one of these older releases can lead to severe problems when estimating some
of the worse (in terms of identification and/or marginal likelihood) models. Furthermore the
ordering of marginal likelihoods would be affected; for example, models with rigid real wages
would do relatively better when using older data releases.
2.5.3 Calibration and prior distributions
As certain steady state ratios are of crucial importance for labor market dynamics and therefore for
overall model fit (see for example Costain and Reiter, 2008), I ensure that all relevant steady state
ratios are the same in all specifications (for given parameter estimates). Therefore I assume that –
’by coincidence’ – in the steady state the FOC for working hours of right-to-manage AND efficient
bargaining hold at the same time; meaning that ςLH
σL
λ = pLςxγH
γ−1 = w (for details see appendix
58The patterns for the other models on top of the list in table 2.1 are relatively similar.
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2.B). This restriction is also one of the reasons why I included flow fixed costs for labor service
firms in this model: When γ is significantly smaller than 1, pLςxγHγ − wH = (1− γ)pLςxγHγ
becomes very large and – if there were no fixed costs – so would the value of posting a vacancy.
This would imply an implausibly large share of hiring costs in GDP and would significantly
dampen the response of employment to changes in PL,t. The assumptions made to ensure that
the ’relevant ratios’ do not change in case of endogenous job destruction and do change as little
as possible in case of contemporaneous hiring are described in appendix 2.B.
Table 2.8 gives an overview over all calibrated parameters. The growth rate of the technology
process µa, the unemployment rate, and the shares of consumption, investment and exports (it
is assumed that the trade balance is zero in steady state) in GDP are chosen to match average
ratios respectively average growth rates in the raw data. The other values for domestic (non-
labor-market) structural parameters are mainly taken from Fenz et al. (2012). σL is chosen to be
rather high and the ’steady state minimum wage’ (= sum of the flow value of being unemployed
and the disutility of work) is assumed to make up 70% of the actual steady state wage. This
specification would imply – when using contemporaneous hiring and exogenous job destruction
(which will be the case in the best specification; see section 2.5.4) and taking prior means for
estimated parameters – an employers’ bargaining power ν of around 0.65.
The calibrated foreign (Euro area) parameters are taken from the estimates of Christoffel et al.
(2008) and Fenz et al. (2012). All other parameters or relevant steady state ratios are estimated
(see table 2.9) or implied by estimated and calibrated parameters (see appendix 2.B).
As the model is estimated using Bayesian methods, I need to choose appropriate priors for all
estimated parameters. The priors are the same over all specifications. However, several parameters
do not show up in all specifications (g˜, ξwr, ξw), which is of importance as the applied Bayesian
model selection procedure assigns penalties for the number of estimated parameters (see for
example Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2011).
All priors are given in table 2.9. As a rule, I assume that shock variances follow an inverted
Gamma distribution and that all parameters which are restricted to lie between 0 and 1 (mainly
the shock autocorrelations) follow a Beta distribution. Other non-negative parameters which
might be close to 0 (but which could theoretically be also larger than 1) are assumed to follow a
Gamma distribution as the alternative of a restricted normal distribution would introduce a kink
close to 0. The other parameters are assumed to be normally distributed.
For choosing the priors of the shock standard deviations I apply the following approach: All
domestic shock standard deviations are given a prior mean of 1, except the shocks for the demand
for investment goods, export goods and imports (reflecting the relatively high volatility of these
aggregates) and of working hours (due to measurement errors) and government consumption
(as the residual of equation (2.99) also accounts for statistical discrepancies and changes in
inventories). The foreign shocks are assigned lower priors, reflecting that not all demand and
supply shocks in the Euro area are symmetric such that they will partly cancel out in the aggregate.
2.5.4 Estimation results
Table 2.1 shows the Laplace approximation59 of marginal likelihoods of all 44 different specifica-
tions. It shows that the variation with contemporaneous hiring, exogenous job destruction, rigid
59Note that the properties of the maximizers (e.g. the Hessian matrix being close to singular or even negative definite)
were relatively poor for some models at the bottom of this table (which can be interpreted as a sign for misspecification of
these specific models).
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nominal wages, convex vacancy posting costs and efficient bargaining has the highest marginal
likelihood. Furthermore, the following patterns can be observed:
• The best specifications all have Calvo wages, which indicates an important role for wage
rigidities. Though their papers refer to US data and use different models (for example, they
do not have endogenous working hours, which means that the interpretation of the wage
rate is different), this result is in line with Riggi and Tancioni (2010), who claim that nominal
wage rigidities are doing better than real wage rigidities, and with Gertler et al. (2008),
according to whom specifications with nominally rigid wages tend to perform better than
the ones with flexible wages. Furthermore, note that according to firm-level data analyzed
by Babecky et al. (2010), automatic indexation of wages to inflation is rare in Austria, but at
the same time Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) find evidence for significant real wage rigidities
in Austria, too.
• The best specifications with exogenous destruction all have efficient bargaining. As already
mentioned in section 2.3.2, efficient bargaining tends to lead to a lower volatility of average
working hours (relative to employment in persons); in the data the volatility of working
hours is ’only’ about 70% larger than the one of the employment rate.
• Out of the specifications with right-to-manage, models with Nash Bargaining on wages do
significantly better than the ones with a simple sharing rule for match surpluses.
• Typically, specifications with convex vacancy posting costs are doing better than their
counterparts with linear ones in case of efficient bargaining, but worse in case of right-to-
manage determination of working hours.
• All specifications at the top of table 2.1 have contemporaneous hiring. However, there is an
interaction effect with the determination of working hours. When using efficient bargaining,
there seems to be an important role for such a timely response of employment in persons
to changes in economic conditions. However, when using right-to-manage, specifications
with lagged hiring tend to do relatively better. Note that the data on employment Nt and
vacancies Vt both refer to averages over quarters. So it is postulated (implicitly) in the best
specifications that vacancies are filled immediately after they are posted (i.e. after zero days
instead of 3 months in case of lagged hiring) and not only within the same quarter.
• The best specifications with endogenous destruction do significantly worse than their coun-
terparts with exogenous destruction. This is not so surprising in case of contemporaneous
hiring as this characteristic also decreases the role of eθ in the one-step-ahead-forecast error
of (un)employment (without incurring the penalty on having to estimate the additional
parameter g˜). Interestingly, however, endogenous destruction also performs relatively worse
in case of lagged hiring.
When assigning the same prior model probabilities to all 44 different specifications, the ratio
of posterior probabilities P of models x and y can be computed from the log-likelihoods l as
follows: P(y)P(x) =
exp(l(y))
exp(l(x)) = exp(l(y)− l(x)) (see for example Hoeting et al., 1999). This means
that the posterior probability of the best specification is more than exp(11) higher than the
second best one, which can be interpreted as decisive evidence against the 43 models with lower
marginal likelihoods. Given how far marginal likelihoods are apart, assigning different prior
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Table 2.1: Log-likelihoods for different model specifications
Model Specification Log-likelihood Model
Hiring Job dest. Vacancies Hours Wages (Laplace approx.) probability
Contemp. Exogenous Convex Eff. barg. Calvo -1224.3 1.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Linear Eff. barg. Calvo -1235.5 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Convex Eff. barg. Real rig. -1249.9 0.0000
Contemp. Endogenous Convex Eff. barg. Real rig. -1260.1 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Linear Eff. barg. Real rig. -1262.1 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Convex Eff. barg. Calvo -1264.9 0.0000
Contemp. Endogenous Linear Eff. barg. Real rig. -1270.0 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Linear Eff. barg. Calvo -1293.3 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Convex Eff. barg. Real rig. -1297.9 0.0000
Lagged Endogenous Convex Eff. barg. Real rig. -1302.3 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Linear Eff. barg. Real rig. -1322.3 0.0000
Lagged Endogenous Linear Eff. barg. Real rig. -1324.3 0.0000
Contemp. Endogenous Convex Eff. barg. Flexible -1324.6 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Linear Right to man. Calvo/Nash B. -1334.0 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Linear Right to man. Real rig./Nash B. -1337.1 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Linear Right to man. Flexible/Nash B. -1337.5 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Convex Right to man. Flexible/Nash B. -1342.1 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Convex Right to man. Real rig./Nash B. -1344.4 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Convex Right to man. Calvo/Nash B. -1346.8 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Linear Right to man. Real rig./Sharing -1355.1 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Linear Right to man. Flexible/Nash B. -1362.9 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Linear Right to man. Real rig./Nash B. -1365.3 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Convex Right to man. Real rig./Sharing -1367.0 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Linear Right to man. Calvo/Nash B. -1369.9 0.0000
Contemp. Endogenous Linear Eff. barg. Flexible -1379.9 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Linear Right to man. Real rig./Sharing -1384.3 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Convex Right to man. Flexible/Nash B. -1388.5 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Convex Right to man. Real rig./Nash B. -1391.9 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Linear Right to man. Flexible/Sharing -1395.6 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Convex Right to man. Calvo/Nash B. -1398.4 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Linear Right to man. Calvo/Sharing -1402.6 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Convex Right to man. Real rig./Sharing -1420.8 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Linear Eff. barg. Flexible -1424.6 0.0000
Lagged Endogenous Linear Eff. barg. Flexible -1425.3 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Convex Right to man. Flexible/Sharing -1438.7 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Linear Right to man. Flexible/Sharing -1444.1 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Convex Right to man. Calvo/Sharing -1455.7 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Linear Eff. barg. Flexible -1457.4 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Convex Eff. barg. Flexible -1490.7 0.0000
Lagged Endogenous Convex Eff. barg. Flexible -1491.2 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Convex Right to man. Flexible/Sharing -1513.0 0.0000
Contemp. Exogenous Convex Eff. barg. Flexible -1569.4 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Linear Right to man. Calvo/Sharing n.a. 0.0000
Lagged Exogenous Convex Right to man. Calvo/Sharing n.a. 0.0000
model probabilities would not make a big difference. Note in this context that the difference
between the second- and the third-best specification is even larger than between the first two
specifications and that the top two models are very similar (the only difference being convexity
of vacancy posting costs). The large difference in marginal likelihoods also indicates that some
models can be seen as severe miss-specifications.
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The preference of the selection procedure of rigid nominal (and also real) wages over flexible
wages is partly due to the fixing of the steady state ’minimum wage’ b+ ςLH
1+σl
(1+σL)λ
, as rigid nominal
(or real) wages could be somehow approximated using flexible wages by assigning an even higher
value to this expression and reducing the bargaining power of workers at the same time. It would,
however, make a significant difference to the reaction of labor market variables to permanent
changes in shock processes (the only unit root shock process in my model is µat , which cannot
permanently influence the unemployment rate due to the assumed indexation of hiring costs
and unemployment benefits) and policy variables (not discussed in this paper; see for example
Costain and Reiter, 2008). Note that the estimation procedure used the additional degree of
freedom granted by the Calvo parameter to assign a much lower (steady state) bargaining power
for employees, namely 0.15 instead of the 0.65 implied by the means of the prior distributions
(via higher values for γ and qU).
Table 2.9 shows mean and standard deviation of the prior distributions and the mean and several
quantiles of the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters of this best-performing model.
The results for the posterior distribution are based on 500,000 Metropolis-Hastings-draws, where
the first 50% are discarded. Note that in many cases the posterior distribution differs substantially
from the prior, which is, however, not a sufficient condition for identification.
Tables 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 show a comparison of empirical moments of the observable variables
with the theoretical moments generated by the estimated policy function and the standard
deviations of shock innovations. Table 2.10 shows that standard deviations and (first-order)
autocorrelations are relatively similar in the data and the model. However, they tend to be
underestimated in the model simulations, which is most severe in case of the growth in real
consumption, real investment and the GDP deflator. The simulated standard deviations tend
to be a bit lower than in the data, too; the relative difference is largest for working hours, the
two domestic price variables and growth in (domestic) GDP. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 show that
cross-correlations between observable variables are relatively similar, too. Larger deviations can
be observed for the correlation of real wage growth with domestic macro variables and for the
correlation of unemployment and vacancies with working hours, foreign output and interest
rates.
2.6 Explaining fluctuations in Austrian unemployment
Over the last decade there have been plenty of papers on the (in)ability of models with search
unemployment to generate certain stylized labor market facts. After a short overview over the
literature I will apply the best model of the comparison exercise from the previous section to
contribute to this discussion.
2.6.1 A short overview over the literature
In his seminal contribution, Shimer (2005) claims that models of search unemployment where
productivity shocks are the only source of economic fluctuations are incapable of accounting
for the high relative volatility of labor market tightness (and unemployment) compared to labor
productivity;60 in simulations of his calibrated model the relative volatility of labor market
tightness is below 10% of the one in the data. He conducts his analysis in a simple model with
60For an alternative discussion of this problem see Costain and Reiter (2008).
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exogenous job destruction, linear hiring costs, flexible wages (with a medium bargaining power
for workers), fixed working hours and without any other frictions in the economy.61 The intuition
for Shimer’s result is as follows: An increase in labor productivity raises – when hiring costs and
the flow value of being unemployed are fixed62 – the value of a future match for entrepreneurs; it
therefore leads to an increase in hiring and in labor market tightness. However, it also means – in
the absence of wage rigidities – a significant increase of real wages via the worker’s share in the
increased revenue and via the increase in the value of being unemployed (due to the higher labor
market tightness). These two channels significantly dampen the increase in the value of a match
to the entrepreneur and thereby also the incentive to post more vacancies.
Among others, Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), Christoffel
and Kuester (2009) and Pissarides (2009) discuss possible alternative approaches to get a higher
relative volatility in models where labor productivity is the only source of aggregate fluctuations.
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) argue that several different deviations from the specification of
Shimer (2005) can lead to a substantially higher relative volatility of the labor market tightness,
for example introducing on-the-job-search. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) get to the desired
results by raising both the bargaining power of firms and the outside option of workers to values
close to 1. However, their calibration would imply that slight changes in unemployment benefits
would lead to implausibly high changes in the unemployment rate (see Costain and Reiter, 2008).
Christoffel and Kuester (2009) increase the relative volatility of unemployment in a model with
endogenous working hours by using flow fixed costs of maintaining a match (like the ones
introduced in equation (2.42))63 and argue that specifications with right-to-manage-determination
of working hours are also able to yield the desired level of the derivative of the unemployment
rate with regard to unemployment benefits. Pissarides (2009) argues (refering to the empirical
evidence discussed at the end of section 2.3.2) that wage rigidities should not be used to solve this
volatility puzzle (like in Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008) and adds a fixed matching component
to the proportional vacancy cost of hiring.
Another possibility to increase the relative volatility of labor market tightness would be to find
other sources of labor market fluctuations which do not have such a strong influence on labor
productivity. One can argue that trying this is already mandated by the fact that the (absolute
value of the) correlations of labor market tightness and the unemployment rate with labor
productivity are rather low (as shown in table 2.3).64 This could be done – still consistent with the
basic philosophy of RBC models – via productivity shocks which do not have a strong immediate
influence on labor productivity. For example, Faccini and Ortigueira (2010) show that investment-
specific technology shocks can help increase the relative volatility of the unemployment rate
compared to labor productivity.
One could also try to incorporate different real and monetary shocks on the demand side in a
New Keynesian DSGE setting. However, relatively few of the contributions in this field try to
explain short-term fluctuations of unemployment, the main focus seems to be on the implications
61His analysis is in continuous time, so no distinction between lagged hiring and contemporaneous hiring can be made.
Furthermore, there are no analogues to the stages 2, 3 and 4 in my model.
62Note again that – to ensure stationarity of the unemployment rate – it is assumed in my model that the flow value of
being unemployed b, fixed costs ΦL and hiring costs cV,t are indexed to the unit-root labor productivity process At (but
not to the stationary total factor productivity process eat ).
63They previously employed such fixed costs in a New Keynesian DSGE model (see Christoffel and Kuester, 2008).
64Note that only in RBC models unemployment necessarily reacts negatively on a positive shock to labor productivity.
In this model with significant nominal and real frictions, unemployment initially increases after a positive shock to labor
productivity (see also figure 2.6).
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of search unemployment for fluctuations of inflation and output in the context of monetary policy
shocks. Notable exceptions to that rule are the calibrated models of Sveen and Weinke (2008)
and Christoffel and Kuester (2008), who claim that demand and monetary policy shocks can
contribute to explaining US unemployment fluctuations when choosing certain labor market
specifications.
2.6.2 The ability of my model to generate stylized facts of Austria
Table 2.2 compares the standard deviations of measures for labor productivity with the one of
labor market variables65 and shows relatively similar patterns for the Austrian data used in this
paper and for the US data used by Shimer (2005). While the absolute standard deviations are not
comparable due to different construction and filtering of the data,66 in both cases the standard
deviation of output per worker is substantially lower than the one of the labor market tightness
(the difference in the US being larger). Table 2.3 shows that the correlations of labor market
variables with measures for productivity are similar to the US case, too. The correlation between
unemployment and vacancies (not shown in table 2.3) is relatively close to -1 in both cases; it is
−0.70 in my data and −0.89 in the US data of Shimer (2005).
Table 2.2: Observed standard deviations and autocorrelations of labor market and productivity
variables
Austria US (Shimer, 2005)
St. dev. Autocorr. St. dev. Autocorr.
GDP per worker (unit root) YN 1.2 0.78 - -
GDP per hour (unit root) YNH 1.0 0.76 - -
GDP per worker (stationary) yN 1.9 0.84 2.0 0.88
GDP per hour (stationary) yNH 1.4 0.84 - -
Unemployment U 8.7 0.87 19.0 0.94
Vacancies V 14.6 0.92 20.2 0.94
Labor market tightness VU 21.6 0.92 38.2 0.94
Table 2.3: Observed correlations of labor market variables with measures for productivity
AT AT AT AT US
Y
N
Y
NH
y
N
y
NH
y
N
(unit root) (unit root) (stationary) (stationary) (stationary)
Unemployment U -0.12 -0.22 -0.19 -0.31 -0.41
Vacancies V 0.51 0.63 0.25 0.36 0.36
Labor market tightness VU 0.40 0.52 0.25 0.37 0.40
As table 2.12 shows, the simulated correlation of U and V is around −0.85 (which is rounded
to −0.9 in the table) compared to -0.7 in the data (table 2.11). A comparison of tables 2.2 and
65Note that – as also indicated in tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 – labor market tightness refers is defined as the ratio of
vacancies over unemployment in the context of this section. This stands in contrast to the definition given by equation
(2.66), which is used in the best-performing model.
66Shimer (2005) looks at output and vacancies in the non-farm business sector only and does not divide output,
unemployment and vacancies by the labor force. Furthermore, he uses an HP filter with the smoothing parameter λ = 105
to detrend the quarterly data for labor market and productivity variables. As the subtraction of a quadratic trend does
not remove a potential unit root from the output series (in contrast to the HP filter; the filtering of data in this paper
is described in subsection 2.5.1), I also report moments of yt := YtAt . This has the (non-negligible) disadvantage that an
estimated data series (namely At) is needed to calculate ’observed’ moments.
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Table 2.4: Simulated standard deviations and autocorrelations of labor market and productivity
variables
St. dev. Autocorr.
GDP per worker (stationary) yN 6.18 0.97
GDP per hour (stationary) yNH 4.99 0.97
Unemployment U 13.39 0.91
Vacancies V 26.27 0.94
Labor market tightness VU 38.58 0.94
Table 2.5: Simulated correlations of labor market variables with measures for productivity
GDP/worker GDP/hour
(stationary) (stationary)
y
N
y
NH
Unemployment U -0.95 -0.70
Vacancies V 0.99 0.80
Labor market tightness VU 1.00 0.79
2.4 indicates that the model replicates the relative volatilities better than Shimer (2005) in his
case of US data. While in my model the generated relative volatility of labor market tightness
compared to labor productivity measures is about two thirds of the one in the data, it is (as already
mentioned above) less than 10% in Shimer (2005). However, my model tends to overestimate
all volatilities, with the effect being more severe in case of productivity measures. The situation
is similar for (the absolute values of) correlations, which are all overestimated using model
simulations (see tables 2.3 and 2.5).
2.6.3 Forecast error variance decompositions
The fact that the relative volatility of unemployment and labor market tightness compared to
measures of labor productivity can be reproduced relatively well is related to the large role of
non-productivity shocks in this model.
Table 2.6: Forecast error variance decomposition for unemployment U
Forecasting horizon
Shock process 1 2 4 8 16 40 100
Productivity (temporary) ea 0.124 0.127 0.124 0.098 0.086 0.094 0.093
Productivity (permanent) eµa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Government consumption eG 0.017 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
Investment ei 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
Labor supply eL 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.020
Domestic inflation eλp 0.024 0.052 0.139 0.335 0.452 0.482 0.486
Matching efficiency eθ 0.523 0.466 0.387 0.288 0.229 0.204 0.201
Import demand em 0.042 0.050 0.054 0.046 0.037 0.035 0.035
Export demand emf 0.133 0.152 0.156 0.126 0.101 0.095 0.095
Risk premium erp 0.087 0.092 0.083 0.058 0.053 0.050 0.050
Import prices epim 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
World inflation epi f 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
World interest rate eR 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004
World demand ey f 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
Sum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 2.7: Forecast error variance decomposition for labor market tightness VU
Forecasting horizon
Shock process 1 2 4 8 16 40 100
Productivity (temporary) ea 0.244 0.224 0.194 0.135 0.110 0.117 0.115
Productivity (permanent) eµa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Government consumption eG 0.033 0.021 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.005
Investment ei 0.016 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
Labor supply eL 0.064 0.058 0.051 0.037 0.028 0.025 0.025
Domestic inflation eλp 0.048 0.093 0.219 0.456 0.570 0.591 0.595
Matching efficiency eθ 0.066 0.054 0.041 0.028 0.021 0.018 0.018
Import demand em 0.082 0.089 0.084 0.062 0.047 0.043 0.043
Export demand emf 0.261 0.268 0.243 0.172 0.128 0.118 0.118
Risk premium erp 0.171 0.162 0.129 0.080 0.068 0.062 0.062
Import prices epim 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
World inflation epi f 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006
World interest rate eR 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006
World demand ey f 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003
Sum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show a forecast error variance decomposition67 for unemployment and labor
market tightness. It shows that the relative role of productivity shocks in explaining labor
market variables is smaller than the one of (both domestic and foreign) demand shocks: Taken
together, the risk premium shock68 and the export demand shock69 contribute significantly more
to fluctuations of U and VU than the productivity shocks. The role of the temporary productivity
shock is not negligible, though. The contribution of the unit-root-productivity shock is very close
to zero. This does not come as a big surprise as it is assumed that hiring costs and unemployment
benefits are indexed to At.70 When looking at longer forecasting horizons, the shock to the
mark-up-process is the most important shock from the supply side.
Figures 2.4 to 2.10 in the appendix show the impulse responses of vacancies, unemployment,
labor market tightness, output per worker and output per hour to the shocks with the largest
contributions (where the dotted lines refer to the second variable on the respective sub-figures).
Figure 2.6 shows that an increase in aggregate productivity pushes output per worker (or per
hour) and unemployment into the same direction – a feature which is not atypical in New
Keynesian models with rigid prices; it takes about 10 quarters after an innovation to eat until
the deviations of labor market tightness and unemployment from their steady state have the
respective ’RBC-sign’. The demand shocks emt , e
mf
t and e
rp
t (figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.10) push them
into different directions and can help to produce the positive correlation between productivity
67This decomposition links the impulse responses of a certain variable to all possible shocks with the standard variances
of theses shocks (the textbook of Luetkepohl, 2006, provides an explanation of this concept on pages 63-66.). Tables 2.13,
2.14 and 2.15 in the appendix also show decompositions for working hours, output per worker and output per hour.
68The risk premium shock erpt should be interpreted as domestic demand shock as an increase in e
rp
t leads to a decrease
of both private consumption and investment for given Euro area interest rates. Note that the domestic interest rate
R ft φ˜rp
(
n f at, e
rp
t
)
is treated as unobservable variable in this paper.
69The export demand shock emft captures developments in exports which cannot be directly related to movements in
Euro area output and relative prices. The strong contribution from the import demand shock emt should be related to the
fact that exports are much more volatile than consumption and investment and that at the same time the import share of
exports is much higher than that of private and government consumption.
70This was necessary to ensure that unemployment is stationary as a transformation would have been more difficult
than with most other macroeconomic aggregates (like GDP, investment, ...). The alternative to this specification would
have been to apply an HP-filter to the other domestic macroeconomic quantities. This would would remove the unit root
and would make At irrelevant.
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measures and labor market tightness (table 2.3). It should also be noted that the changes in
the two productivity measures (output per worker, output per hour) are driven by temporary
productivity shocks to a very small extent (see tables 2.14 and 2.15).71
A further interesting aspect of the forecast error variance decomposition is that the contribution
of the residual in the law of motion of (un-)employment, the matching efficiency process eθt ,
is ’only’ about 50% for short horizons. These results stand in stark contrast to Lubik (2009),
in whose smaller search unemployment model for the US economy a similar shock explains
practically the whole variation in US unemployment, and to Konya and Krause (2009), where
shocks to matching efficiency and to the outside option (equivalent to b in this paper) explain
almost all of its fluctuations. Working hours are exogenous in both papers, so there the number
of workers is the only available margin for adjusting employment after demand or supply shocks.
Figure 2.9 shows that eθt pushes vacancies and unemployment into the same direction, which
is at odds with the empirical evidence (see above). Higher matching efficiency increases the
probability of finding a job (and therefore decreases unemployment) but at the same time less
vacancy posting is necessary for entrepreneurs to get the desired number of new workers.72 The
role of eθt in explaining fluctuations in
V
U is negligible. This is not surprising, however, as the
matching efficiency shock serves as a wedge between (un)employment and vacancies (see also
section 2.3.1).
2.6.4 Historical shock decompositions for 2007 to 2011
Another way to look at the relative contribution of different shocks to movements in Austrian
labor market variables is to conduct a historical shock decomposition, which is another by-
product of the Bayesian estimation (combining estimation residuals with the policy function).
This decomposition shows which shocks (i.e. which parts of the vector et) can be attributed to the
observed changes in variables. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the results of such a decomposition for
labor market tightness and unemployment from 2007 to 2011 (Fenz et al., 2012, make a similar
exercise with Austrian GDP in this time period).73 While the decline in Austrian GDP from
mid-2008 to mid-2009 has been substantial, the increase in unemployment has been relatively low
by international standards (similar to Germany; see for example Stiglbauer, 2010) and it has been
accompanied by a decline in working hours per employee. If working hours had not been used
as endogenous observable variable, the contribution of the matching efficiency shock would have
likely been larger to be able to capture this ’too small’ response of employment (in persons) to
the decline in economic activity.
Similar to the forecast error variance decomposition, figures 2.1 and 2.2 indicate that there is
only a very limited role for (domestic and/or foreign) productivity shocks74, while external
and domestic demand shocks explain a large part of the fluctuations (in case of the change in
unemployment the matching efficiency shock is most important). As these 2 figures try to explain
71Like before in section 2.6.2, the unit-root-productivity process At was deducted from YtNt and
Yt∫ Nt
0 Ht
. This is necessary
as At dominates all other shock processes for longer forecasting horizons, but at the same time it has no influence on
unemployment and labor market tightness (see again tables 2.6 and 2.7).
72Note, however, that vacancies are also treated as observable variable in Lubik (2009) and Konya and Krause (2009)
(only for the US).
73To make these figures more readable, the 14 shocks have been allocated to 7 different groups (as explained in table
2.16).
74Note again that the unit-root process At not only affects Austrian productivity, but also the one of the rest of the
world and that hiring costs and unemployment benefits are indexed to At.
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Figure 2.1: Historical shock decomposition for the change in labor market tightness
Figure 2.2: Historical shock decomposition for the change in the unemployment rate
the changes in variables (in contrast to tables 2.6 and 2.7, where deviations from steady state
are analyzed), the contributions can be compared to the forecast error variance decomposition
only for shorter horizons (where matching efficiency and demand shocks play a more significant
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role) and the sum of the ’contributions’ can substantially differ from the change in the variable
in certain quarters (like in early 2008). Both figures indicate that in 2008/09 foreign demand
contributed to the worsening of labor market variables relatively earlier than domestic demand.
Due to the assumed Ricardian equivalence and the fact that government consumption shocks
also include changes in inventories, not much can be said about the contribution of fiscal policy
to changes in unemployment and vacancies in the context of this model.
2.7 Conclusions and possible extensions
Among the 44 compared specifications, the variation with contemporaneous hiring, exogenous
job destruction, rigid nominal wages, convex vacancy posting costs and efficient bargaining has
the highest marginal likelihood. Most importantly, the model comparison indicated a large role
for wage rigidities and for a timely response of unemployment to changes in economic conditions.
The best-performing model can reproduce relative volatilities of Austrian labor market vari-
ables relatively well, but the issue of too high simulated absolute volatilities deserves further
investigation. Furthermore, shock decompositions indicate that fluctuations in Austrian labor
market tightness and unemployment are driven more by demand shocks than by productivity
shocks. And while the role of the residual (matching efficiency shock eθt ) in the law of motion
of employment is substantial, it is significantly smaller than in comparable contributions to the
literature.
Possible extensions to my work include a systematic prior sensitivity analysis and changes in the
overall setting which make more combinations with endogenous job destruction possible.
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Appendix
2.A Derivations of certain labor market equations
Hiring condition
Using that JV,i,t = 0 in equilibrium, (2.43) becomes:
βEt
Λt+1
Λt
JF,new,t+1 = Et
AtcV,t
qV(θt, eθt+1)
. (2.140)
Putting that into (2.42) and considering that new matches get the average hourly wage yields:
JF,new,t = PL,tςxH
γ
new,t − AtΦL −WtHnew,t +Et(1− δ)
AtcV,t
qV(θt, eθt+1)
. (2.141)
Iterating (2.141) one period forward and plugging that into (2.140) yields (2.46).
Nash Bargaining
Maximizing JνF,i,t(JW,i,t − JU,t)1−ν with respect to the wage rate yields:
ν(JW,i,t − JU,t)∂(JW,i,t − JU,t)∂Wi,t + (1− ν)JF,i,t
∂JF,i,t
∂Wi,t
= 0.
In case of efficient bargaining ( ∂(JW,i,t−JU,t)∂Wi,t = Hi,t and
∂JF,i,t
∂Wi,t
= −Hi,t) this reduces to:
ν(JW,i,t − JU,t) = (1− ν)JF,i,t.
In case of right-to-manage the number of hours depends directly on the wage rate (rearranging
(2.49) yields Hi,t =
(
PL,tςxγ
Wi,t
) 1
1−γ ), which makes things more complicated:
∂(JW,i,t − JU,t)
∂Wi,t
= Hi,t +
∂Hi,t
∂Wi,t
(Wi,t −MRSi,t) = Hi,t1− γ
(
MRSi,t
Wi,t
− γ
)
,
∂JF,i,t
∂Wi,t
=
∂Hi,t
∂Wi,t
(PL,tςxγH
γ−1
i,t −Wi,t)− Hi,t = −Hi,t,
where I made use of the fact that ∂Hi,t∂Wi,t =
−1
1−γ
(
PL,tςxγ
Wi,t
) 1
1−γ 1
Wi,t
= −11−γ
Hi,t
Wi,t
and MRSi,t =
ect e
L
t ςLH
σL
i,t
Λt
.
So the first order condition for the maximization problem from above is:
ν
MRSi,t
Wi,t
− γ
1− γ (JW,i,t − JU,t) = (1− ν)JF,i,t. (2.142)
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Nash bargaining in case of right-to-manage: Subtracting equation (2.45) from (2.44) and rear-
ranging leads to:
JW,i,t − JU,t − βEtΛt+1Λt (1− δ)(JW,i,t+1 − JU,t+1) =
=Wnbi,t Hi,t −
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t
)
− βEtΛt+1Λt qU(θt, e
θ
t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1).(2 143)
Using (2.142), (2.143) can be rewritten to:
1− ν
ν
1− γ
MRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
JF,i,t − β1− νν (1− δ)Et
1− γ
MRSi,t+1
Wnbi,t+1
− γ
Λt+1
Λt
JF,i,t+1 =
=Wnbi,t Hi,t −
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t
)
− βEtΛt+1Λt qU(θt, e
θ
t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1).(2 144)
The LHS of (2.144) can be rearranged by using (2.42):
1− ν
ν
1− γ
MRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
JF,i,t − β1− νν (1− δ)Et
1− γ
MRSi,t+1
Wnbi,t+1
− γ
Λt+1
Λt
JF,i,t+1 =
=
(1− ν)(1− γ)
ν
(
MRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
) (JF,i,t − β(1− δ)EtΛt+1Λt JF,i,t+1
)
+β
1− ν
ν
(1− δ)EtΛt+1Λt JF,i,t+1
 1− γMRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
− 1− γMRSi,t+1
Wnbi,t+1
− γ

=
1− ν
ν
1− γ
MRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
(PL,tH
γ
i,t − AtΦL −Wnbi,t Hi,t)
+β
1− ν
ν
(1− δ)EtΛt+1Λt JF,i,t+1
 1− γMRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
− 1− γMRSi,t+1
Wnbi,t+1
− γ

Using this, (2.144) can be rewritten to:1+ 1− ν
ν
1− γ
MRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
Wnbi,t Hi,t = 1− νν 1− γMRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
(PL,tH
γ
i,t − AtΦL) + Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t
+β
1− ν
ν
(1− δ)EtΛt+1Λt JF,i,t+1
 1− γMRSi,t
Wnbi,t
− γ
− 1− γMRSi,t+1
Wnbi,t+1
− γ

+βEt
Λt+1
Λt
qU(θt, eθt+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1).
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Nash bargaining in case of efficient bargaining: By Nash bargaining (efficient bargaining
case)/surplus sharing (right-to-manage) it holds that in firm i for all t:
JW,i,t − JU,t = 1− νν JF,i,t. (2.145)
So (2.143) can be rearranged to:
1− ν
ν
(
JF,i,t − βEtΛt+1Λt (1− δ)JF,i,t+1
)
=
=Wnbi,t Hi,t −
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t
)
− βEtΛt+1Λt qU(θt, e
θ
t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1).
The LHS of the latter equation can be simplified by using (2.42):
1− ν
ν
(PL,tH
γ
i,t − AtΦL −Wnbi,t Hi,t) =
= Wnbi,t Hi,t −
(
Atb+
eLt e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t
)
− βEtΛt+1Λt qU(θt, e
θ
t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1).
Solving for Wnbi,t finally yields (2.50).
Endogenous job destruction
New equation for wages: Subtracting equation (2.60) from (2.59) yields:
JW,i,t − JU,t = Wi,tHi,t − e
L
t e
c
tςL
(1+ σL)Λt
H1+σLi,t − Atb− Atςbbi,t
+βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(
(1− δ)G(b˜t+1)(JW,i,t+1 − JU,t+1)− qU(θt, eθt+1)G(b˜t+1)(JW,new,t+1 − JU,t+1)
)
.
Using that
JW,i,t − JU,t − βEtΛt+1Λt (1− δ)G(b˜t+1)(JW,i,t+1 − JU,t+1) =
=
1− ν
ν
(
JF,i,t − βEtΛt+1Λt (1− δ)G(b˜t+1)JF,i,t+1
)
=
1− ν
ν
(PL,tςxH
γ
t −Wi,tHt)
and solving for Wnbi,t Ht leads to (2.62).
New equation for hiring: Using that JV,t = 0, (2.58) can be expressed as follows:
AtcV,t
qV(θt, eθt+1)
= βEt
Λt+1
Λt
G(b˜t+1)JF,new,t+1. (2.146)
Putting this relation into (2.57) leads to
JF,new,t = PL,tςxH
γ
t − AtΦL −WtHt +Et(1− δ)
AtcV,t
qV(θt, eθt+1)
; (2.147)
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iterating one period forward and plugging back into (2.146) yields (2.61).
2.B Further information on calibration and estimation strategy
Implied parameters and ratios in all settings
• The share µ of domestic goods for the production of final goods is given by µ = 11+xy .
• The steady state return on capital is equal to the (net) interest rate on bonds plus a
compensation for depreciation of the real capital stock: rk =
µa
β − 1+ τ.
• The mark-up in steady state can be computed by using that, due to the specification
of production and price setting, capital must get a share of α
1+Φy
1+λp of overall GDP as
remuneration: λp =
α(1+Φy )
rkky
− 1 where ky := ky =
iy
1− 1−τ
µa
.
• The steady state revenue of labor service firms pLςxHγ can be derived using that labor
services must get a share of (1− α) 1+
Φ
y
1+λp of overall GDP as remuneration. So pLςxH
γ =
(1−α)(y+Φ)
N(1+λp)
.
• As said before, I assume that ’by coincidence’ in steady state both optimality conditions
for working hours (efficient bargaining and right-to-manage) hold: This implies wH =
γpLςxHγ = γ
(1−α)(y+Φ)
N(1+λp)
and ςLH
1+σL
(1+σL)λ
= γ pLςxH
γ
1+σL
= γ1+σL
(1−α)(y+Φ)
N(1+λp)
.
Implied parameters and ratios in standard setting
• As unemployment is constant in the steady state, job creation needs to be equal job
destruction. This leads to: δ = U1−U qU .
• The flow value of being unemployed b is implied by the calibration that b + ςLH
1+σL
(1+σL)λ
=
0.7wH.
• The difference between the values of being employed and unemployed in steady state is
given by: jwu =
wH−(b+ ςLH
1+σL
λ )
1−β(1−δ−qU) .
• The flow fixed cost of labor service firms ΦL can be derived using that in steady state
the hiring condition is cVqV = β
(
pLςxHγ −ΦL − wH + (1− δ) cVqV
)
. Solving for ΦL yields
ΦL = pLςxHγ − wH + 1−β(1−δ)β cVqV .
• The firm’s bargaining power in wage determination can be derived by using the wage
equation in steady state: wH = (1− ν)(pLςxHγ − ΦL) + (1− ν)cVθ + ν
(
b+ H
1+σL
(1+σL)λ
)
,75
which leads to ν = pLςxH
γ−ΦL+cVθ−wH
pLςxHγ−ΦL+cVθ−
(
b+ H
1+σL
(1+σL)λ
) .
75Evaluating (2.50) at the steady state, one gets wH = (1− ν)(pLςxHγ −ΦL) + ν
(
b+ ςL
(1+σL)λ
H1+σL
)
+ νβqU jwu. Using
that in the steady state there is Nash bargaining sharing in all matches, one can rearrange νβqU jwu = νβqU 1−νν j f =
(1− ν)βqU cVβqV = (1− ν)cVθ, where j f is the steady state value of
JF,new,t
At
.
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Rescaling of parameters and estimation strategy in case of endogenous job destruction
When implementing endogenous job destruction, I assume that overall job destruction and overall
job creation in steady state are like in the case of exogenous destruction.76
• For deriving new values for qU and qV , one only needs to bear in mind that a share G˜ of new
matches is destroyed before they actually start to work. So qU,end =
qU,exo
G˜
and qV,end =
qV,exo
G˜
.
• Overall job destruction is given by δN in case of exogenous destruction and (1− G˜(1− δ))N
in case of endogenous destruction. So I need that δexo = 1− G˜(1− δend) which implies
δend = 1− 1−δexoG˜ .
The only additional variable which will be estimated is g˜. The other variables are calibrated
and/or computed as follows:
• It is assumed that 75% of job destruction is endogenous in steady state (so G˜δexo = 0.75).
• It is assumed that bend = 0.6bexo, which implies that
∫ b˜
0 bg(b)db = 0.4G˜bexo.
• Let w˜H denote the wage in a match which is at the margin of being destroyed. In the
steady state it holds that 0 = pLςxHγ − ΦL − w˜H + (1 − δ) cVqV(θ) , where w˜H = wH +
ν(1− ξwr)ςb b˜− ν(1− ξwr)ςb
∫ b˜
0 bg(b)db
G˜
. Solving for b˜ leads to b˜ =
pLςxHγ−ΦL−wH+(1−δ) cVqV
ν(1−ξwr)ςb +∫
bg(b)db
G˜
, where ΦL = pLςxHγ − wH + 1−β(1−δ)G˜β cVqV .
• Furthermore it is assumed that ςb = 1.
• To ensure that the difference between the value of being employed and of being unemployed
(jwu) is the same in the steady state, it has to hold that bend = bexo −
∫ b˜
0 bg(b)db
G˜
.
Rescaling of parameters in case of contemporaneous hiring
The implementation strategy for contemporaneous hiring is similar to the one of endogenous job
destruction: I assume that observable77 job destruction and observable job creation in steady state
are the same as with lagged hiring.78 The rescaling in case of exogenous destruction is as follows:
• The laws of motion of employment in steady state are N = (1 − δlag,exo)N + qU(1 −
N) in case of lagged hiring and N = (1− δcon,exo)N + qU(1− (1− δcon,exo)N) in case of
contemporaneous hiring.
• Job finding and vacancy filling rates qV and qU are assumed to be like in the case of lagged
hiring.
• Solving the law of motion for employment for the job destruction rate yields δlag,exo =
qU(1−N)
N and δcon,exo =
qU(1−N)
(1−qU)N . So it has to hold that δcon,exo =
δlag,exo
1−qU .
The rescaling in case of endogenous destruction is as follows:
76I use the subscript end for the case of endogenous job destruction and exo for exogenous job destruction.
77Both ’observable job creation’ and ’observable job destruction’ exclude the case of workers whose job was destroyed
in the same period in which they found another job and started working again.
78I use the subscript lag for the case of lagged hiring and con for contemporaneous hiring.
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• The laws of motion of employment in steady state are N = (1− δlag,exo)N + qU(1− N) in
case of lagged hiring (and exogenous destruction) and N = G˜((1− δcon,end)N+ qU(1− (1−
δcon,end)N)) in case of contemporaneous hiring (with endogenous destruction).
• Job finding and vacancy filling rates qV and qU are assumed to be like in the case of lagged
hiring (qV,end =
qV,exo
G˜
and qU,end =
qU,exo
G˜
).
• Solving the laws of motion for employment for the job destruction rate yields δlag =
qU(1−N)
N
and δcon,end =
G˜qU(1−N)−(1−G˜)N
G˜(1−qU)N
.79 So it has to hold that δcon,end =
δlag,exo−(1−G˜)
G˜−qU,exo
.80
Furthermore note that the following steady state values change slightly:
• Due to the different hiring condition ( cVqV = G˜
(
pLςxHγ −ΦL − wH + β(1− δ) cVqV
)
), it now
holds that ΦL = pLςxHγ − wH + 1−β(1−δ)G˜G˜
cV
qV
, where G˜ = 1 in case of exogenous job
destruction.
• As the steady state expression for the wage is now wH = (1− ν)(pLςxHγ −ΦL) + (1−
ν)β(1− δ)cVθ + ν
(
b+ H
1+σL
(1+σL)λ
)
,81 the expression for the firm’s bargaining power in wage
determination changes to ν = pLςxH
γ−ΦL+β(1−δ)G˜cVθ−wH
pLςxHγ−ΦL+β(1−δ)G˜cVθ−
(
b+ H
1+σL
(1+σL)λ
) , where G˜ = 1 in case of
exogenous job destruction.
• In case of endogenous job destruction, the value of b˜ also changes slightly. The term
(1− δ) cVqV(θ) in the job destruction equation is multiplied by β in case of contemporaneous
hiring, so b˜ =
pLςxHγ−ΦL−wH+β(1−δ) cVqV
ν(1−ξwr)ςb +
∫
bg(b)db
G˜
.
79N = G˜((1− δ)N + qU(1− (1− δ)N)) = G˜((1− δ)N − qU(1− δ)N) + G˜qU = G˜(1− δ)(1− qU)N + G˜qU . So 1− δ =
N−G˜qU
G˜(1−qU )N
. This leads to δ = 1− N−G˜qU
G˜(1−qU )N
= G˜(1−qU )N−N+G˜qU
G˜(1−qU )N
= G˜qU (1−N)−(1−G˜)N
G˜(1−qU )N
.
80δcon,end =
G˜qU,end(1−N)−(1−G˜)N
G˜(1−qU,end)N
=
qU,exoU−(1−G˜)N
G˜(1−qU,end)N
=
qU,exoU
N
1
G˜(1−qU,end)
− (1−G˜)N
G˜(1−qU,end)N
=
δlag,exo
G˜−qU,end G˜
− 1−G˜
G˜−qU,end G˜
.
81Evaluating the wage equation at the steady state yields wH = (1− ν)(pLςxHγ − ΦL) + ν
(
b+ ςL
(1+σL)λ
H1+σL
)
+
νβ(1− δ)G˜qU jwu, where νβ(1− δ)G˜qU(1− δ)jwu = νβ(1− δ)G˜qU 1−νν j f = (1− ν)β(1− δ)G˜qU cVqV = β(1− δ)G˜(1− ν)cVθ.
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2.C Further tables and figures
Table 2.8: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value
Shock autocorrelations
Investment ρi 0
Import demand ρm 0.75
Export demand ρmf 0.75
Risk premium ρrp 0.75
Model-specific deep parameters
Indexation parameter for wage setting γw 0.5
Convexity of vacancy costs ψV 1
Other domestic deep parameters
Discount factor β 0.995µa
Share of capital α 0.31
Depreciation rate τ 0.025
Share of fixed cost in production Φy 0
Degree of habit formation κ 0.4
Disutility of hours worked σL 10
Indexation parameter for price setting γp 1
Risk premium coefficient ˜φrp 0.01
Hiring costs*labor markt tightness ¯cVθ 0.3
Parameter in final goods CES function σm → ∞
Foreign deep parameters
Degree of habit formation κ f 0.566
Indexation parameter for price setting γp f 0.424
Inflation coefficient in Taylor rule ψ f 1.9
Persistence interest rate ρr 0.855
Foreign inverse elasticity of labor supply σ fl 5.42
Parameter in final goods CES function σmf → ∞
Steady state values
Growth of permanent technology shock µa − 1 0.003
Share of consumption in GDP cy 0.5512
Share of investment in GDP iy 0.2214
Share of exports in GDP xy 0.4855
Unemployment rate u 0.0521
Threat point of worker
¯
b+ ςLH
1+σL
(1+σL )λ
wH 0.7
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Table 2.9: Estimation results for structural parameters
Parameter Prior Posterior
Type Mean SE Mean 5% 95%
Shock autocorrelations
Productivity (temporary) ρa beta 0.750 0.150 0.921 0.861 0.985
Productivity (permanent) ρµa beta 0.750 0.150 0.332 0.229 0.442
Government consumption ρG beta 0.750 0.150 0.651 0.492 0.818
Labor supply ρL beta 0.750 0.150 0.913 0.851 0.982
Matching efficiency ρθ beta 0.750 0.150 0.754 0.631 0.883
Import prices ρpim beta 0.750 0.150 0.886 0.802 0.980
World demand ρy f beta 0.750 0.150 0.742 0.662 0.827
Variances of shock innovations
Productivity (temporary) ea invg 1.000 Inf 0.984 0.813 1.148
Productivity (permanent) eµa invg 1.000 Inf 0.550 0.470 0.625
Government consumption eG invg 4.000 Inf 3.506 2.994 4.003
Investment ei invg 4.000 Inf 2.581 2.214 2.947
Labor supply eL invg 4.000 Inf 6.164 5.231 7.059
Domestic inflation eλp invg 1.000 Inf 0.232 0.197 0.266
Matching efficiency eθ invg 1.000 Inf 0.521 0.367 0.667
Import demand em invg 4.000 Inf 1.028 0.882 1.180
Export demand emf invg 4.000 Inf 3.366 2.624 4.078
Risk premium erp invg 1.000 Inf 0.641 0.546 0.735
Import prices epim invg 1.000 Inf 0.961 0.814 1.100
World inflation epi f invg 0.500 Inf 0.152 0.129 0.174
World interest rate eR invg 0.500 Inf 0.101 0.087 0.116
World demand ey f invg 0.500 Inf 1.828 1.520 2.131
Other structural parameters in all models
Foreign trade adjustment costs φmf gamma 0.400 0.200 0.254 0.108 0.392
Domestic trade adjustment costs φm gamma 0.400 0.200 0.040 0.013 0.066
Calvo parameter prices ξp beta 0.750 0.150 0.952 0.927 0.978
Job finding prob. ¯qU beta 0.750 0.150 0.886 0.860 0.913
Matching function elasticity η beta 0.500 0.150 0.056 0.034 0.076
Production elasticity wrt hours γ beta 0.600 0.150 0.888 0.809 0.972
Investment adjustment costs χ gamma 0.250 0.100 0.191 0.098 0.282
Parameter of capital utilisation function ψ norm 4.000 1.500 4.266 2.183 6.180
Output coefficient in Taylor rule ψy f gamma 0.300 0.150 0.291 0.189 0.388
Foreing Calvo parameter prices ξ fp beta 0.750 0.150 0.939 0.918 0.959
Model-specific structural parameters
Pdf at threshold (end. dest.) g˜ invg 0.005 0.075 - - -
Real wage rigidity ξwr beta 0.500 0.100 - - -
Calvo parameter wages ξw beta 0.750 0.150 0.976 0.957 0.996
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Table 2.10: Standard deviations and autocorrelations of observable variables in the data and the
model
St. dev. St. dev. Autocorr. Autocorr.
Data Model Data Model
GDP growth ∆Y 0.83 1.76 0.20 0.36
Consumption growth ∆C 0.97 1.68 -0.34 0.30
Investment growth ∆I 2.41 3.61 -0.15 0.49
Export growth ∆X 2.47 2.54 0.31 0.22
Import growth ∆M 2.49 2.14 0.13 0.07
Wage growth ∆W 0.67 0.90 0.34 0.13
Working hours H 0.83 2.02 0.85 0.95
Unemployment U 8.69 13.39 0.87 0.91
Vacancies V 14.61 26.27 0.92 0.94
GDP deflator Πd 0.26 0.77 -0.11 0.85
Consumption deflator Π 0.37 0.70 0.02 0.43
Foreign output y f 1.26 1.03 0.90 0.83
Foreign inflation Π f 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.42
Foreign interest rate R f 0.26 0.27 0.92 0.89
Table 2.11: Cross-correlations of observable variables in the data
∆Y ∆C ∆I ∆X ∆M ∆W H U V Πd Π y f Π f R f
GDP growth ∆Y 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.2
Consumption growth ∆C 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Investment growth ∆I 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.4 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Export growth ∆X 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.7 -0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.3
Import growth ∆M 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 -0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.3
Wage growth ∆W -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 1.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1
Working hours H 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.1 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.1
Unemployment U 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 1.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.6
Vacancies V 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.7 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.6
GDP deflator Πd -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Consumption deflator Π 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
Foreign output y f 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.7 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.4 0.8
Foreign inflation Π f 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.0 0.4
Foreign interest rate R f -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.4 1.0
Table 2.12: Cross-correlations of observable variables in the model
∆Y ∆C ∆I ∆X ∆M ∆W H U V Πd Π y f Π f R f
GDP growth ∆Y 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Consumption growth ∆C 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Investment growth ∆I 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Export growth ∆X 0.7 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Import growth ∆M 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Wage growth ∆W 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Working hours H 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 -0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unemployment U -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 1.0 -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vacancies V 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 -0.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GDP deflator Πd -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Consumption deflator Π -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 -0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Foreign output y f 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.3
Foreign inflation Π f 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.3
Foreign interest rate R f 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.0
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Table 2.13: Forecast error variance decomposition for working hours H
Forecasting horizon
Shock process 1 2 4 8 16 40 100
Productivity (temporary) ea 0.182 0.173 0.155 0.114 0.078 0.081 0.081
Productivity (permanent) eµa 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Government consumption eG 0.054 0.037 0.022 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.008
Investment ei 0.022 0.019 0.014 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.006
Labor supply eL 0.571 0.541 0.507 0.451 0.412 0.423 0.423
Domestic inflation eλp 0.013 0.034 0.103 0.268 0.394 0.386 0.385
Matching efficiency eθ 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Import demand em 0.024 0.032 0.034 0.026 0.018 0.017 0.017
Export demand emf 0.105 0.131 0.130 0.093 0.063 0.059 0.059
Risk premium erp 0.000 0.008 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.010
Import prices epim 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
World inflation epi f 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
World interest rate eR 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
World demand ey f 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Sum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 2.14: Forecast error variance decomposition for output per worker yN (stationary)
Forecasting horizon
Shock process 1 2 4 8 16 40 100
Productivity (temporary) ea 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.025 0.096 0.181 0.183
Productivity (permanent) eµa 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
Government consumption eG 0.133 0.077 0.039 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.008
Investment ei 0.048 0.034 0.022 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.005
Labor supply eL 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.016 0.016
Domestic inflation eλp 0.033 0.089 0.259 0.556 0.664 0.602 0.599
Matching efficiency eθ 0.027 0.019 0.012 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003
Import demand em 0.150 0.149 0.127 0.077 0.042 0.037 0.037
Export demand emf 0.411 0.423 0.361 0.211 0.114 0.099 0.099
Risk premium erp 0.163 0.176 0.148 0.077 0.044 0.039 0.039
Import prices epim 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
World inflation epi f 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003
World interest rate eR 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.004
World demand ey f 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Sum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 2.15: Forecast error variance decomposition for output per working hour yNH (stationary)
Forecasting horizon
Shock process 1 2 4 8 16 40 100
Productivity (temporary) ea 0.092 0.084 0.085 0.104 0.180 0.276 0.279
Productivity (permanent) eµa 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
Government consumption eG 0.077 0.048 0.025 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.006
Investment ei 0.026 0.020 0.014 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003
Labor supply eL 0.140 0.120 0.098 0.064 0.036 0.031 0.030
Domestic inflation eλp 0.019 0.061 0.197 0.457 0.568 0.507 0.504
Matching efficiency eθ 0.017 0.013 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
Import demand em 0.120 0.123 0.109 0.071 0.040 0.034 0.034
Export demand emf 0.287 0.312 0.283 0.179 0.100 0.085 0.085
Risk premium erp 0.204 0.202 0.163 0.088 0.051 0.044 0.044
Import prices epim 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
World inflation epi f 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
World interest rate eR 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.004
World demand ey f 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Sum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Figure 2.3: Identification strength at the prior mean for the best-performing model
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Table 2.16: Shock groups for historical decomposition
Group name Included shocks
Technology Productivity (temporary) ea, Productivity (permanent) eµ
a
Preferences Labor supply eL
Domestic demand Government consumption eG, Investment ei, Risk premium erp
Prices Domestic inflation eλp , World inflation epi f , Import prices epim
Labor market Matching efficiency eθ
Foreign monetary World interest rate eR
Foreign demand World demand ey f , Export demand eφmf , Import demand eφm
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to import demand shock
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses to export demand shock
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to (temporary) productivity shock
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to disutility of work shock
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses to price mark-up shock
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Figure 2.9: Impulse responses to matching efficiency shock
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Figure 2.10: Impulse responses to risk premium shock
Chapter 3
International Fragmentation,
Unskilled Unemployment and the
Role of Nontradable Goods
Lukas Reiss1
JEL codes: F16, E24, F11
Abstract
In this paper I analyze the effects of international outsourcing on the employment of unskilled
labor in a Heckscher-Ohlin-World (2 countries with different relative endowments: unskilled-
labor-abundant South and skill-abundant North). Relocation of parts of the value added chain in
manufacturing (due to a relative increase in Southern productivity) makes Northern production
more skill-intensive. This causes a shift of part of the unskilled labor force to the non-trading
sectors which are assumed to be highly intensive in this factor. Sectoral unemployment rates of the
low skilled are increasing, the overall effect on unskilled unemployment depends heavily on the
characteristics of the non-trading sectors. Furthermore, under certain circumstances this increase
in outsourcing can also be accompanied by an increase in the relative price of labor-intensive
goods and the relative employment in labor-intensive sectors.
3.1 Introduction
From the 1970s to the mid-2000s, Western Europe and the US experienced relative increases in
unemployment rates of low skilled2 and the decrease of their relative wages, where in the US the
decrease in relative wages was more pronounced while in Western Europe the increase in the
relative unemployment rate was stronger.3 In the same time period trade has been liberalized
1Lukas.Reiss@oenb.at. Many thanks to Christian Haefke, Ingrid Kubin and Michael Rauscher for helpful comments.
Remaining mistakes are all mine.
2The use of the words ’skilled’ and ’unskilled’ in this paper is not meant to indicate that people without a university
(or high school) degree are less able than people who have a diploma; it is just following a convention in the literature
which refers to worse prospects at the job market.
3See for example chapter 13 in Borjas (2005), chapter 10 in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) and Pierrard and Sneessens
(2008).
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and world trade has substantially grown. Is there any relationship, namely a differential response
of these two regions’ labor markets? And what may cause them to respond differently?
This naturally raises two questions:
1. Which factors contributed to the losses of unskilled labor in Western Europe and the US?
2. Which factors can be made responsible for the differential response of (Continental) Western
Europe and the US?
3.1.1 The importance of international outsourcing
Concerning the first question, the different (but partially interconnected) possible reasons which
are discussed most prominently in the literature are: migration, institutional changes, international
trade and (skill-)biased technological progress (see for example Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004,
chapter 10). The latter is typically argued to be the by far most important contributor, which is
also claimed in several empirical studies. However, a comparatively smaller role of international
trade is usually acknowledged too.4
The potential distributional impact of international trade is an old issue in economics, which –
probably most importantly (in the context of physical capital and labor) – is for example analyzed
in the famous Heckscher-Ohlin-model.5
Over the last two decades there have also been several contributions analyzing the impact of
international trade on the (un)employment of skilled and unskilled workers: These include
Krugman (1995), Davis (1998), Sener (2003), Moore and Ranjan (2005), Egger and Kreickemeier
(2008), Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009), Mitra and Ranjan (2009) and Helpman et al. (2010).
Most of the above mentioned papers do not fully account for trade in intermediate goods. Trade
in intermediate goods is relevant in both theoretical and empirical terms. According to OECD
(2007), imports in intermediate goods already make up around 10% of GDP in most Western
European countries (and upward trending), even Germany – Europe’s largest economy – has
a share of 10%. In the larger and less open US economy it is 3%.6 The empirical evidence on
the effects of increased outsourcing is mixed; for example OECD (2007) find negative effects of
offshoring and import penetration on demand for unskilled labor.
Taking into account of the existence of outsourcing is very important when comparing the theoret-
ical predictions of trade models with data: It can be taken as a reply to the common argument (for
example made by Moore and Ranjan, 2005) that international trade cannot contribute too much to
the relative decrease in unskilled wages and employment as relative prices of skilled goods and
relative employment in skill-intensive sectors did not increase too much over the last decades,
contrary to predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin-model for the effects of opening up trade with
labor-abundant countries. The answer of authors like Feenstra and Hanson (2001)7 is that one has
4There is also the reasoning that both factors are closely interrelated as for example globalization might enforce
(skill-biased) technological progress (see again Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, chapter 10).
5Among others, chapter 2 in Feenstra (2004) provides a theoretical discussion of this model. An overview of the
empirical literature of the 1980s and 1990s of the impact of international trade on the relative wage of unskilled workers
can for example be found in Feenstra and Hanson (2001).
6These numbers are actually underestimating the extent of international outsourcing as also parts of trade in final
goods can be seen as a part of that. For example firms could only keep headquarter services in-house and subcontract all
manufacturing of final goods (see for example Feenstra and Hanson (1996) who include that aspect into their empirical
definition of outsourcing).
7This paper provides a much longer discussion on these arguments. In addition it contains a very detailed empirical
analysis of possible effects of outsourcing on the share of low skilled in the overall wage bill (with mixed results).
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to look at relative employment shares and prices of different fragments/subsectors (where the fit
with the theoretical implications is much better) instead of more aggregated sectors.
Another important aspect of international outsourcing is the scale effect – namely that the relative
productivity of outsourcing sectors increases, which may even lead – depending on whether there
are demand-side restrictions – to an overall increase of employment in this sector (compared
to the pre-outsourcing situation). These effects are empirically very hard to distinguish from
the ones of skill-biased-technological change. The possibility of an increase in employment in a
sector which increases its extent of outsourcing is emphasized in the theoretical work of Mitra
and Ranjan (2010)8 and the empirical paper of Amiti and Wei (2005). However, both contributions
do not account for skill and it is unlikely that the skill composition of a sector remains the same
after an increase in outsourcing. In a model with heterogeneous skill (without unemployment),
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) show that – under certain assumptions – these productivity
effects can be so large that the factor affected by outsourcing can even benefit from it.
3.1.2 The importance of non-trading sectors
Concerning the second question, most of the literature refers to factors like relatively higher
unemployment benefits, employment protection and union power in Continental Europe (see for
example chapter 10 in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Pierrard and Sneessens (2008) and Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999)). Within the above cited literature on unskilled unemployment and trade,
Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) and Mitra and Ranjan (2009) also discuss the role of fair wage
constraints. All 4 factors are thought to lead to a relatively smaller reaction of wages to a negative
shock, making a stronger reaction of employment ’necessary’.9 In the following, I will argue
that the characteristics of non-trading sectors might be an alternative reason for this differential
response.
Though trade in services is becoming more important in both the popular media (e.g. call-centers
and programmers in India) and in empirics (service offshoring has strongly increased over the
last years – however, from a very low starting point – see OECD, 2007), there are still many kinds
of services which can be considered as non-tradable – especially consumer services.
One interesting aspect in the context of outsourcing is that consumer services are presumably
relatively intensive in unskilled labor compared to manufacturing. When the share of unskilled
labor used in manufacturing decreases after an increase in international fragmentation, there will
be a shift of part of the unskilled labor force from manufacturing to the non-trading sector. I
will argue that their ’ability to absorb labor’ can differ significantly across industrial economies.
This may be one of the causes of the differential response to an increase in international trade
mentioned in the first paragraph.
The above mentioned papers on unskilled unemployment and trade do either not incorporate non-
trading sectors, or only skilled workers are employed in them. In the model of Mitra and Ranjan
(2010), the non-trading sector employs the same kind of workers whose jobs might be outsourced
in manufacturing, but labor is homogeneous (my model will build on their contribution).
8Actually this theoretical paper does not only analyze the effects of outsourcing, it also incorporates a sector producing
non-tradable goods.
9It should be noted, however, that the effects of employment protection on the response of unemployment to a negative
shock can be ambiguous (see for example Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
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3.1.3 Overview over the rest of the paper
In the following, I will – building on the contributions of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and
Mitra and Ranjan (2010) – set up a model to analyze the effects of an increase in international
outsourcing from rich (abundant in skilled labor) countries to poorer (abundant in unskilled
labor) ones on employment of unskilled labor. Thereby I account for the role of the characteristics
of sectors producing non-tradable goods (as possible cause for a differential response). The rest
of the paper is organized as follows: The model setting will be explained in section 3.2, followed
by an analysis of the effects of an increase in outsourcing in this model (sections 3.3 and 3.4).
Section 3.5 compares my results with the existing literature, and section 3.6 concludes and talks
about possible extensions.
3.2 Model setting
The economy in my model is characterized by
• 2 factors of production: skilled labor H and unskilled labor L (skill is exogenous),
• 2 goods: non-tradable good Z which is produced using only unskilled labor (’consumer
services’10) and a tradable composite manufacturing good Y which is produced out of a
continuum of intermediate goods X(i) using both skilled and unskilled labor, and
• 2 regions: North N is relatively skill-abundant and South S is unskilled-labor-abundant,
and the latter has also a lower total factor productivity in manufacturing.
In both regions there is a continuum of workers who provide one unit of labor each and who are
not mobile across regions (they cannot migrate from North to South or vice versa). Skilled workers
are always employed, they can switch from one firm to the other without any frictions11 and get
paid their marginal revenue product which has to be equal in all subsectors of the respective
region. Unskilled workers are subject to search-unemployment. There is no on-the-job-search.
The unemployed can search either in consumer services (indexed by z) or in manufacturing (index
x) and have to be indifferent between these two options.
The identical utility function of all workers (and entrepreneurs) is
Utility(C(t)) =
∫ ∞
0
C(t)e−rtdt, (3.1)
where
C(t) = Y(t)µZ(t)1−µ. (3.2)
This specification implies that there is no consumption smoothing over time (as lifetime utility
is linear in consumption) and that in each period a share µ of aggregate income goes into
manufacturing goods and the rest into consumer services. In the following I drop the time index
and only look at the steady state.
10Business services can be thought of as being a part of the composite manufacturing good Y.
11One could think of them being employed by competitive temp agencies.
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3.2.1 Manufacturing sector
Following the model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996),12 I assume that the final manufacturing good
Y is assemblied out of a continuum of intermediate goods X(i) with a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
lnY =
∫ 1
0
α(i) ln X(i)di, (3.3)
where
∫ 1
0 α(i)di = 1. Intermediate goods are produced via
X(i) = Ax,lL(i)γ(i)H(i)1−γ(i), (3.4)
where Ax,l denotes the country-specific total factor productivity in manufacturing (l = N, S,
throughout section 3.2 region indices will be dropped) and the elasticity γ(i) ∈ (0, 1) is decreasing
in i. The latter means that – for given wage rates – the skill intensity of production will be
increasing in i.
In each i, there are infinitely many firms producing X(i, k) units each (
∫
X(i, k)dk = X(i)). They
have to pay a fee of cV,x for posting vacancies and employ only one unit of unskilled labor
(L(i, k) = 1 ∀i, k). So it holds that:
X(i, k) = AxH(i, k)1−γ(i). (3.5)
Unskilled workers are subject to search-unemployment. If they apply in the manufacturing sector,
they do not know in which subsector i and firm k they will work after being matched. The number
of matches is determined by a linear homogeneous matching function Match(Vx,Ux) where Ux
denotes the mass of unskilled unemployed in sector manufacturing and Vx is the mass of vacancies.
Let θx := VxUx denote the labor market tightness in sector x. The probability of filling a vacancy is
given by qV(θx) :=
Match(Vx ,Ux)
Vx = Match(1,
Ux
Vx ) = Match(1,
1
θx
), which is decreasing in θx, and
the job finding rate is qU(θx) :=
Match(Vx ,Ux)
Ux = Match(θx, 1) = Match(1,
1
θx
)θx = qV(θx)θx, which
is increasing in θx. When unemployed, workers receive a flow of b (value of home production
plus unemployment benefits, the latter being financed by lump-sum taxes).
Let JF, JW , JU and JV denote the values of a match to the employer, of a match to the unskilled
employee, of being unemployed and of posting a vacancy, respectively. The asset equations for
firm k in subsector i are:13
rJF,x(i, k) = AxH(i, k)1−γ(i)Px(i)−QH(i, k)−Wx(i)− δ(JF,x(i, k)− JV,x(i, k)), (3.6)
rJW,x(i, k) = Wx(i)− δ(JW,x(i, k)− JU,x), (3.7)
rJU,x = b+ qU(θx) (EJW,x − JU,x) , (3.8)
rJV,x(i, k) = −cV,x + qV(θx)(JF,x(i, k)− JV,x(i, k)), (3.9)
where r is the exogenous discount rate, δ is the exogenous job destruction rate, Q is the wage rate
of a skilled worker, Wx(i) are wages of the unskilled, and Px(i) is the price of one unit of X(i).
12However, they use a Leontief production function for aggregating the two types of labor.
13The value of being unemployed JU,x does not carry indices for subsector and firm. This is due to the assumption that
workers applying in x do not know to which firm (and subsector) they might be matched.
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Due to free entry the value of posting a vacancy has to be zero:
JV,x(i, k) = 0. (3.10)
Flow profits of firms and wages are determined via Nash Bargaining where workers are assumed
to have bargaining power (1− ν). Using this assumption and the zero-profit-condition (3.10),
Wx(i) can be expressed in the following way (derivation in appendix 3.A):
Wx(i) = Wx = b+
(1− ν)cV,x
ν
(
θx +
r+ δ
qV(θx)
)
. (3.11)
The wage is increasing in the flow value of being unemployed b, the bargaining power (1− ν), the
labor market tightness θx and the costs of posting a vacancy cV,x. The higher b and θx (implying
a higher job finding probability), the better the outside option for the worker; and the higher cV,x
and θx (via a lower probability of filling a vacancy), the higher is the rent generated by the match
(as the expected costs for the employer of forming a new match are higher).
Using free entry (3.10) in (3.6) and computing the first-order-conditions yields (derivation in
appendix 3.A):
Px(i) =
1
Axγ(i)γ(i)(1− γ(i))1−γ(i)
(
Wx(i) + (r+ δ)
cV,x
qV(θx)
)γ(i)
Q1−γ(i). (3.12)
This is close to the typical expression for a cost function in the Cobb-Douglas-case (see for example
Mas-Colell et al., 1995, chapter 5, example 5.C.1). The higher i, the lower is γ(i) and so the higher
is the weight on the remuneration of high skilled labor and the lower the weight on the cost of
unskilled labor. This cost of unskilled labor is larger than the wage rate as (r+ δ) cV,xqV(θx) goes to
the entrepreneur (to make up for the costs of filling a vacancy).
3.2.2 Consumer services
Consumer services are produced using unskilled labor only. Every one-job-firm produces Az
units, so aggregate production of z is:14
Z = Az(Lz −Uz). (3.13)
The matching technology is the same as in the manufacturing sector, but that the cost of posting
a vacancy cV,z can differ from the one in manufacturing. The asset equations are given by:
rJF,z = AzPz −Wz − δ(JF,z − JV,z), (3.14)
rJW,z = Wz + δ(JU,z − JW,z), (3.15)
rJU,z = b+ qU(θz)(JW,z − JU,z), (3.16)
rJV,z = −cV,z + qV(θz)JF,z = 0. (3.17)
14This setting is inspired by Mitra and Ranjan (2010) who incorporate the non-trading sector in a very similar way (in
their case of ’perfect labor mobility’).
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Similar steps as in the previous section lead to
Wz = b+
(1− ν)cV,z
ν
(
θz +
r+ δ
qV(θz)
)
, and (3.18)
Pz =
1
Az
(
Wz + (r+ δ)
cV,z
qV(θz)
)
=
1
Az
(
b+
cV,z
ν
(
(1− ν)θz + r+ δqV(θz)
))
. (3.19)
3.2.3 Labor market equilibrium
Unemployed unskilled workers have to be indifferent between searching in x or in z, which
means that JU,x = JU,z. Combining equations (3.8), (3.16), (3.11) and (3.18), this is equivalent to
(for the intermediate steps see appendix 3.A):
cV,xθx = cV,zθz. (3.20)
Note that this equation implies an important trade-off: A relatively higher cV means a relatively
higher wage and a relatively lower job finding probability.15
All unskilled workers either belong to the labor force in x or to the one in z:
L = Lx + Lz. (3.21)
In the steady state the outflow of unemployment (newly formed jobs) has to be equal to the
inflow (destroyed jobs). So in sector x, it has to hold that qU(θx)Ux = δ(Lx −Ux). This means
that the mass of unemployed in equilibrium is:
Ux =
δ
δ+ qU(θx)
Lx, (3.22)
which depends positively on the separation rate δ, negatively on the job finding rate qU(θx)
and positively on labor force Lx (as Ux denotes the mass of unemployed in x and not the
unemployment rate). As the job destruction rate δ is assumed to be constant, the level of the
unemployment rate is only determined by the job finding probability. So when later a shift in the
trade structure will lead to a change in the steady state unemployment rate, this will be via a
change in job creation (and not in job destruction).
Making the same steps for sector z yields:
Uz =
δ
δ+ qU(θz)
Lz. (3.23)
Aggregate unemployment U = Ux +Uz is then equal to:
U = δ
(
Lx
δ+ qU(θx)
+
Lz
δ+ qU(θz)
)
. (3.24)
To get to the overall unemployment rate of the unskilled, one has to divide (3.24) by L. Equation
(3.24) shows that the sectoral composition of the labor force is crucial. If qU(θx) 6= qU(θz), then
the sectoral unemployment rates will differ and so a change in the relative size of the labor force
15Equations (3.11) and (3.18) indicate that ∂ ln(W−b)∂ ln cV = 1 for given θ but 0 <
∂ ln(W−b)
∂ ln θ < 1 for given cV . Furthermore,
note again that the probability to find a job increases in θ.
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in x will – for given θx and θz – lead to a change of the overall unemployment rate (for given
sectoral unemployment rates). This point will be crucial later in sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4.
3.3 Effects of change in outsourcing structure
3.3.1 Introducing international trade
As a next step I introduce trade into this model. I assume that all intermediate goods can be
traded freely. So each good is produced in the region where unit cost is lower. Using this in (3.12)
yields:
Px(i) =
1
γ(i)γ(i)(1− γ(i))1−γ(i) min
WCγ(i)x,N q1−γ(i)N
Ax,N
,
WCγ(i)x,S q
1−γ(i)
S
Ax,S
 , (3.25)
where WCx :=Wx + (r+ δ)
cV,x
qV(θx)
= b+ cV,xν
(
(1− ν)θx + r+δqV(θx)
)
.
As stated before, the South is assumed to be more abundant in unskilled labor (HNLN >
HS
LS
) and
to have a lower total factor productivity (Ax,S < Ax,N). If the endowments are different enough,
it holds that WCx,SAx,S <
WCx,N
Ax,N
and QSAx,S >
QN
Ax,N
(this implies that QN WCx,SQS WCx,N < 1). This means that
compared to total factor productivity, unskilled labor is relatively cheaper in the South and skilled
labor relatively cheaper in the North. So there is a unique i∗ for which:
WCγ(i
∗)
x,N W
1−γ(i∗)
N,S
Ax,N
=
WCγ(i
∗)
x,S Q
1−γ(i∗)
S
Ax,S
, (3.26)
WCγ(i)x,N Q
1−γ(i)
N
Ax,N
<
WCγ(i)x,S Q
1−γ(i)
S
Ax,S
for i > i∗, and
WCγ(i)x,N Q
1−γ(i)
N
Ax,N
>
WCγ(i)x,S Q
1−γ(i)
S
Ax,S
for i < i∗.
So everything with i > i∗ (the relatively skill-intensive intermediate goods) is produced in the
North, the rest (the relatively unskilled-labor-intensive inputs) in the South (see figure 3.1).16 i∗
will from now on be called ’outsourcing frontier’.
3.3.2 Distribution of income
Given this frontier one can compute the relative shares of North and South and of H and L in
world income. A share
∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di of overall revenue from manufacturing will be generated in the
North.
Northern income is chosen to be the numeraire. As all income of workers and entrepreneurs17 is
assumed to be spent on consumption, this means that:
QNHN +WCx,N(Lx,N −Ux,N) + Pz,NAz,N(Lz,N −Uz,N) = 1.
16Note that the ordinate in figures 3.1 and 3.2 has a logarithmic scale. Furthermore, Px(i) has been pre-multiplied by
γ(i)γ(i)(1− γ(i))1−γ(i). This has no effect on any results in this paper, but eases the visual presentability of the function
Px(i).
17I assume that the vacancy posting cost cV is paid to households; this ensures that GDP equals consumption in the
Northern economy.
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Figure 3.1: Prices as a function of i and the outsourcing frontier
From (3.2) it can be seen that a fraction µ of income is spent on goods from sector x and the rest
on services:
WCx,N(Lx,N −Ux,N) +QNHN = µ, (3.27)
Pz,NAz,N(Lz,N −Uz,N) = 1− µ. (3.28)
Using that (3.3) and (3.4) are Cobb-Douglas as well, it becomes clear that a share
∫ 1
i∗ (1−γ(i))α(i)di∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
of revenue from Northern manufacturing goes to skilled labor and the rest to unskilled workers
and entrepreneurs:
WCx,N(Lx,N −Ux,N) = µ
∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
, (3.29)
QNHN = µ
∫ 1
i∗(1− γ(i))α(i)di∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
. (3.30)
Note that the choice of numeraire is not irrelevant in this model as the flow value of being
unemployed b and the vacancy posting costs (cV,x, cV,z) are fixed in terms of it. Northern income
was chosen as it can be expected that the decrease in the share of the overall pie after outsourcing
(di∗ > 0) is approximately offset by the growth of the whole pie as the shift will be assumed
to be due to a productivity increase in the South. This choice has similar implications as a
fair-wage-constraint, which is for example employed by Egger and Kreickemeier (2008), because
also there a trade-induced increase in wage inequality goes hand in hand with an increase in
unskilled unemployment (see section 3.5).
An intuitive alternative choice would have been to assume quasilinear preferences with the
Northern service good as numeraire, but that would have caused severe problems. Using (3.18) in
(3.19) and setting Pz = 1, one can see that such an assumption would pin down the labor market
tightness in z – and by equation (3.20) also the one in x. So the choice of the numeraire remains
an open issue.
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3.3.3 Relocation of production and Northern unemployment
One possible reason for an increase in i∗ can be a relative increase in Southern productivity Ax,S.
Appendix 3.A shows that
di∗
d ln Ax,S
> 0. (3.31)
A higher Ax,S means that intermediate goods with an index slightly above the ’old’ i∗ will now
be cheaper to produce in the South (see figure 3.2).18 This result stands in contrast to typical
small-open-economy models of a Heckscher-Ohlin-type, where a factor-neutral productivity
increase by 1% would lead to a 1% increase in all factor remunerations.
The increase in outsourcing from the North to the South leads to an even stronger specialization
of the North in skill-intensive production as the outsourced parts are the least skill-intensive.
Therefore the relative wage of skilled labor increases.19
To analyze the effects of such an increase in outsourcing on unskilled unemployment in the North,
one has to derive the labor market equilibrium in the North for a given i∗. Using (3.22) in (3.29)
yields:
qU (θx,N)
(
b+ cV,x,Nν
(
r+δ
qV(θx,N)
+ (1− ν)θx,N
))
δ+ qU (θx,N)
Lx,N = µ
∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i), di∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
. (3.32)
Using (3.23) in (3.28) yields a similar expression for the service sector:
qU (θz,N)
(
b+ cV,z,Nν
(
r+δ
qV(θz,N)
+ (1− ν)θz,N
))
δ+ qU (θz,N)
Lz,N = 1− µ. (3.33)
Rearranging the last expression and substituting out Pz,N , Lz,N and θz,N results in (derivation in
appendix 3.A):
Lx,N = LN − 1− µ
b+ cV,z,Nν
 r+δ
qV
(
cV,x,N θx,N
cV,z,N
) + (1−ν)cV,x,Nθx,NcV,z,N

 δ
qU
(
cV,x,Nθx,N
cV,z,N
) + 1
 . (3.34)
The latter equation shows that Lx,N is increasing in θx,N as qV(θ) is decreasing in θ and qU(θ) =
qV(θ)θ is increasing in θ. This implies that the LHS in equation (3.32) is increasing in θx,N , while
the RHS is decreasing in i∗20. So it holds that:
dθx,N
di∗ < 0. (3.35)
Due to the increase in outsourcing, unskilled labor cannot be used as productively as before and
less vacancies for them are posted in sector x. This leads to a decrease of the wage rate and of the
unskilled labor force in x. By equation (3.21) the latter means an increase in the labor force Lz in
the non-trading sector.
18Note that figure 3.2 is a bit simplifying as the increase in Ax,S induces changes in factor prices which would actually
also change the slopes of the Px(i)-functions.
19This can be seen from equation (3.30) where QN is an increasing function of i∗.
20 ∂
∂i∗
( ∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i),di∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
)
=
−γ(i∗)α(i∗)
(∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
)
+α(i∗)
∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di(∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
)2 = −γ(i∗)α(i∗)
∫ 1
i∗ (γ(i∗)−γ(i))α(i)di(∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
)2 < 0 as γ(i) is decreasing in
i by assumption and so
∫ 1
i∗ (γ(i
∗)− γ(i))α(i)di > 0.
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Figure 3.2: Relocation of production
However, to ensure that unemployed unskilled workers are still indifferent between searching in
x and searching in z, the labor market tightness in z has to decrease too ( dθz,Ndi∗ < 0; see equation
(3.20)).21 By equations (3.22) and (3.23) this means that both sectoral unemployment rates increase:
dUx,NLx,N
di∗ > 0 and
dUx,NLx,N
di∗ > 0. (3.36)
Note that the effect on overall unskilled unemployment UN is ambiguous. If the hiring costs in
z are sufficiently lower than in x and the unemployment rate in z is therefore lower too, then
the shift of labor force from the high-unemployment sector x to the low-unemployment-sector z
could lead to a decrease in the overall unemployment rate in spite of the increase in both sectoral
unemployment rates.22 Note again that in this case wages in z are lower than in x (see section
3.2.3).
The effect on the overall unemployment rate is also closely linked to the effect on wage inequality
(between skilled and unskilled) in this model. As indicated before, Wx and Wz will decrease
in terms of the numeraire and Q will increase. The only possible scenario in which this would
not necessarily lead to an increase in the relative wage of skilled labor,23 would be a case where
cV,z > cV,x (the opposite from the previous paragraph): Then an increase in the labor force of z
would mean that relatively more unskilled workers earn a wage in the high-unemployment-high-
wage-sector. And this effect could – at least in principle – outweigh the impact of the relative
increase of Q compared to Wx and Wz.
3.3.4 Possible differential response
The dependence of the labor market effects on the relative hiring costs in x and z introduces the
possibility of a differential response of unemployment rates to outsourcing due to differences in
the characteristics of the non-trading sectors.
21As θz is falling, the price of good z is falling as well in terms of the numeraire (this can be seen from equation (3.19)).
22Mitra and Ranjan (2010) make a similar point (case of ’perfect labor mobility’).
23The relative wage in this model is derived by comparing Q to the weighted average of Wx and Wz: QWx (Lx−Ux )+Wz (Lz−Uz )
Lx+Lz−(Ux+Uz )
.
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Imagine two disconnected pairs which both consist of a Northern and a Southern model economy:
Germany (outsourcing to countries in Central Eastern Europe) on the one hand and the US
(outsourcing to Mexico and South Asia) on the other.24 Even if unemployment benefits and
matching technology as well as the hiring costs in manufacturing were the same in both countries,
differences in the characteristics of the service sectors would lead to a differential response to an
increase in outsourcing. For example, if hiring costs were relatively lower in the US service sector,
this would lead to a smaller response of unskilled unemployment and a larger response of wage
inequality. This could also be one of the explanations of the relatively higher share of services
and construction in overall employment in the US and the UK. According to the OECD, in 2010
services and construction accounted for ’only’ 79% of overall employment in the Euro area, but
for 88% in the US and 87% in the UK (these numbers also include business services).
In the context of this paper, these hiring costs cV can be thought of as a proxy for other sector-
specific factors which drive wages and the cost of hiring in the same direction (like training
costs).
Note that the analysis in this model abstracts from skilled unemployment and so an increase in
unskilled unemployment is equivalent to an increase in overall unemployment. If one were also
to account for skilled unemployment, the (likely negative) effect of an increase in outsourcing on
the overall unemployment rate should be significantly dampened by the expected decrease in
skilled unemployment.
3.4 International fragmentation versus trade in final goods
The setting employed so far serves very well for emphasizing the role of non-tradable goods
and for deriving the implications of increased outsourcing for labor markets. However, while in
section 3.1.1 I emphasize the importance of distinguishing between trade in final goods and trade
in intermediate goods, there is nothing in my analysis which would change if I just relabelled
the intermediate manufacturing goods as final goods (and interpret Y in equation (3.3) as an
aggregator for deriving utility). The case is similar with several other papers discussing the
impact of ’offshoring’ or ’outsourcing’ on unskilled unemployment (see section 3.5).
So to be able to compare changes in relative employment and relative prices of different sectors
(as in Feenstra and Hanson, 2001), I need to split up the manufacturing process further into the
following two stages:25
1. Different intermediate goods X(i, j) (with differing labor elasticities γ(i, j)) are bundled to
2. different final goods X(i) (with labor elasticities γ(i) =
∫ 1
0 γ(i, j)dj).
Production functions are given by:
lnY =
∫ 1
0
ln X(i)di and
ln X(i) =
∫ 1
0
ln X(i, j)dj.
X(i, j) = AxL(i, j)γ(i,j)H(i, j)1−γ(i,j),
24In reality the US and Germany obviously engage in trade with each other.
25To make things a bit easier, I set α(i, j) = 1 ∀i, j.
3.4. INTERNATIONAL FRAGMENTATION VERSUS TRADE IN FINAL GOODS 85
where the labor elasticity γ(i, j) is increasing in j for given i. Similar to before I have:
P(i, j) =
1
γ(i)γ(i,j)(1− γ(i, j))1−γ(i,j) min
WCγ(i,j)x,N Q1−γ(i,j)N
Ax,N
,
WCγ(i,j)x,S Q
1−γ(i,j)
S
Ax,S
 .
For each i, there will be a cut-off point j∗(i) for which everything with j(i) < j∗(i) (j(i) > j∗(i)) is
produced in the South (North). As productivity Ax,l is assumed to be the same across all sectors
(within each country), γ(i, j∗(i)) =: γ∗ is identical for all i.26
The effects of an increase in outsourcing on labor markets (possibly caused by a relative increase
in Southern productivity) are qualitatively the same as before. But the enriched production
structure allows me to look at relative prices and relative employment of different sectors before
and after the overall increase in outsourcing.
Appendix 3.B shows that the effect of an increase in Southern productivity on the relative
production (i.e. relative to overall production) of good i˜ can be expressed as follows:
d ln X(i˜)
d ln Ax,S
− d lnY
d ln Ax,S
= j∗(i˜)−
∫ 1
0
j∗(i)di
+
(∫ j∗(i˜)
0
γ(i˜, j)dj−
∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0
γ(i, j)djdi
)
d ln Nx,S
d ln Ax,S
+
(∫ 1
j∗(i˜)
γ(i˜, j)dj−
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i)
γ(i, j)djdi
)
d ln Nx,N
d ln Ax,S
+γ∗
(
−Nx,S(i˜)
Nx,S
+
Nx,N(i˜)
Nx,N
) ∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di
+(1− γ∗)
(
−HS(i˜)
HS
+
HN(i˜)
HN
) ∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di. (3.37)
This long expression can be disentangled as follows:
1. The terms in the first line denote the gains from the productivity increase in the South (as
intermediate goods which were already produced in the South before the increase in Ax,S
can now be produced with less factor input).
2. The terms in the second and third line denote the effects of the change in the number of
unskilled workers in both Southern and Northern manufacturing. This change is due to a
shift to the service sector and higher unemployment, the number of unskilled workers in
manufacturing decreases.
3. The terms in the last two lines denote the effects of increased outsourcing on the intra-
manufacturing-sector-availability of labor (in the South Nx,S and HS are distributed to a
wider range of manufacturing tasks, while labor becomes less scarce in remaining Northern
manufacturing).
One case where sector i˜ is relatively labor-intensive (meaning that
∫ 1
0 γ(i˜, j)dj >
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0 γ(i, j)djdi)
and an increase in Southern productivity increases the relative price of i˜ is illustrated in figure 3.3
(details can be found in appendix 3.B).27 There the first two lines of (3.37) both cancel out, the
26Note, however, that some sectors might produce everything in one region (when either γ(i, j) > γ∗ ∀j or γ(i, j) <
γ∗ ∀j).
27Note that i˜ is only very slightly more labor intensive than the average.
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γ(i˜, j)
Figure 3.3: Outsourcing frontier for different manufacturing sectors
item in the third line is negative and the sum of the fourth and the fifth line is smaller than zero
too (see again appendix 3.B).
As P(i)X(i) is identical over all goods, this relative decrease of X(i˜) means that the relative
price of labor-intensive good i˜ increases. Furthermore, while the other sectors relocate parts
of their production to the South, sector i˜ does not, which also means an increase in relative
employment (compared to overall manufacturing) of this sector in the North. The results of
section 3.3.3 also imply that – like with skill-biased technological change – there is an increase in
the skill-intensity in all manufacturing sectors of the economy (due to the shift of unskilled labor
into unemployment and into the service sector).
This means that in this model – and in contrast to typical models analyzing trade in final goods
only – an increase in outsourcing to labor-abundant countries cannot only lead to an increase
in unskilled unemployment, but can also be accompanied by an increase in the relative price of
labor-intensive goods and the relative employment in labor-intensive sectors.
3.5 Comparison to other results in the literature
The result that an increase in trade or opening up trade increases unemployment and/or wage
inequality is not new in the literature. For example, it is also the case in Krugman (1995), Davis
(1998), Sener (2003), Moore and Ranjan (2005), Egger and Kreickemeier (2008)28, Keuschnigg and
Ribi (2009), Mitra and Ranjan (2009) and Helpman et al. (2010).
The analysis of Sener (2003) and Helpman et al. (2010) is made in the context of opening
up/liberalizing North-North-trade (trade of countries which are similar in terms of factor en-
dowments and productivity). So the channels leading to their results are completely different
to my work. In Sener (2003) trade liberalization increases the gains to innovation and makes
therefore working in R&D (= high skilled jobs) more attractive, while at the same time increasing
turnover and job destruction in the manufacturing industry (= low skilled jobs). In Helpman
et al. (2010), one crucial factor for the increase in unemployment and inequality is the expansion
of the manufacturing sector following an increase in trade of its goods. This leads to a shift
28Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) also discuss cases where international fragmentation benefits unskilled labor.
3.5. COMPARISON TO OTHER RESULTS IN THE LITERATURE 87
of a part of the labor force from the low-income-low-unemployment numeraire sector to the
high-wage-high-unemployment manufacturing sector.29
The contributions of Krugman (1995), Davis (1998), Moore and Ranjan (2005), Mitra and Ran-
jan (2009), Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) and Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) all model North-
South-trade in a Heckscher-Ohlin-like-setting. In the first four papers an exogenous (trade- or
fragmentation-driven) increase of the relative price of the skill-intensive good is analyzed, while
in Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) it becomes possible to split up previously integrated production
structures and in Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) there is a decrease in transport costs. In a model
without unemployment this would typically lead to an increase of the relative wage of the skilled,
but due to frictions (minimum wages in the former two, fair wages in the third and search
frictions in the latter three) there is an increase in unemployment of the unskilled. The difference
of my contribution to these six papers is two-fold:
First, the proposed reason for a differential response is different in my model. In Krugman
(1995) and Davis (1998) the prevailing minimum wage is the reason for the different response of
’Europe’ (Northern country with binding minimum real wage constraint) and ’the US’ (Northern
country with flexible labor markets) to opening up trade with a unskilled-labor-abundant country
(leading to an increase in inequality in ’the US’ and an increase in unemployment in ’Europe’),3031
while Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) and Mitra and Ranjan (2009) claim that stricter ’fair wage
constraints’ in Europe could lead to this result. Moore and Ranjan (2005) and Keuschnigg and
Ribi (2009) do not explicitly talk about a differential response of different Northern economies
to ’globalization’ but mention that the higher unemployment benefits, the higher the reaction
of unemployment rates and the lower of wages. So in all of these papers the characteristics
of the trading sectors (real wage rigidities and unemployment benefits) are the reason for the
differential response. However, in my paper I argue that there can be a differential response of
different Northern economies to the same shock even if the characteristics of the manufacturing
sectors (including unemployment benefits) are the same. Namely, possible differences in the
characteristics of the non-trading sectors could matter (see section 3.3.4).
Second, with the exception of Egger and Kreickemeier (2008), none of the above papers makes
the crucial distinction between the skill-intensity of sectors/final goods versus the one of subsec-
tors/intermediate goods. Krugman (1995) and Davis (1998) explicitly model trade in final goods
only; Moore and Ranjan (2005), Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) and Mitra and Ranjan (2009) model
trade in intermediate goods (the latter two use the terms outsourcing respectively offshoring).
However, in all three contributions these two intermediate goods (the skill-intensive and the
labor-intensive one) are boundled into just one final good, so all of them could be easily rewritten
into a model with two consumption goods, and so the above mentioned distinction cannot be
made. However, this distinction – which I explicitly make in section 3.4 – is crucial, as an increase
of the relative price of skill-intensive final goods (which is needed to have adverse effects for
unskilled labor in Heckscher-Ohlin-type-models with trade in final goods) is often claimed to be
29The mechanism making workers indifferent between applying in these 2 sectors is somehow different from the one in
my model, however: In Helpman et al. (2010), all workers in the numeraire sector receive the same wage regardless of
their ability which is not observable to themselves. In manufacturing, there is a (costly) screening for abilities with a
certain ability threshold below which workers are rejected (and therefore unemployed); the wage rate for the accepted
workers is higher than in the numeraire sector.
30The first to analyze the effects of minimum wages in a Heckscher-Ohlin-world was Brecher (1974) in a more theoretical
contribution.
31The first to analyze the effects of minimum wages in a Heckscher-Ohlin-world was Brecher (1974) in a more theoretical
contribution.
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at odds with empirical evidence (see section 3.1 and Feenstra and Hanson (2001)).
Only Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) make this distinction: In their model, there are three
final goods (Y, skill-intensive X, labor-intensive Z) and the good with the intermediate skill
intensity (Y) can be internationally fragmented. However, their production structure introduces
an ambiguity in the distributional effects of international outsourcing, which does not exist in
my model. Similar to the more general fragmentation model of Kohler (2003), in Egger and
Kreickemeier (2008) international fragmentation benefits the factor which is used intensively in
the fragmenting sector. So if (relatively labor-intensive) fragments are outsourced to Southern
economies, the impact on wage premiums and unemployment rates depends on the relative skill
intensity of the outsourcing sector. If it is relatively skill-intensive (i.e. production of Y and Z
in the pre-fragmentation-equilibrium), the results are relatively similar to mine; if it is relatively
labor-intensive (i.e. production of X and Y in the pre-fragmentation-equilibrium), unskilled labor
gains from international fragmentation. In my model the relative gain of certain sectors from
international outsourcing is reflected in an increase in their produced quantities but – thanks to
the general equilibrium setting – leads at the same time to a decrease of the relative prices of their
goods (which can be easily quantified due to the Cobb-Douglas-specification, see section 3.4).
Due to the latter aspect, there can be no gain for unskilled labor after an increase in outsourcing
to labor-abundant countries in my model (in contrast to the case of a small open economy in
Egger and Kreickemeier, 2008).
The models of Matusz (1996), Hoon (2001), Mitra and Ranjan (2010) and Felbermayr et al. (2011)
all have only one type of labor input. Furthermore, they all emphasize the efficiency gains
from opening up or liberalizing trade while I analyze an increase in trade caused by higher
competitiveness of a trading partner and stress the relative loss incurred by unskilled labor.
Given these settings, it comes at no surprise that in Matusz (1996) and Hoon (2001) opening up
trade is unambiguously positive for employment and that in the other two contributions the
effects tend to be positive with some ambiguities: In the perfect-labor-mobility case in Mitra
and Ranjan (2010), sectoral unemployment rates decrease after outsourcing becomes possible,
but the effect on overall employment can be negative. In Felbermayr et al. (2011) the effect on
employment is positive in two trade liberalization scenarios and ambiguous in one.
With one exception, these four models are therefore not comparable with mine. The work of Mitra
and Ranjan (2010) is similar to mine in terms of the modelling approach: The (homogeneous)
unemployed workers have to be indifferent between searching in a sector where international
outsourcing is possible and one where it is not. They get to a similar dependence of the overall
labor market effects of outsourcing on the relative hiring costs in the two sectors, but the effect
of international outsourcing on sectoral employment rates is positive (i.e. in the ’normal case’
outsourcing reduces unemployment). Furthermore, in their contribution it is not explicitly
mentioned to be a reason for a differential response of Northern economies to international
outsourcing. They analyze the potential impact of labor mobility between the trading and the
non-trading sector on the response to international outsourcing instead.
3.6 Conclusion and possible extensions
In this paper I have analyzed the effects of international outsourcing on the employment of
unskilled labor in a Heckscher-Ohlin-World (2 countries with different relative endowments).
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An increase in outsourcing from the skill-abundant North to the labor-abundant South makes
Northern production more skill-intensive. This causes a shift of part of the unskilled labor force
to the non-trading sectors and increases sectoral unemployment rates. The characteristics of this
non-trading sector are then crucial to determine the overall effect of unskilled unemployment
and can be a cause for a differential response of different Northern economies (like Germany and
the US) to an increase in outsourcing. Furthermore, I show that in my setting – in contrast to
typical models analyzing trade in final goods only – an increase in outsourcing to labor-abundant
countries can also be accompanied by an increase in the relative price of labor-intensive goods
and the relative employment in labor-intensive sectors in the North.
Possible extensions to this work would be to look at adjustment paths from one steady state to
the other and to get away from the purely unit-cost-based location decision; the latter would
be necessary to calibrate the model as now the effects of changes in Southern productivity on
relative production would be very large.
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Appendix
3.A Derivations related to employment effects
Intermediate Steps for Equations (3.11) and (3.20)
Combining Nash bargaining and the zero-profit-condition (3.6) and (3.9) yields
JW,x(i, k)− JU,x = (1− ν)ν JF,x(i, k)
=
(1− ν)
ν
cV,x
qV(θx)
. (3.38)
This expression is independent of i. So JW,x(i, k) = EJW,x = JW,x. Subtracting (3.8) from (3.7),
solving for Wx(i) = Wx and then plugging in from above leads to:
Wx = b+ (r+ δ+ qU(θx))(JW,x − JU,x)
= b+ (r+ δ+ qU(θx))
(1− ν)
ν
cV,x
qV(θx)
= b+
(1− ν)cV,x
ν
(
θx +
r+ δ
qV(θx)
)
.
Plugging that into the expression of the value of being unemployed (3.8) yields
rJU,x = b+ qU(θx)
(1− ν)
ν
cV,x
qV(θx)
= b+
(1− ν)
ν
cV,xθx. (3.39)
Intermediate Steps for Equation (3.12)
Taking the first derivative of (3.6) with regard to H(i, k) yields:
(1− γ(i))AxH(i, k)−γ(i)Px(i) = Q.
Solving for H(i, k) = H(i) yields:
H(i, k) =
(
Ax(1− γ(i))Px(i)
Q
) 1
γ(i)
. (3.40)
Using (3.10) and (3.6) to rewrite (3.9) leads to:
(r+ δ)JV,x(i) = AxH(i, k)1−γ(i)Px(i)−QH(i, k)−Wx(i)− (r+ δ) cV,xqV(θx) = 0. (3.41)
Combining (3.40) and (3.41) and rearranging yields:
0 = AxPx(i)
(
Ax(1− γ(i))Px(i)
Q
) 1−γ(i)
γ(i) −Q
(
Ax(1− γ(i))Px(i)
Q
) 1
γ(i) −Wx(i)− (r+ δ) cV,xqV(θx)
= A
1
γ(i)
x Px(i)
1
γ(i)Q
γ(i)−1
γ(i)
[
(1− γ(i))
1−γ(i)
γ(i) − (1− γ(i)) 1γ(i)
]
−Wx(i)− (r+ δ) cV,xqV(θx) .
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Finally one gets to (3.12) by solving for Px(i).
Intermediate Steps for Equation (3.34)
Using (3.19) in (3.33) results in:
f (θz,N) θz,N
(
b+ cV,z,Nν
(
r+δ
f (θz,N)
+ (1− ν)θz,N
))
δ+ f (θz,N) θz,N
Lz,N = 1− µ.
Rewriting that expression using (3.20) and (3.21) yields
f
(
cV,x,Nθx,N
cV,z,N
)
cV,x,Nθx,N
cV,z,N
b+ cV,z,Nν
 r+δ
f
(
cV,x,N θx,N
cV,z,N
) + (1−ν)cx,Nθx,NcV,z,N

δ+ f
(
cV,x,Nθx,N
cV,z,N
)
cV,x,Nθx,N
cV,z,N
(LN − Lx,N) = 1− µ;
solving for Lx,N leads to (3.34).
Intermediate Steps for Equation (3.31)
Using equations (3.29) - (3.30) (and the equivalent expressions for the South), (3.26) can be
expressed as:
Ax,S
Ax,N
=
(
Lx,N −Ux,N
Lx,S −Ux,S
)γ(i∗) (∫ i∗
0 γ(i)α(i)di∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di
)γ(i∗) (
HN
HS
)1−γ(i∗) (∫ i∗
0 (1− γ(i))α(i)di∫ 1
i∗(1− γ(i))α(i)di
)1−γ(i∗)
.
Taking logs on both sides and rearranging leads to:
0 = Ω(Ax,S, Ax,N , i∗) := − ln Ax,SAx,N + γ(i
∗) ln
(
Lx,N −Ux,N
Lx,S −Ux,S
)
+ (1− γ(i∗)) ln
(
HN
HS
)
+γ(i∗) ln
∫ i∗
0
γ(i)α(i)di− γ(i∗) ln
∫ 1
i∗
γ(i)α(i)di
+(1− γ(i∗)) ln
∫ i∗
0
(1− γ(i))α(i)di
−(1− γ(i∗)) ln
∫ 1
i∗
(1− γ(i))α(i)di. (3.42)
Applying the implicit function theorem, the effect of an unexpected increase in Southern produc-
tivity Ax,S on the outsourcing frontier i∗ can be computed as follows:
d i∗
d ln Ax,S
= −
∂Ω
∂ ln Ax,S
∂Ω
∂i∗
. (3.43)
Taking derivatives of (3.42) yields
∂Ω
∂ ln Ax,S
= −1, (3.44)
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and
∂Ω
∂i∗ =
∂γ(i∗)
∂i
(
ln
(Lx,N −Ux,N)HS
(Lx,S −Ux,S)HN + ln
∫ i∗
0 γ(i)α(i)di
∫ 1
i∗(1− γ(i))α(i)di∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di
∫ i∗
0 (1− γ(i))α(i)di
)
+γ(i∗) γ(i
∗)α(i∗)∫ i∗
0 γ(i)α(i)di
+ γ(i∗) γ(i
∗)α(i∗)∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di
+ (1− γ(i∗)) (1− γ(i
∗))α(i∗)∫ i∗
0 (1− γ(i))α(i)di
.(3.45)
Combining equations (3.43), (3.44) and (3.45) results in:(
di∗
d ln Ax,S
)−1
=
∂Ω
∂i∗ =
∂γ(i∗)
∂i
ln
QN WCx,S
QSWCx,N
+ γ(i∗) γ(i
∗)α(i∗)∫ i∗
0 γ(i)α(i)di
+ γ(i∗) γ(i
∗)α(i∗)∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di
+ (1− γ(i∗)) (1− γ(i
∗))α(i∗)∫ i∗
0 (1− γ(i))α(i)di
+ (1− γ(i∗)) (1− γ(i
∗))α(i∗)∫ 1
i∗(1− γ(i))α(i)di
+ γ(i∗)
dNx,N
di∗
Nx,N
− γ(i∗)
dNx,S
di∗
Nx,S
, (3.46)
where I used equations (3.29) and (3.30) for rearranging terms. All but the last two terms in (3.46)
are unambiguously positive (as ∂γ(i
∗)
∂i < 0 and
QN WCx,S
QS WCx,N
< 1). To keep things simple, I assume
that labor markets in the South are competitive and not subject to a search friction. Then it holds
that:
Nx,S =
µ
∫ i∗
0 α(i)γ(i)di∫ i∗
0 α(i)di
µ
∫ i∗
0 α(i)γ(i)di∫ i∗
0 α(i)di
+ 1− µ
NS =
µ
∫ i∗
0 α(i)γ(i)di
µ
∫ i∗
0 α(i)γ(i)di+ (1− µ)
∫ i∗
0 α(i)di
NS,
where NS = LS is exogenous. As the overall skill intensity in the Southern manufacturing sector
increases with the rise in i∗, the share of the unskilled labor force working in the manufacturing
sector decreases:
dNx,S
di∗ =
µα(i∗)γ(i∗)
(
µ
∫ i∗
0 α(i)γ(i)di+ (1− µ)
∫ i∗
0 α(i)di
)
(
µ
∫ i∗
0 α(i)γ(i)di+ 1− µ
)2 NS
− (µα(i
∗)γ(i∗) + (1− µ)α(i∗)) µ ∫ i∗0 α(i)γ(i)di(
µ
∫ i∗
0 α(i)γ(i)di+ 1− µ
)2 NS
=
µ(1− µ)α(i∗)γ(i∗) ∫ i∗0 α(i)di− (1− µ)α(i∗)µ ∫ i∗0 α(i)γ(i)di(
µ
∫ i∗
0 γ(i)di+ 1− µ
)2 NS
=
µ(1− µ)α(i∗) ∫ i∗0 α(i)di(
µ
∫ i∗
0 γ(i)di+ 1− µ
)2 (γ(i∗)− 1)NS < 0. (3.47)
So −γ(i∗)
dNx,S
di∗
Nx,S
> 0.
To get to the intended result of di
∗
d ln Ax,S
> 0, the only thing left to show is that γ(i∗)
dNx,N
di∗
Nx,N
(which
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is negative) is sufficiently small in absolute value. Rearranging equation (3.32) yields:
Nx,N =
µ
∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
b+ cV,xν
(
(1− ν)θx,N + r+δqV(θx,N)
) . (3.48)
d Nx,N
d i∗ can be computed as follows:
d Nx,N
d i∗ =
∂Nx,N
∂ i∗ +
∂Nx,N
∂ θx,N
d θx,N
d i∗ . (3.49)
It has already been shown in section 3.3.3 that d θx,Nd i∗ < 0. Taking derivatives of (3.48) with regard
to θx,N and i∗ leads to:
∂Nx,N
∂ θx,N
=
−µ
∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di(
b+ cV,xν
(
(1− ν)θx,N − r+δqV(θx,N)
))2 ( cV,xν
(
(1− ν)− r+ δ
(qV(θx,N))2
∂qV
∂θx,N
))
< 0, and
∂Nx,N
∂ i∗ =
µ
−γ(i∗)α(i∗) ∫ 1i∗ α(i)di+α(i∗) ∫ 1i∗ γ(i)α(i)di(∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
)2
b+ cV,xν
(
(1− ν)θx,N + r+δqV(θx,N)
) = µ
α(i∗)
∫ 1
i∗ α(i)(γ(i)−γ(i∗))di(∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
)2
b+ cV,xν
(
(1− ν)θx,N + r+δqV(θx,N)
)
= Nx,N
α(i∗)
∫ 1
i∗ α(i)(γ(i)− γ(i∗))di(∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
) (∫ 1
i∗ α(i)γ(i)di
) < 0.
As ∂Nx,N∂ θx,N < 0 and
d θx,N
d i∗ < 0, it holds that:
d Nx,N
d i∗ >
∂Nx,N
∂ i∗ =
α(i∗)Nx,N∫ 1
i∗ α(i)γ(i)di
(∫ 1
i∗ α(i)γ(i)di∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
− γ(i∗)
)
.
Using this expression and taking one of the summands of (3.46), one can finally show that
γ(i∗)
( dNx,N
di∗
Nx,N
+
γ(i∗)α(i∗)∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di
)
> γ(i∗)
(
α(i∗)∫ 1
i∗ α(i)γ(i)di
(∫ 1
i∗ α(i)γ(i)di∫ 1
i∗ α(i)di
− γ(i∗)
)
+
γ(i∗)α(i∗)∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di
)
> γ(i∗)
(
− α(i
∗)∫ 1
i∗ α(i)γ(i)di
γ(i∗) + γ(i
∗)α(i∗)∫ 1
i∗ γ(i)α(i)di
)
= 0,
which implies that
(
di∗
d ln Ax,S
)−1
> 0.
3.B Derivations related to international fragmentation
This appendix shows that an increase in Ax,S and therefore in outsourcing to the labor-abundant
South will not necessarily mean that the relative price of skill-intensive goods increases or that the
relative employment in skill-intensive sectors increases. In the following I will use the words ’good’
and ’sector’ equivalently. Sector i˜ will be labelled as labor-intensive if
∫ 1
0 γ(i˜, j)dj >
∫ 1
0 γ(i, j)djdi.
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Production of good X(i) is given by:
ln X(i) =
∫ j∗(i)
0
(ln Ax,S + γ(i, j) ln NS(i, j) + (1− γ(i, j)) ln HS(i, j)) dj
+
∫ 1
j∗(i)
(ln Ax,N + γ(i, j) ln NN(i, j) + (1− γ(i, j)) ln HN(i, j)) dj
=
∫ j∗(i)
0
(
ln Ax,S + γ(i, j) ln
γ(i, j)Nx,S∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 γ(i, j)dj di
+ (1− γ(i, j)) ln (1− γ(i, j))HS∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 (1− γ(i, j))dj di
)
dj
+
∫ 1
j∗(i)
ln Ax,N + γ(i, j) ln γ(i, j)Nx,N∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i) γ(i, j)dj di
+ (1− γ(i, j)) ln (1− γ(i, j))HN∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i)(1− γ(i, j))dj di
 dj,(3.50)
where the last equality is due to the Cobb-Douglas-structure production function, which implies
the following distribution of unskilled and skilled labor over the manufacturing subsectors in
North and South:
HS(i, j) =
(1− γ(i, j))∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 (1− γ(i, j))djdi
HS, (3.51)
HN(i, j) =
(1− γ(i, j))∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i)(1− γ(i, j))djdi
HN , (3.52)
Nx,S(i, j) =
γ(i, j)∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 γ(i, j)djdi
Nx,S, (3.53)
Nx,N(i, j) =
γ(i, j)∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i) γ(i, j)djdi
Nx,N . (3.54)
Differentiating (3.50) with regard to ln Ax,S yields:
d ln X(i)
d ln Ax,S
= j∗(i)
+
(
ln Ax,S + γ∗ ln
γ∗Nx,S∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 γ(i, j)dj di
+ (1− γ∗) ln (1− γ
∗))HS∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 (1− γ(i, j))dj di
)
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
−
ln Ax,N + γ∗ ln γ∗Nx,N∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i) γ(i, j)dj di
+ (1− γ∗) ln (1− γ
∗)HN∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i)(1− γ(i, j))dj di
 dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
−
∫ j∗(i)
0
(
γ(i, j)
γ∗∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 γ(i, j)dj di
+ (1− γ(i, j)) 1− γ
∗∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 (1− γ(i, j))dj di
)
dj
∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di
+
∫ 1
j∗(i)
γ(i, j) γ∗∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i) γ(i, j)dj di
+ (1− γ(i, j)) 1− γ
∗∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i)(1− γ(i, j))dj di
 dj ∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di
+
∫ j∗(i)
0
γ(i, j)dj
d ln Nx,S
d ln Ax,S
+
∫ 1
j∗(i)
γ(i, j)dj
d ln Nx,N
d ln Ax,S
. (3.55)
The terms in the second and third line cancel out as and PS(i, j∗(i)) = PN(i, j∗(i)) and therefore
XS(i, j∗(i)) = XN(i, j∗(i)). Furthermore γ∗ can be taken out of the integrals. So (3.55) can be
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simplified to
d ln X(i)
d ln Ax,S
= j∗(i) +
∫ j∗(i)
0
γ(i, j)dj
d ln Nx,S
d ln Ax,S
+
∫ 1
j∗(i)
γ(i, j)dj
d ln Nx,N
d ln Ax,S
+γ∗
− ∫ j∗(i)0 γ(i, j)dj∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 γ(i, j)dj di
+
∫ 1
j∗(i) γ(i, j)dj∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i) γ(i, j)dj di
 ∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di
+(1− γ∗)
− ∫ j∗(i)0 (1− γ(i, j))dj∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 (1− γ(i, j))dj di
+
∫ 1
j∗(i)(1− γ(i, j))dj∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i)(1− γ(i, j))dj di
 ∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di.
Using equations (3.51) to (3.54) this can be rewritten to
d ln X(i)
d ln Ax,S
= j∗(i) +
∫ j∗(i)
0
γ(i, j)dj
d ln Nx,S
d ln Ax,S
+
∫ 1
j∗(i)
γ(i, j)dj
d ln Nx,N
d ln Ax,S
+γ∗
(
−Nx,S(i)
Nx,S
+
Nx,N(i)
Nx,N
) ∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di
+(1− γ∗)
(
−HS(i)
HS
+
HN(i)
HN
) ∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di. (3.56)
When comparing this derivative for sector i˜ with the average over the whole manufacturing sector,
one gets to:
d ln X(i˜)
d ln Ax,S
− d lnY
d ln Ax,S
= j∗(i˜)−
∫ 1
0
j∗(i)di
+
(∫ j∗(i˜)
0
γ(i˜, j)dj−
∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0
γ(i, j)djdi
)
d ln Nx,S
d ln Ax,S
+
(∫ 1
j∗(i˜)
γ(i˜, j)dj−
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i)
γ(i, j)djdi
)
d ln Nx,N
d ln Ax,S
+γ∗
(
−Nx,S(i˜)
Nx,S
+
Nx,N(i˜)
Nx,N
) ∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di
+(1− γ∗)
(
−HS(i˜)
HS
+
HN(i˜)
HN
) ∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di. (3.57)
One numerical example where this expression becomes negative for a labor-intensive sector i˜
(labor-intensive meaning
∫ 1
0 γ(i˜, j)dj >
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0 γ(i, j)djdi) would be the following (also illustrated
in figure 3.3):
• γ(i˜, j) = 0.48 for j ≤ 0.4 and γ(i˜, j) = 0.185 for j > 0.4,
•
∫ 1
0 γ(i, j)di = 0.6− 0.6j,
• j∗(i˜) =
∫ 1
0 j
∗(i)di = 0.4 and γ∗ = 0.36 (this can be achieved by appropriately choosing other
exogenous parameters like labor supply and total factor productivity).
Then it holds that:
• j∗(i˜)− ∫ 10 j∗(i)di = 0;
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•
∫ j∗(i˜)
0 γ(i˜, j)dj−
∫ 1
0
∫ j∗(i)
0 γ(i, j)djdi = 0 as production in sector i˜ is as labor intensive as the
average in the South (note again that d ln Nx,Nd ln Ax,S < 0);
•
∫ 1
j∗(i˜) γ(i˜, j)dj >
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
j∗(i) γ(i, j)djdi as production in sector i˜ is relatively more labor intensive
than the average in the North (note again that d ln Nx,Nd ln Ax,S < 0); and
• γ∗
(
−Nx,S(i˜)Nx,S +
Nx,N(i˜)
Nx,N
)
+ (1− γ∗)
(
−HS(i˜)HS +
HN(i˜)
HN
)
= −0.006 < 0 as HS(i˜)HS =
Nx,S(i˜)
Nx,S
= 1
while Nx,N(i˜)Nx,N and
HN(i˜)
HN
are very close to 1 and γ∗ is significantly smaller than (1− γ∗) (note
again that
∫ 1
0
dj∗(i)
d ln Ax,S
di > 0).
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